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The theory of constitutional pluralism suggests that interacting legal orders that are 
(or claim to be) constitutional in nature need not—and should not—necessarily be 
regarded as being hierarchically arranged, with one ‘on top of’ the others. Rather, the 
relationships between the orders can be conceived of heterarchically. However, there 
is an assumption in much of the literature that the ‘interface norms’ that regulate the 
relationships within such a heterarchy are universal by nature, capable of 
undifferentiated application across differing constitutional orders. This thesis 
examines whether interface norms are in fact universal by nature, or whether they are 
relationship- and context-dependent, taking as its field of study three interacting legal 
orders—those of Ireland, the European Union, and the European Convention on 
Human Rights. It uses an established model of constitutional pluralism based on 
‘coordinate constitutionalism’ to test the assumption of universality across three 
constitutional frames: the ‘vertical’ relationship between Ireland and the European 
orders, the ‘horizontal’ relationship between the European orders, and the 
‘triangular’ panoply of state, Union and Convention. Having analysed the interface 
norms at work in these relationships, both in isolation and in the round, the thesis 
concludes that these norms are not in fact universal, and that different conceptions of 
constitutional pluralism need to pay much greater attention to the specific nature of 
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This thesis examines the nature of the ‘interface norms’ that regulate the 
relationships between legal orders under certain conceptions of constitutional 
pluralism. It takes as its field of study three interacting legal orders—those of 
Ireland, the European Union, and the European Convention on Human Rights—and 
uses a model of constitutional pluralism based on the ‘coordinate constitutionalism’ 
of Charles Sabel and Oliver Gerstenberg1 in order to test the literature’s assumption 
that the norms regulating the interaction of overlapping constitutional orders are 
universal in nature. 
 
1 RESEARCH CONTEXT: CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM 
‘National law’ and ‘international law’ were once quite easily distinguishable. The 
former operated within the territorial and conceptual borders of the Westphalian 
nation state; the latter dealt with the interstices between these states. However, the 
years since 1945 have seen the rise of one of the defining features of modern public 
law: the non-state legal system or normative order. This phenomenon entails, as its 
logical corollary, a shift or transfer of institutional normative power away from 
traditional actors, such as states and governments, and towards various international, 
transnational, and supranational organisations—public,2 private,3 and sometimes a 
hybrid of the two4—with concomitant difficulties for received notions of public 
accountability and democratic legitimacy. Though frequently possessed of the kind 
of jurisgenerative authority once the sole preserve of state legal orders, non-state 
legal systems lack many of the features commonly thought essential for the 
legitimation of the exercise of public power. Furthermore, given that this transfer of 
power has occurred without states relinquishing their claims to sovereignty and 
autonomy (the ‘transfer’ in this sense perhaps better characterised as a ‘pooling’), the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 CF Sabel and O Gerstenberg ‘Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus: The ECJ and the 
Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order’ (2010) 16 European Law Journal 511. 
2 Such as the United Nations. 
3 Such as the International Standardization Organisation or the World Anti-Doping Agency (N Walker 
‘Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative Orders’ 
(2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 373 at 382). 
4 Such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) (ibid). 
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prospect arises of legal conflict between the state and non-state orders in cases where 
their jurisdictions overlap. 
Accordingly, much effort has gone into the attempt to conceptualise and to 
legitimise these orders—and to explain their relationships with each other and with 
more traditional legal orders—by transplanting the idea of constitutionalism (defined 
by Neil Walker as ‘the normative discourse through which constitutions are justified, 
defended, criticised, denounced or otherwise engaged with’5) from its state-based 
incubator and developing a theory to fit the post-state configuration,6 while keeping 
that which made constitutionalism desirable in the first place. In this way, the United 
Nations Charter is reconceived as a kind of ‘constitution’ for the international 
community,7 while attempts have been made similarly to ‘constitutionalise’ the 
international trade regime of the World Trade Organization.8  
The focus of the thesis is on one particularly promising, yet particularly 
controversial, manifestation of this discourse: constitutional pluralism. However, as 
Matej Avbelj and Jan Komárek claim, ‘[t]he concept has gained so many meanings 
that often the participants in the debate talk past each other, each endorsing a 
different understanding of what constitutional pluralism actually means.’9 These 
different understandings of the idea will be outlined in Chapter 1, but, at its simplest, 
constitutional pluralism is the notion that interacting legal systems that are (or claim 
to be) constitutional in nature need not—and should not—necessarily be regarded as 
being hierarchically arranged, with one ‘on top of’ the others. Rather, the 
relationships between the orders can be conceived of heterarchically, so that conflict 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 N Walker ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317 at 318. 
6 By ‘post-state’ here, I do not mean to imply that the state is no longer of any relevance—quite the 
contrary, as the thesis will demonstrate—but simply that the state can no longer be considered in 
isolation. 
7 B Fassbender ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community’ (1998) 
36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 529; and ‘“We the Peoples of the United Nations”: 
Constituent Power and Constitutional Form in International Law’ in M Loughlin and N Walker (eds) 
The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (Oxford: OUP, 2007) 
at 269. 
8 See, inter alia, E-U Petersman ‘The WTO Constitution and Human Rights’ (2000) 3 Journal of 
International Economic Law 19; DZ Cass The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization 
(Oxford: OUP, 2005); JL Dunoff ‘Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s “Constitution” and the 
Discipline of International Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 647. 
9 M Avbelj and J Komárek ‘Four Visions of Constitutional Pluralism’ EUI Working Papers Law 
2008/21, available at <cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/9372>, at 1. (Note that all URLs cited in this thesis 
were last checked on 10 Nov 2013). 
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between them can be managed and ultimately resolved interactively and dialogically, 
without necessarily relegating one legal order to an inferior status or, conversely, 
privileging it over and above the others. This is a significant departure from the 
tradition of state-based constitutionalism, which presupposes and requires a 
hierarchical arrangement of the legal order. Of the many different conceptions of 
constitutional pluralism in the literature, this thesis focuses on a particular subset: the 
‘metaconstitutional’10 theories, which seek to posit an overarching normative 
framework for the management and resolution of conflict between constitutional 
orders while still preserving their autonomy, and not integrating them into a new 
whole. This metaconstitutional framework—a system of constitutional norms about 
constitutional norms—serves a bridging function between the orders, providing 
certain adjudicative principles by which they can accommodate and manage the 
competing claims of each other order in the given constitutional heterarchy. 
However, analysis of these ‘interface norms’ reveals an interesting—and 
significant—problem. 
 
2 RESEARCH PROBLEM: INTERFACE NORMS 
It is important to distinguish at the outset between two different kinds of interface 
norm. First, there are the substantive ‘norms-at-the-interface’ between legal orders. 
By this, I mean the norm or norms around which a concrete case of interaction or 
potential conflict between legal orders revolve, such as the right to human dignity 
‘versus’ the freedom to provide services in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) case 
of Omega11 or the right to property ‘versus’ a state’s international obligations in the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case of Bosphorus.12 Any norm can 
become a norm-at-the-interface if its application in a given case gives rise to 
questions of jurisdictional overlap between legal orders; this thesis will consider 
several of them, but they are not its central focus. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See generally N Walker ‘Flexibility Within a Metaconstitutional Frame: Reflections on the Future 
of Legal Authority in Europe’ in G de Búrca and J Scott (eds) Constitutional Change in the EU: From 
Uniformity to Flexibility (Oxford: Hart, 2000). 
11 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der 
Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609. 
12 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland [2005] ECHR 440. 
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Secondly, and more importantly, there are the metaconstitutional norms—
‘interface norms proper’—which, according to Nico Krisch, ‘regulate to what extent 
norms and decisions in one sub-order have effect in another … [and] are the main 
legal expression of openness and closure, friendliness or hostility among the different 
parts.’13 For example, the principle of conditional recognition, epitomised in the 
Solange14 jurisprudence of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) recurs 
throughout different conceptions of constitutional pluralism. It is this second-order 
type of interface norm that is the focus of the thesis because, while there is a certain 
amount of disagreement in the literature as to the identity of these norms, there is 
near-unanimity as to their nature—a position that I argue to be problematic. 
Specifically, there is an inherent claim in the literature that second-order interface 
norms are universal by nature: that however we classify them or frame them, their 
application need not be adjusted to any given institutional or jurisdictional 
circumstance. In their presentation and analysis of interface norms, scholars in the 
field draw on various sources—the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, the European Court of Human Rights, and (especially) the 
BVerfG—but rarely consider whether and how the specific relations between the 
institutional actors in any given case may have influenced the choice and application 
of interface norms. In this regard, the ‘founder’ of constitutional pluralism, Neil 
MacCormick, wrote that ‘[t]he settled, positive character of law is jurisdiction-
relative. … Moral judgments, however personal and controversial, are not in this 
way relativistic … These judgments apply universally.’15 But concerns relating to 
democracy and individual rights—the normative core of the principle of conditional 
recognition—are both legal and moral in nature. Are they (and should they be) 
universal or particular in their application? 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 N Krisch Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford: OUP, 
2010) at 285–286. 
14 Reported in English as Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für 
Getreide und Futtermittel (Case 2 BvL 52/71) [1974] 2 CMLR 540 (‘Solange I’); Re the Application 
of Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft (Case 2 BvR 197/83) [1987] 3 CMLR 225 (‘Solange II’). 
15 N MacCormick Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth 
(Oxford, OUP 1999) at 14–15. 
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3 RESEARCH QUESTION: UNIVERSALITY OF INTERFACE NORMS? 
The research question that this thesis addresses is therefore as follows: are the 
interface norms between legal orders the same regardless of the relationship 
between the orders themselves and between the institutional actors involved? 
The thesis seeks to question a largely unchallenged presumption. It does this 
through the adoption of a version of constitutional pluralism modelled on the 
coordinate constitutionalism of Sabel and Gerstenberg as an analytical frame in order 
to test the hypothesis of interface norm universality across three categories of 
postnational legal relationship, isolated in the first instance and then drawn together 
holistically, drawing on a wide array of norms-at-the-interface: first, the ‘vertical’16 
relationship between the EU and its Member States, and between the ECtHR and the 
signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); secondly, the 
‘horizontal’ relationship between the EU and the ECtHR; and, finally, the 
‘triangular’ panoply of state, Union and Convention. 
The significance of the thesis lies in the result of the testing: either the interface 
norms are indeed universal, or they are relationship-dependent. If universal, this 
bolsters the explanatory and normative claims of constitutional pluralism, providing 
us with universal norms for the approximation and coordination of distinct but linked 
legal orders. If relationship-dependent, this demonstrates the need for continued 
case-specific analysis in order for the particular to reshape the universal.17 My 
hypothesis is that interface norms are better conceived of in this latter, relationship-
dependent sense. 
 
4 RESEARCH FIELD: JUSTIFICATION OF CHOICE OF JURISDICTIONS 
Nowhere has the growth of non-state legal actors been more obvious than in Europe, 
where the legal orders of the European Union and the Council of Europe have 
intermingled with, infiltrated, and—in places—supplanted state-centred law to an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 ‘Vertical’ is in quotes because a truly heterarchical arrangement of legal orders would have no x-
axis. The terms ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ will be used throughout, but only as a heuristic device: no 
concession to hierarchy is implied. 
17 This phrasing is adapted from N Walker ‘Reconciling MacCormick: Constitutional Pluralism and 
the Unity of Practical Reason’ (2011) 24 Ratio Juris 369 at 380; which draws in turn from M Walzer 
‘Nations and Universe’ in D Miller (ed) Thinking Politically: Essays in Political Theory (New Haven 
CT: Yale UP, 2007) at 184. 
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unprecedented degree. Just as the constitutional credentials of the two most 
significant European non-state actors are the most developed of their transnational 
peers, so too is the academic discourse on non-state constitutionalism most 
developed with reference to the European experience. It is for this reason that the law 
of the EU and of the ECHR are two parts of the main focus of this thesis. The choice 
of the third, the law of Ireland, requires further explanation. 
First, the choice of a single jurisdiction for analysis across the vertical and 
triangular relationships allows us to control for jurisdictional variables in a way that 
a more wide-ranging survey would not. There is a trend within the literature on 
constitutional pluralism to pick certain ‘highlight’ cases from different jurisdictions 
in order to demonstrate points or illustrate arguments. This approach lacks the 
continuity and focus of reliance on a single jurisdiction as an exemplar of the nation 
state in the postnational European legal sphere. Having said this, and though the 
thesis will draw heavily on Irish jurisprudence, it is not confined or unique to Ireland. 
It is intended that whereas the cases to be studied—and the interface norms they 
involve—may or may not be universal, the issues and themes involved are 
universalisable, to some extent at least, across EU Member States. 
Secondly, the nature of Ireland’s constitutional order makes it a suitable 
candidate, combining the enclosed, self-referencing and self-authorising nature of the 
classical constitution of a sovereign state with an apparent openness to the 
postnational configuration, though the level of this openness varies as between the 
EU and the ECHR, a point returned to below. 
Thirdly, there is a rich seam of constitutional jurisprudence to be mined with 
respect to the relatively long Irish experience of European integration. This 
jurisprudence has not generally been analysed in the round to date, taking the 
European constitutional constellation as a whole, but instead with the focus either on 
one particular legal order, or on discrete, substantive norms-at-the-interface rather 
than the metaconstitutional interface norms involved. As a result, the jurisprudence is 
under-theorised, despite the fact that, as we shall see, it very much lends itself to 
further analysis of the nature of the relationships between constitutional orders in the 
Europe of the early twenty-first century. Moreover, this large body of jurisprudence 
shows the constitutional frame not to be quite as open as its plain text—and the 
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history of Irish ‘loyalty’ to European integration—might suggest. Again, this is not 
unique to Ireland—the BVerfG’s decision in Lisbon18 signals a degree of relative 
closure in a jurisdiction generally regarded as constitutionally open. However, 
whereas the German jurisprudence has been analysed extensively in the literature, 
the Irish cases have yet to receive the same treatment. 
Finally, and related to the foregoing, Alexander Somek notes that  
[i]t is indeed a quite remarkable fact about European constitutional theory 
that in its most visible form it scarcely amounts to more than a series of 
glosses on lengthy opinions by the German Federal Constitutional Court.19 
While I would not necessarily go quite so far, it is true that there is a tendency in the 
literature to focus on the jurisprudence of large and powerful actors. In testing the 
universality of interface norms developed with reference to such actors, it is 
therefore a novel contribution to turn the lens to an economically, demographically 
and geographically peripheral state, such as Ireland. 
 
5 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter 1 consists of a literature review, examining the concept of constitutional 
pluralism: its origins, its development, and some of its specific applications to the 
EU and the ECHR, particularly as regards interface norms. It considers some of the 
many criticisms of the theory, and the attempts to navigate a way through them. It 
concludes by adopting a particular form of constitutional pluralism as an analytical 
framework to engage with the research question of whether interface norms are 
universal by nature. 
Chapter 2 examines the vertical constitutional frame: the nature of the 
relationships between Ireland and the EU, and Ireland and the ECHR; the means by 
which the norms of these non-state legal orders are received within the domestic 
order; and the question of the choice and application of interface norms in cases of 
conflict. Chapter 3 takes a similar approach to the horizontal frame, with an analysis 
of the institutional and jurisprudential links between the law of the EU and of the 
ECHR, and the normative criteria by which these links are managed. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Reported in English as Re Ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon (2 BvE 2/08) [2010] 3 CMLR 13. 
19 A Somek ‘Monism: A Tale of the Undead’ in M Avbelj and J Komárek (eds) Constitutional 
Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Oxford: Hart, 2012) at 346. 
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Chapter 4 then combines these vertical and horizontal frames, and investigates 
the triangular dimension of constitutional pluralism in Europe, whereby specific 
norms-at-the-interface may lead to tripartite conflict, its management and its 
resolution. The question of the choice and application of interface norms in specific 
circumstances becomes more complex in this frame, as will be demonstrated by the 
empirical case study developed in the chapter, the question of abortion in the Irish 
legal system. 
Chapter 5 draws the three frames together, with a theoretical examination of what 
became clear when the inter-order relationships were looked at in isolation, and what 
becomes clear when all three are pulled together into one holistic frame. Finally, a 
brief conclusion restates the answer to the research question of interface norm 
universality, in light of the empirical evidence in Chapters 2–4, and the theoretical 
analysis in Chapter 5: that the norms are not in fact universal. As a result, the many 
different conceptions of constitutional pluralism need to pay much greater attention 
to the specific nature of any given constitutional order and its relationship with other 
orders in the constitutional heterarchy.
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CHAPTER 1:  
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM 
INTRODUCTION 
A major feature of the European legal landscape in the early twenty-first century is 
the existence of multiple, overlapping, interlocking normative orders—national, 
supranational and international. The questions then arise as to how best to 
conceptualise this plurality of legal orders, and the way in which they relate to each 
other. This chapter reviews the literature on one attempt to answer these questions, 
the idea of constitutional pluralism. Section 2 lays some groundwork, first by setting 
out the initial development of the theory in the context of the constitutionalisation of 
EU law, and then by outlining a particular refinement and condensation of the theory 
into a ‘lowest-common-denominator’ conception. In Section 3, I address the 
preliminary conceptual and definitional difficulty of attempting to reconcile two 
ideas, ‘constitutionalism’ and ‘pluralism’, which by some accounts are in fact 
irreconcilable opposites. Having suggested that constitutionalism and pluralism are 
not in fact opposites, but rather end points on a continuum, I then narrow the focus of 
the discussion to the normatively thicker, ‘metaconstitutional’ theories of 
constitutional pluralism in the literature, as opposed to the looser conceptions of 
‘radical’ pluralism. In Section 4, I outline the approaches of the major writers in the 
area of metaconstitutional pluralism with reference to both the EU and the ECHR, 
highlighting their similarities and differences, before settling on a particular 
conception of metaconstitutional pluralism as the analytical framework for the case 
studies used in the thesis. Section 5 discusses the arguments of constitutional 
pluralism’s detractors, and highlights a particular problem that arises from the 
overview of the metaconstitutional conceptions of pluralism in the literature, and 
which forms the research question of the thesis: the alleged universality of the 
interface norms by which the relationships between legal orders are regulated. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes the discussion by outlining the method and approach to 
be taken in subsequent chapters, detailing the model of metaconstitutional pluralism 
to be used and parsing the relationships between the three legal orders under 
discussion into ‘vertical’, ‘horizontal’ and ‘triangular’ frames, in order to address the 
research question of the universality of interface norms. 
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1 CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM’S ORIGINS IN THE EU 
1.1 Constitutionalisation and disorder 
The story of the European Communities’ (and later the Union’s) growth from a 
classical, treaty-based creature of international law, nothing more than a set of 
binding obligations between states, to the supranational, vertically-integrated legal 
order that exists today is well known, and will not be recounted at great length here.1 
Suffice it to say that the European Court of Justice (ECJ), through its formulation 
and elaboration of the twin doctrines of the direct effect of Community law and its 
primacy over national law, effected the steady ‘constitutionalisation’ of the 
Community. The famous statement from van Gend en Loos that ‘[t]he Community 
constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the States 
have limited their sovereign rights’2 lost its ‘of international law’ qualifier five years 
later in Molkerei-Zentrale.3 Not only was the EEC Treaty capable of ‘producing 
direct effects and creating individual rights which national courts must protect’,4 but 
‘[t]he law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, 
because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal 
provisions, however framed.’5 By 1986, the ECJ felt confident enough in Les Verts 
to call the EEC Treaty the Community’s ‘basic constitutional charter.’6 
This judicial constitutionalisation of the Union did not occur in a vacuum, but 
was aided by the agreement—or at least the acquiescence—of the Member States. 
There is the obvious fact that 22 of the 28 Member States acceded to the Community 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See generally, N MacCormick Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European 
Commonwealth (Oxford: OUP, 1999) ch 7 and references therein; P Craig and G de Búrca EU Law: 
Text, Cases and Materials (5th ed, Oxford: OUP, 2011) chs 8–10. But let us bear in mind Arnull’s 
warning against assuming too much: A Arnull ‘The Americanization of EU Law Scholarship’ in A 
Arnull, P Eeckhout and T Tridimas (eds) Continuity and Change in EU Law: Essays in Honour of Sir 
Francis Jacobs (Oxford: OUP, 2008) at 424–427. 
2 Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1 at 12. 
3 Case 28/67 Firma Molkerei-Zentrale Westfalen/Lippe GmbH v Hauptzollamt Paderborn [1968] 
ECR 143 at 152. 
4 Van Gend en Loos (n 2) at 13 
5 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 at 594. 
6 Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339 at para 23, affirmed in 
Case C–314/91 Weber v Parliament [1993] ECR I–1093 at para 8; Case C–15/00 Commission v 
European Investment Bank [2003] ECR I–7281 at para 75; Joined Cases C–402/05 P and C–415/05 P 
Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I–6351 at paras 81 and 281. 
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or Union long after 1964, aware of the implications of van Gend and Costa. But 
more importantly, Joseph Weiler notes that this constitutionalisation was ‘brought 
about with the full collaboration of national governments [and] national parliaments, 
who again and again … ratified the new order.’7 He invokes Albert Hirschman’s 
theory of exit and voice to show that as Community law developed, political 
intergovernmentalism provided a counterweight to legal supranationalism, ‘allowing 
the Member States to digest and accept the process of constitutionalization’, which 
they could do ‘because they took real control of the decision-making process, thus 
minimizing its threatening features.’8 
However, having had less of a Hirschmanian voice in the matter, the supreme 
and constitutional courts of some Member States were rather less enthusiastic, 
particularly the German Federal Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
(BVerfG). In its Solange I judgment,9 the BVerfG claimed for itself the jurisdiction 
to review Community norms for conformance with fundamental rights as set out in 
the Grundgesetz. This was in clear defiance of the ECJ’s ruling in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft10 (itself a stage in the proceedings that lead to the Solange I 
judgment), which had reserved such jurisdiction to itself. Faced with the threat of 
open rebellion by one of the most powerful and influential constitutional courts in 
Europe—and an apex constitutional actor in what has long been the continent’s 
economic powerhouse—the ECJ staged a remarkable about-turn in its jurisprudence. 
Whereas once it had held that fundamental rights as they appear in national 
constitutions were entirely outwith the scheme of the Treaties,11 or, later, were to be 
protected only insofar as they formed part of the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States,12 the ECJ held in Nold13 that:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 JHH Weiler The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 1999) at 4, drawing on A Hirschman 
Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1970). 
8 Weiler (n 7) at 36. 
9 Reported in English as Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für 
Getreide und Futtermittel (Case 2 BvL 52/71) [1974] 2 CMLR 540. 
10 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Eunfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125. 
11 Case 1/58 Stork v High Authority [1959] ECR 17; Joined Cases 36, 37, 38 & 40/59 Geitling v High 
Authority [1960] ECR 423; Case 40/64 Sgarlata and others v Commission [1965] ECR 215. See, in 
particular, Geitling at 438: ‘Community law, as it arises under the ECSC Treaty, does not contain any 
general principle, express or otherwise, guaranteeing the maintenance of vested rights.’ 
12 Case 29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419; Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (n 10) at 
para 3. 
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[F]undamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law, 
the observance of which [the Court] ensures. In safeguarding these rights, 
the Court is bound to draw inspiration from constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, and it cannot therefore uphold measures 
which are incompatible with fundamental rights recognized and protected by 
the Constitutions of those States. Similarly, international treaties for the 
protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or 
of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines which should be 
followed within the framework of Community law.14 
The ECJ went on to develop its case law15 to the satisfaction of the BVerfG, which 
held in Solange II16 that as the EC’s (and in particular the ECJ’s) rights protection 
was now at a level comparable to its own, it would no longer exercise (but did not 
renounce) the jurisdiction it had claimed for itself. 
It is in response to this ‘disorder of normative orders’17—wherein the legal orders 
of both the EU and its Member States make claims to autonomy and to primacy in 
their own domain, with all the potential for jurisdictional overlap and conflict that 
this entails—that constitutional pluralism has been developed. 
 
1.2 Beginnings: MacCormick’s ‘radical pluralism’ and ‘pluralism under 
international law’ 
The title of ‘inventor’ of constitutional pluralism—at least insofar as it relates to 
European law of both kinds—belongs to Neil MacCormick, who set out to show that: 
[S]overeignty and sovereign states, and the inexorable linkage of law with 
sovereignty and the state, have been but the passing phenomena of a few 
centuries, that their passing is by no means regrettable, and that current 
developments in Europe exhibit the possibility of going beyond all that.18 
MacCormick illustrated this claim by reference to the UK’s position within the legal 
orders of the European Communities and of the European Convention on Human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Case 4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491. 
14 Ibid at para 13. 
15 See, in particular, Case 44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727. For a summary of 
developments, see N Fennelly ‘Pillar Talk: Fundamental Rights Protection in the European Union’ 
(2008) 1 Judicial Studies Institute Journal 95 at 97–106. See further, N Nic Shuibhne ‘Margins of 
Appreciation: National Values, Fundamental Rights and EC Free Movement Law’ (2009) European 
Law Review 230. 
16 Reported in English as Re the Application of Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft (Case 2 BvR 197/83) 
[1987] 3 CMLR 225. 
17 N Walker ‘Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative 
Orders’ (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 373. 
18 N MacCormick ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’ (1993) 56 Modern Law Review 1 at 1. 
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Rights: to regard the UK as still being ‘sovereign’ in the classical, all-encompassing 
sense is to blind ourselves to objective reality, but to regard the Communities as 
being sovereign, with Member States merely their subordinates, is to overstate the 
case.19 Problematically, the traditional concept of sovereignty by its very nature—
indivisible, exclusive, etc—lends itself only to one of these either-or approaches. 
Alternatively, ‘[t]o escape from the idea that all law must originate in a single power 
source, like a sovereign, is thus to discover the possibility of taking a broader, more 
diffuse, view of law.’20 
It is exactly this broader, more diffuse approach that MacCormick took in 
response to the Maastricht judgment21 of the BVerfG two years later.22 Here, the 
BVerfG held the Maastricht Treaty to be compatible with the Grundgesetz, but also 
drew a line in the sand: sovereignty in Germany continues to be vested in the 
German people, and Germany is still (for the BVerfG) a sovereign state. 
Accordingly, the competences of the EU are specified and limited, and its authority 
derived from and dependent on that of the Member States: neither the EU 
corporately, nor any of its individual actors—such as the Court of Justice—has 
interpretive Kompetenz-Kompetenz, the power to decide the limits of its own 
jurisdiction and powers. As a result, if the BVerfG detected an intrusion by a future 
EU legislative instrument into the still-sovereign sphere of German law, such 
instrument would have no binding power within Germany.23 How can this be 
squared with the ECJ’s long-standing jurisprudence on the autonomy and primacy of 
Community—and now Union—law? Clearly, the BVerfG and the ECJ cannot both 
be right. Or can they? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibid at 5, citing the House of Lords judgment in R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte 
Factortame [1991] 3 All ER 769 and the ECtHR judgment in Sunday Times v United Kingdom (No 2) 
[1991] ECHR 50. 
20 MacCormick (n 18) at 8. 
21 Reported in English as Brunner v European Union Treaty (Case 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2959/92 JZ 
1993, 1100) [1994] 1 CMLR 57. 
22 N MacCormick ‘The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal 259. 
23 Much of this argument has been echoed more recently in a somewhat different constitutional frame, 
in the BVerfG’s judgment on the compatibility of the Lisbon Treaty with the Grundgesetz, reported in 
English as Re Ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon (2 BvE 2/08) [2010] 3 CMLR 13. See further JEK 
Murkens ‘Bundesverfassungsgericht (2 BvE 2/08): “We want our identity back”—the Revival of 
National Sovereignty in the German Federal Constitutional Court’s decision on the Lisbon Treaty’ 
(2010) Public Law 530; J Ziller ‘The German Constitutional Court’s Friendliness towards European 
Law: On the Judgment of Bundesverfassungsgericht over the Ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon’ 
(2010) 16 European Public Law 53; M Niedobitek ‘The Lisbon Case of 30 June 2009—A Comment 
from the European Law Perspective’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal 1267. 
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MacCormick observed that from the point of view of an institutional (rather than 
pure) theory of law, institutions and actors within municipal European legal systems 
derive their authority and competence from the national legal order, independently of 
whatever international or supranational organisations to which the state may belong. 
Equally, EU legal actors derive their authority and competence from the Treaties, 
without reference (for doctrinal purposes) to the ins and outs of the national law of 
any one Member State. The conclusion MacCormick drew from this observation is a 
clear statement of the fundamentals of constitutional pluralism, and merits quoting at 
length: 
[T]he doctrine of supremacy of Community law is not to be confused with 
any kind of all-purpose subordination of Member State law to Community 
law. Rather, the case is that these are interacting systems, one of which 
constitutes in its own context and over the relevant range of topics a source 
of valid law superior to other sources recognised in each of the Member 
State systems. … On the whole, therefore, the most appropriate analysis of 
the relations of legal systems is pluralistic rather than monistic, and 
interactive rather than hierarchical. The legal systems of Member States and 
their common legal system of EC law are distinct but interacting systems of 
law, and hierarchical relationships of validity within criteria of validity 
proper to distinct systems do not add up to any sort of all-purpose 
superiority of one system over another.24 
This refusal to accept (from anything other than an internal perspective) the claims of 
apex actors within both national and European law to total primacy, one over the 
other, is one of the hallmarks of constitutional pluralism. However, acceptance of the 
incommensurability of the sovereignty-claims of the heterarchical orders does not 
offer us any assistance in seeking to determine how conflicts between these orders 
might be resolved. Quite the opposite, for a clear hierarchical division between the 
orders would enable us to look to our chosen actor (whether the ECJ or a national 
court) for the final say on the matter, but acceptance of heterarchy leaves us at a loss. 
This is why MacCormick later termed this initial formulation of constitutional 
pluralism as one of ‘radical pluralism’, which ‘entails acknowledging that not every 
legal problem can be resolved legally’.25 
MacCormick later moved away from this radical pluralism towards ‘pluralism 
under international law’, which, he admitted, is ‘a kind of “monism” in Kelsen’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 MacCormick (n 22) at 264. 
25 MacCormick (n 1) at 119. 
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sense’,26 whereby conflicts between legal orders are dealt with under the overarching 
normative authority of international law.27 His main reason for doing so was in 
response to a problem of radical pluralism, which we shall, in Section 5, see 
extended to the idea of constitutional pluralism tout court, that:  
Simply to remit to state courts an unreviewable power to determine the 
range of domestic constitutional absolutes that set limits upon the domestic 
applicability of Community law would seem likely to invite a slow 
fragmentation of Community law.28 
However, the fact that pluralism under international law does admit to the existence 
of an authoritative frame for the resolution of disputes does not necessarily rob it of 
its pluralist qualities. Accepting the hierarchically superior placement of public 
international law does not require the subsequent hierarchical arrangement of EU and 
Member State law one above the other—the two orders remain interactive and 
heterarchical in their (‘horizontal’) relationships with one another, subject only to the 
ultimate authority of the public international order. It is from these two conceptions 
of the idea of constitutional pluralism, one radical, one rather less so, that the 
literature has evolved. 
 
1.3 The three major claims of Walker’s pluralism 
MacCormick’s underlying scepticism towards claims to sovereignty in the classical 
sense by any modern legal or political actors29 was taken up and developed by Neil 
Walker, who, in his exposition of the ontological basis of constitutional pluralism,30 
combines scepticism as to sovereignty-claims with a recognition of the fact that 
constitutionalism itself—which he defines as ‘the normative discourse through which 
constitutions are justified, defended, criticised, denounced or otherwise engaged 
with’31—has ‘been subject to a perhaps unprecedented range and intensity of 
attack.’32 If claims to sovereignty are to be treated sceptically, and if the very concept 
of constitutionalism is a debased and antiquated one, then any attempt to frame and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 MacCormick (n 1) at 121. 
27 See further, N MacCormick ‘Risking Constitutional Collision in Europe?’ (1998) 18 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 517. 
28 MacCormick (n 1) at 120. 
29 Upon which he elaborated in MacCormick (n 1): see, in particular, chs 7 and 8. 
30 N Walker ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317. 
31 Ibid at 318. 
32 Ibid. 
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explain the European legal landscape and its multiple, competing, overlapping 
jurisdictions by means of a constitutionalist discourse, pluralist or otherwise, would 
be doubly quixotic. 
Having set out what he believes to be the major criticisms of constitutionalism, 
and possible methods for them to be overcome,33 Walker outlines a particular 
conception of constitutional pluralism as the best way of meeting the challenges, a 
conception which, echoing MacCormick: 
[R]ecognises that the European order inaugurated by the Treaty of Rome has 
developed beyond the traditional confines of inter-national law and now 
makes its own independent constitutional claims, and that these claims exist 
alongside the continuing claims of states. The relationship between the 
orders, that is to say, is now horizontal rather than vertical—heterarchical 
rather than hierarchical.34 
However, let us be quick to note, as Walker himself does,35 that this brief outline of 
the contours of pluralism does not even come close to answering all of the objections 
of the critics (and, most likely, it raises a whole crop of new ones). This is why 
Walker calls it a ‘lowest common denominator’36 position, serving only as a 
common basis shared by the various species of pluralism, ‘a series of preliminary 
steps beyond which the various pluralists … and many others have gone their own 
ways’.37 
The kind of pluralism that Walker outlines is much more than an attempt simply 
to explain what actually happens in European constitutional practice. While, as we 
shall see, pluralism’s explanatory or analytical function is of profound importance, it 
is not the only element of the theory. Additionally, pluralism is presented as being 
normatively desirable, because of its claimed ability to transcend the flaws and 
shortcomings for which constitutionalism is (perhaps justly) criticised, while still 
retaining the possibility of meaningfully bringing public power under public control, 
which made constitutionalism a worthy discourse in the first place. The first, 
explanatory, claim of Walker’s baseline conception is that to persist with a monist 
conception of constitutionalism in Europe is to ignore reality. The only adequate way 
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34 Ibid at 337, emphasis in original. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid at 339. 
37 Ibid at 337. 
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of accounting for the radical changes to the allocation and distribution of 
jurisgenerative power in the past half-century is conceptually to posit the different 
legal orders alongside each other, rather than in some vertical relationship (the 
precise arrangement of which will differ depending on one’s own political 
preferences and institutional viewpoint). This explanatory claim is deeply persuasive. 
The current configuration of the exercise of public power in Europe bears little 
relation to anything that went before. A monist view, whereby the exercise of all 
public power must draw on the same font of legitimacy, a common constitutional 
Grundnorm, has little to offer given the competing claims to autonomy that 
characterise the legal landscape. The different accounts of constitutional pluralism in 
the literature thus take this explanatory claim as a given. 
However, the second, normative, claim goes further: not only is constitutional 
heterarchy posited as an observable, existing fact, but this fact is to be welcomed. 
For Walker, pluralism ‘contend[s] that the only acceptable ethic of political 
responsibility for the new Europe is one that is premised upon mutual recognition 
and respect between national and supranational authorities.’38 This normative claim 
is less clear-cut than the explanatory, but, as we shall see in Section 4, the various 
strands of pluralism on offer do tend to commit themselves to the normative 
desirability of a judicial and legal (indeed constitutional) ethic of mutual recognition, 
mutual accommodation, and mutual deference, even if this deference is conditional 
and contingent. Comity, the recognition of the other, and the tolerance of difference 
are all normative values inherent in, and expressed through, the different 
articulations of constitutional pluralism in the literature. 
There is also a third, epistemic, claim: that, in explanatory terms, there is no 
neutral position; no bird’s-eye view; no ‘Archimedean point’ ‘from which we can 
evaluate the strength and validity of the different, and in some respects contending, 
authority claims made from national and supranational constitutional sites.’39 
Instead, we can either accept the plausibility (and, crucially, the incommensurability) 
of each claim, and the heterarchical vision of their interrelationships that follows, or 
we can reject the plausibility of any given claim, which collapses us back into 
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constitutional monism, with one system hierarchically inferior to the other. There are 
two preliminary points to be made here. First is Robert Schütze’s criticism that the 
alleged absence of such an epistemic vantage point is in fact neither new nor unique 
to EU constitutionalism, but is rather ‘part and parcel of Europe’s federal nature’.40 
European insistence on an undivided conception of sovereignty is both ‘introverted 
and unhistorical’41 on this analysis, and ignores the experience of federalism and 
divided sovereignty in the United States. Let us just note this criticism for now, and 
bear it in mind while examining the various pluralisms in Section 4 below, before 
returning to engage with the criticism fully in Section 5. 
The second point is that this claim of perpetual epistemic indeterminacy is at the 
root of much of the confusion and disagreement in the discourse surrounding 
constitutional pluralism, and can be described as a ‘tightrope problem’: is this 
indeterminacy in fact sustainable, or must it inevitably collapse into constitutional 
monism, whether national or supranational? The danger is that by leaning too far 
either to one side or the other, constitutional pluralism loses the run of itself, and 
returns us to one of the opposing monisms beyond which it tries to move. Underlying 
this difficulty is the possibly inherent tension between constitutionalism and 
pluralism, whereby the two are regarded as being diametrically opposed and utterly 
irreconcilable. Before detailing the further development of the theories of 
constitutional pluralism—and thus the research question at the heart of this thesis—
this alleged dichotomy must be addressed. 
 
2 CONSTITUTIONALISMS AND PLURALISMS 
The tendency to posit constitutionalism and pluralism in oppositional, agonistic 
terms is put forward most forcefully by Nico Krisch, who writes that 
constitutionalism in the postnational42 sphere: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 R Schütze ‘Federalism as Constitutional Pluralism’ in M Avbelj and J Komárek (eds) 
Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Oxford: Hart, 2012) at 211 (emphasis in 
original). 
41 Ibid. 
42 By which Krisch means the legal landscape where ‘[t]he classical distinction between the domestic 
and international spheres … is increasingly blurred… [and] law has become ‘postnational’—the 
national sphere retains importance, but it is no longer the paradigmatic anchor of the whole order’ (N 
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[A]ttempts to provide continuity with the domestic constitutionalist tradition 
by construing an overarching legal framework that determines the 
relationships of the different levels of law and the distribution of powers 
among their institutions. It seeks to redeem the modern, revolutionary 
promise of a human-made constitution as an antidote to the forces of history, 
power and chance.43 
Pluralism, on the other hand: 
[I]s a less orderly affair. It sees such an overarching framework as neither 
practically possible nor normatively desirable and seeks to discern a model 
of order that relies less on unity and more on the heterarchical interaction of 
the various layers of law. Legally, the relationship of the parts of the overall 
order in pluralism remains open—governed by the potentially competing 
rules of the various sub-orders, each with its own ultimate point of reference 
and supremacy claim, the relationships between them are left to be 
determined ultimately through political, not rule-based processes.44 
If we accept this characterisation of the two ideas, then talk of ‘constitutional 
pluralism’ is simply idle, a theoretically impossible cul-de-sac into which has been 
invested far too much time and intellectual effort. On this analysis, MacCormick’s 
retreat from radical pluralism to pluralism under international law is emblematic of 
the tension, and Krisch’s dichotomous characterisation of the two concepts fits well 
with MacCormick’s two positions, with ‘radical pluralism’ as an example of Krisch’s 
pluralism simpliciter, and ‘pluralism under international law’ being recast instead as 
a species of what Krisch would call constitutionalism, notwithstanding the 
heterarchical relationship of the legal orders below the overarching level of 
international law. 
However, the idea that constitutional pluralism is a contradiction in terms is itself 
open to serious challenge. In this Section, I first set out why this is so, before going 
on to outline different ways in which the various theories of constitutional pluralism 
can be conceptualised. 
 
2.1 A false dichotomy 
The objection is put somewhat differently—but more succinctly—by Davies, who 
writes that: 
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43 Ibid at 23. 
44 Ibid. 
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Where there are multiple sources of apparently constitutional law one 
always takes precedence and the other is then no longer constitutional. 
Dialogue may help the legal sources reconcile, but it does not change the 
normative hierarchy between them.45 
Is this really the case? In order to engage with Davies’ criticism, let us compare it to 
another situation by rephrasing it: what about a case where there are not ‘multiple 
sources of apparently constitutional law’, but rather ‘multiple provisions of definitely 
constitutional law’? 
What I have in mind is a classic situation of two constitutional rights being in 
conflict in a given case, such as the right to freedom of speech and the right to 
privacy, both of which we can well imagine being given some sort of specific 
recognition in a hypothetical (state) constitutional order. While the particular 
calculus a judge will employ in determining any given dispute will differ from case 
to case, and from place to place, it is unrealistic to imagine that a victory for the 
speaker means that the right to privacy ‘is no longer constitutional’, or that some 
definitive normative hierarchy between the two has been established. Similarly, a 
victory for the person seeking to protect his or her privacy does not mean that the 
right to freedom of speech has been destroyed for all time coming. Rather, it is just 
that two rights were in conflict in a particular way and a resolution was necessary. 
The effectiveness of one was temporarily displaced in favour of another, but not 
destroyed. 
How, and to what extent, does this then differ from the case discounted by 
Davies, where there is conflict not between the norms of a legal order but between 
the norms of legal orders? I suggest that the two situations can be seen as being at 
the very least partially analogous. It is an overstatement to imagine that the 
disapplication in a given case of a norm from one ‘constitutional’ order in favour of a 
norm from another ‘constitutional’ order necessarily makes one order ‘more 
constitutional’ than the other. At least, this is the case if we accept (and embrace) the 
possibility of ‘constitutionalism beyond the state’.46 It would seem that only on a 
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‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the European Union’ (2001) 7 European Law Journal 125; JHH 
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statist, monist conception of constitutionalism can we describe the temporary 
disapplication of the norms of one order in favour of another as relegating the 
disapplied order to non-constitutional status. 
It is precisely this—statist—conception of constitutionalism that Krisch employs 
in positing pluralism and constitutionalism as opposites.47 We can in fact go further, 
for Krisch makes it clear that he has a particular kind of state constitutionalism in 
mind: 
[T]he line of tradition that traces itself back to the American and French 
revolutions, [which] stresses more the formal elements: the actual 
constitution (not only limitation) of government through an act of the 
people, as expressed in a constitutional document.48 
This he contrasts to the older conception of constitutionalism, ‘closer to British 
history and common law ideas, [which] emphasizes the importance of substantive 
constitutional values (rights, democracy, etc) as limitations to government power.’49 
The problem here is that ‘modern’ revolutionary constitutionalism obviously bears 
little relation to the foundation and evolution of the European ordre publique. This 
was obvious even prior to the failed EU Constitutional Treaty, but that very failure 
highlighted that if we are to imagine and describe the European legal order—by 
which I mean here the whole panoply of state, Union and Convention—as being 
‘constitutional’, it is the older, evolutionary conception of constitutionalism that we 
must adopt.50 Krisch and Davies’ argument that pluralism and constitutionalism are 
irreconcilable is perfectly true—even trivially so—if we are to take the 
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revolutionary, documentary form of constitutionalism as our sole definition and point 
of reference. This sort of constitution is (or perhaps was) by its very nature 
authoritative, self-referential, and self-contained. Quite aside from the fact that these 
adjectives do not necessarily apply to non-state European constitutionalism, they 
may not even accurately describe the constitutions of EU Member States any longer, 
given the EU’s claim to primacy and hierarchical superiority, and the openness of 
their legal orders to the influence of the ECHR and ECtHR. 
This being the case, the claim that pluralism and constitutionalism are 
irreconcilable is not insuperable if we broaden our conception of constitutionalism to 
include the evolutionary, as I would argue we must. Walker’s definition of 
constitutionalism as ‘the normative discourse through which constitutions are 
justified, defended, criticised, denounced or otherwise engaged with’51 is an 
altogether broader conception of the notion than the more prescriptive account given 
by Krisch, but it leaves open the question of what is meant by ‘constitutions’. As we 
have seen, for those who regard constitutionalism and pluralism as opposites, 
‘constitutions’ must be the founding documents that not only limit but also constitute 
and empower a polity and its institutions. The broader, evolutionary conception is 
that ‘the constitution’ is more than the document, or the accumulation of norms, 
practices, precedents and customs from which the polity may derive its legitimacy 
and by which the actions of the polity may be restrained.  
As a corollary, whether or not a given polity is ‘constitutional’—and thus, 
whether there is any point in speaking of ‘constitutionalism’—is not an either/or 
question, but one of degree. The calculus used to determine where on this 
constitutional/non-constitutional continuum a given polity or organisation can be 
placed can be boiled down to three parts: empowerment, restraint, and the 
metaconstitutional enquiry. If a legal order makes claims for itself as an ‘institutional 
normative order’52 (empowerment), and limits those claims with, to take Paul Craig’s 
examples, ‘[i]ssues such as the accountability of government, broadly conceived, 
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principles of good administration and mainstreaming of human rights’53 (restraint), 
that legal order can lay claim, at the very least, to a ‘thin’54 or ‘low-intensity’55 
constitutionalism. Just how thin or thick, low- or high-intensity the constitutionalism 
in question actually is—and how valid or invalid the claims—can then be analysed in 
the third stage, the metaconstitutional enquiry. This is defined by Craig as that 
discourse which asks questions ‘such as why a constitution is legitimate, why it is 
authoritative and how it should be interpreted’ and including ‘the deeper justificatory 
rationale for the particular constitutional rules that a legal system has adopted.’56  
Importantly, this more finely-graded conception of whether a given legal order 
qualifies as constitutional can be extended to the question of whether the 
relationships between legal orders are constitutional, pluralist, or somewhere in 
between, as we shall now see 
 
2.2 Reconciling the dichotomy: different constitutionalisms, different 
pluralisms 
Just as the first order question of the constitutionality of a legal order admits of 
answers altogether more complex than a simple denial or recognition of 
constitutionality, so too does the second order question of the relationships between 
legal orders (constitutional, pluralist or otherwise) allow us to give much more 
nuanced answers. There is still value in Krisch’s criticism, however, in that it forces 
us to be clearer in our meanings: to what extent are the different constitutional 
pluralisms in the literature constitutional, and to what extent are they pluralist?  
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2.2.1 Constitutional pluralism, pluralist constitutionalism 
There may be a qualitative difference between what we could call theories of 
‘constitutional pluralism’ and ‘pluralist constitutionalism’. This is more than a 
semantic quibble, because the two ideas approach the problem—the resolution of 
seemingly opposing realities—from different angles. Constitutional pluralism in the 
strict sense can be seen as trying to collar, tame and stabilise the inherent 
unpredictability of a radical conception of pluralism (that is, to make pluralism more 
constitutional), whereas a theory of pluralist constitutionalism can be seen as trying, 
in the first instance, to make constitutionalism more pluralist, taking as its starting 
point the stability and predictability of state constitutionalism, while rescuing it, in 
Walker’s sense,57 from the fact that a globalising world has robbed it of much of its 
previous descriptive force and accuracy; and, secondly, to open it to the 
polycentricity inherent in European integration. Put simply, constitutional pluralism 
seeks to narrow the overly broad, and pluralist constitutionalism seeks to broaden the 
overly narrow. 
If we accept that constitutionalism and pluralism are not irreconcilable, we can 
recast MacCormick’s two conceptions in ways that do not fit Krisch’s either/or 
schema. In this light, MacCormick’s radical pluralism is indeed a species of 
constitutional pluralism—rather than pluralism simpliciter in Krisch’s sense—but is 
only ‘constitutional’ in the thin, descriptive sense that it deals with the arrangement, 
hierarchical or otherwise, of legal orders which themselves make valid 
(constitutional) claims to normative authority, whether in the normatively thick sense 
of national constitutionalism or the ‘small-c’ constitutionalism of the EU.58 Its 
reliance on politics, rather than law, for the ultimate resolution of disputes between 
orders places it more towards the pluralist end of the spectrum, but does not 
altogether rob it of its constitutional pedigree. Conversely, the recognition of public 
international law as an overarching frame makes pluralism under international law 
the more constitutional of MacCormick’s two legal pluralisms, though it owes rather 
more to the constitutionalised internationalism of Bardo Fassbender59 than to more 
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traditional, state-based theories, or, indeed, to the normatively thicker conceptions of 
constitutional pluralism which will now be introduced. 
 
2.2.2 Different classifications 
2.2.2.1 Six conceptions 
Though positing a difference between constitutional pluralism and pluralist 
constitutionalism does enable us to demonstrate more clearly the finely-graded 
relationship between the two concepts, and to determine how close to either end of 
the spectrum a given theory is, it is still a relatively rough division. Matej Avbelj 
outlines, more specifically, six conceptions of constitutionalism with respect to the 
legal order of the EU, all of which have pluralist aspects, though to greatly varying 
degrees: ‘socio-teleological constitutionalism’, represented by the work of Weiler;60 
‘epistemic meta-constitutionalism’, represented by Walker;61 the ‘best fit universal 
constitutionalism’ of Mattias Kumm;62 the ‘harmonious discursive constitutionalism’ 
of Miguel Poiares Maduro;63 Ingolf Pernice’s ‘multilevel classical 
constitutionalism’;64 and the ‘reductionist constitutionalism’ of Charles Sabel and 
Oliver Gerstenberg.65 
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Two of these theories—‘socio-teleological constitutionalism’ and ‘multi-level 
classical constitutionalism’—are only pluralist in the very thinnest of senses. The 
normative core of Weiler’s theory is the notion of ‘constitutional tolerance’, which 
celebrates as a virtue distinct to the sui generis,66 non-documentary constitutionalism 
of the EU that the institutional actors of the Member States:  
accept [the legal doctrines of EU constitutionalism] as a continuously 
renewed, autonomous and voluntary act of subordination, in the discrete 
areas governed by Europe, to a norm that is the aggregate expression of 
other wills, other political identities, other political communities.67 
Though this constitutional tolerance does recognise constitutional plurality, and 
evinces a similar commitment to the normative imperatives of pluralism as that 
outlined in the second claim of Walker’s lowest-common-denominator conception, 
its prior acceptance of the hierarchical constitutional claims of the EU order 
undermines any substantively pluralist aspects of the theory. As Avbelj notes: 
[I]t fails to explain how its constitutional vision of the integration can be 
then genuinely tolerant and thus truly legitimate if a normative ideal of 
constitutional tolerance is introduced only when the constitutional 
framework of a clearly hierarchical nature is already in place.68 
Similarly, but more explicitly, Ingolf Pernice’s ‘multi-level constitutionalism’ is 
virtually indistinguishable from standard federal constitutionalism at the state level, 
and in cases of conflict between legal orders always weighs on the side of the 
application of EU law.69 Accordingly, neither of these theories will feature in what 
follows. 
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2.2.2.2 Metaconstitutional pluralism 
Though Avbelj does not group the remaining theories together, there is a significant 
amount of common ground between them. Most importantly, they share a conception 
(though in different ways and to varying degrees) of overarching 
‘metaconstitutional’70 principles whereby conflict between legal orders can—in the 
first place—be avoided, and—if necessary—be resolved. Metaconstitutional 
pluralism therefore seeks either (in its explanatory dimension) to identify, or (in its 
normative dimension) to posit a series of higher order norms that serve a bridging 
function between legal orders, while still maintaining the essentially heterarchical 
nature of the relationships between them and without falling off the tightrope and 
collapsing the orders into a monist whole. It is in this respect that this version of 
pluralism is metaconstitutional: it identifies or posits constitutional rules about 
constitutional rules. This can then be contrasted with radical pluralism, along 
MacCormick’s lines, which, as Cormac Mac Amhlaigh notes: 
[I]nvolves nothing more than the prudence, pragmatism and accommodation 
of state and suprastate—mainly judicial—actors, operating in the absence of 
a higher-order metaconstitutional normative framework.71 
Indeed, as we saw with MacCormick’s version of the theory, radical pluralism 
explicitly disclaims the very possibility of metaconstitutional principles serving the 
bridging function described above. Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner 
write that: 
Any aspirations to a normative unity of global law are … doomed from the 
outset. A meta-level at which conflicts might be solved is wholly elusive 
both in global law and in global society. Instead, we might expect intensified 
legal fragmentation.72 
In the global context, this may well be the case, but the focus of this thesis is on the 
two European non-state legal orders and (one of) their constituent states: these 
systems’ high degree of legal and social embeddedness, coupled with the active 
academic debate on the relationships between them, means that in the specifically 
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European context the search for a metaconstitutional framework for the resolution of 
conflicts is more fruitful. 
 
2.2.2.3 Metaconstitutional interface norms 
At the heart of these metaconstitutional pluralisms are the specific norms constituting 
the overarching framework, which offer guidance in the avoidance and resolution of 
conflicts between orders. These have been termed ‘interface norms’ by Krisch, 
which ‘are the main legal expression of openness and closure, friendliness or 
hostility among the different parts’.73 This is the description that will be adopted 
throughout this thesis, and a major part of the discussion in Section 4 below is 
focused on the nature of the interface norms supplied or suggested by each of the 
metaconstitutional conceptions of pluralism. However, two preliminary matters must 
be dealt with here. 
First, we have already seen that Krisch rejects the concept of (meta)constitutional 
pluralism as an impossibility, and posits his own theories as being specifically 
pluralist rather than constitutional. This he makes clear when he writes that: 
Unlike in a constitutionalist structure, the strength of the respective claims in 
a pluralist order is not assessed by a single decision-maker or from a central 
vantage point. The pluralist setting distinguishes itself precisely by the fact 
that the conflict rules do not have an overarching legal character; they are 
normative, moral demands that find (potentially diverging) legal expressions 
only within the various sub-orders.74 
But as we have seen, we need not accept this characterisation of affairs. The fact ‘the 
rules are set by each sub-order for itself’75 does not necessarily render them non-
constitutional, especially in light of the above discussion of the finely-graded, rather 
than either/or, nature of constitutionalism, and in particular when we consider the 
rules as being metaconstitutional. In fact, Krisch tacitly concedes as much when he 
goes on to write that: 
This can lead to incoherences in the overall order … [y]et the rule of law 
also poses demands on decision-makers in a pluralist setting: its asks 
legislators and judges to pursue the values of legal certainty and 
predictability by striving for consistency in the overall order. At times this 
goal may be trumped by other values—autonomy, democracy, and rights 
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among them. If another order does not deserve respect on the basis of its 
autonomy pedigree, overall consistency need not be ensured.76 
It is precisely this sort of contingent, relational analysis that supplies 
metaconstitutional pluralism with its constitutional credentials, and distinguishes it 
from radical pluralism, contrary to Krisch’s a priori distinction between the two. 
The lines quoted above also hint at the second preliminary issue: the use of the 
phrase interface norms to describe the means by which the relations between legal 
orders can be regulated. As we have seen, Krisch also characterises these ‘norms’ as 
‘rules’, ‘demands’ and even ‘values’. Elsewhere, he writes of the need for ‘a more 
finely tuned legal and doctrinal instrumentarium’77 and ‘doctrinal tools’.78 The issue 
is compounded by the varying ways in which the different metaconstitutional 
theories classify their conceptions of interface norms. As we shall see in Section 4, 
they are most frequently described as ‘principles’. Mattias Kumm is explicit in his 
outline of what has come to be called ‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’79 that he 
adopts and relies on Robert Alexy’s conception of norms as consisting of both rules 
and principles,80 under which: 
[P]rinciples are norms which require that something be realized to the 
greatest extent possible given their legal and factual possibilities. Principles 
are optimization requirements, characterized by the fact that they can be 
satisfied to varying degrees and that the appropriate degree of satisfaction 
depends not only on what is factually possible but also on what is legally 
possible. The scope of the legally possible is determined by opposing 
principles and rules. 
By contrast rules are norms that are always either fulfilled or not. If a rule 
validly applies, then the requirement is to do exactly what it says, neither 
more nor less. In this way rules contain fixed points in the field of the 
factually and legally possible. This means that the distinction between rules 
and principles is a qualitative one and not one of degree. Every norm is 
either a rule or a principle.81 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Ibid at 296. 
77 Ibid at 286. 
78 Ibid. 
79 See Section 3.3, below. 
80 Kumm (n 62) at 290 fn 70, citing R Alexy A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2002) 
at 44–110; R Sieckmann Regelmodelle und Prinzipienmodelle des Rechtssystems (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 1990); R Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1977). See also M 
Kumm ‘Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?: Three Conceptions of the 
Relationship Between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice’ 
(1999) 36 Common Market Law Review 351 at 375 fn 47, citing R Dworkin Law’s Empire (London: 
Fontana, 1986); R Alexy Theory of Legal Argumentation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); N MacCormick 
Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978). 
81 Alexy (2002 n 80) at 47–48. 
Chapter 1: European Constitutional Pluralism 
 40 
Therefore, though the phrase ‘interface norms’ which will be used throughout the 
thesis is Krisch’s, this does not require us to accept the constitutionalism/pluralism 
dichotomy, nor does it limit the discussion to hard and fast legal rules. The various 
understandings of interface norms encompass not just rules and principles, but, in 
certain conceptions, ‘doctrinal instrumentaria’ in Krisch’s sense: whole toolkits 
encompassing a variety of considerations as to how legal orders relate to one another. 
Let us now examine the various metaconstitutional pluralisms in more detail, and 
in particular their conception of interface norms. 
 
3 ‘GOING THEIR OWN WAYS’:  
DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF METACONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM 
3.1 Sabel and Gerstenberg: polyarchic coordinate constitutionalism 
Sabel and Gerstenberg take as their starting point the ECJ’s development of a 
fundamental rights jurisprudence at the behest of Member State courts, most notably 
the BVerfG, as set out in Section 2 above. They note, however, that more recent 
judgments such as Schmidberger82 and Omega83—where attempts are made at 
reconciling the market freedoms of the EU with national commitments to freedom of 
expression and the right to human dignity respectively —have the effect of solving 
an old problem only to recreate the same problem at a level further abstracted from 
national constitutionalism. In rising to the challenge of developing its own 
fundamental rights jurisprudence, the ECJ has extended its jurisdiction ‘in ways that 
overlap and potentially compete with that of Member States in matters of visceral 
concern’.84 This is not just an issue within the confines of the EU and its relations 
with its parts, but is compounded by the EU’s place in the broader international 
order. Kadi85 is given as an example: instead of national courts making demands of 
the supranational ECJ, the supranational ECJ makes demands of the Security Council 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Case C–112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, International Transporte und Planzüge v Austria [2003] ECR 
I–5659l. 
83 Case C–36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der 
Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I–9609. 
84 CF Sabel and O Gerstenberg ‘Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus: The ECJ and the 
Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order’ (2010) 16 European Law Journal 511 at 512. 
85 Joined Cases C–402/05 P and C–415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission [2008] 
ECR I–6351. 
Chapter 1: European Constitutional Pluralism 
 41 
of the United Nations, a jurisgenerative body unused to having its decisions reviewed 
in courts of law.86 In the European sphere, the problem is complicated by the obvious 
overlap between the ECJ’s jurisprudence on fundamental rights and the position of 
the ECtHR as the overseer and guardian of the ECHR, which the ECtHR has gone so 
far as to describe as a ‘constitutional instrument of a European Public Order’.87 
There is therefore in Europe a potential tripartite clash of jurisdiction concerning 
the meaning and scope of human and fundamental rights. Though the jurisdictions of 
the EU, the ECtHR and states are separate, they are not neatly compartmentalised or 
hermetically sealed. Sabel and Gerstenberg suggest that this problem is in the 
process of being resolved by: 
the formation of a novel order of coordinate constitutionalism in which 
Member States, the ECJ [and] the ECtHR … agree to defer to one another’s 
decisions, provided those decisions respect mutually agreed essentials. This 
coordinate order extends constitutionalism … beyond its home territory in 
the nation state through a jurisprudence of mutual monitoring and peer 
review that carefully builds on national constitutional traditions, but does 
not create a new, encompassing sovereign entity.88 
This coordinate constitutional order is described in terms of John Rawls’s idea of 
overlapping consensus,89 whereby general agreement on fundamental matters of 
principle does not rest on a single set of shared (in this case, constitutional) values, 
but rather: 
On the contrary, the parties to an overlapping consensus know that they 
have reached agreement on essentials, such as the attractiveness of 
democracy as a system of government or of respect for the individual as a 
condition of freedom and fairness, through differing, only partially 
concordant interpretations of such comprehensive ideas.90 
The acknowledgement of these differences, rather than being a cause of friction, is 
precisely what drives each actor to reserve to themselves the right to their own 
interpretation of overlapping principles, while simultaneously affording that right to 
competing actors, within broader or narrower limits. For Sabel and Gerstenberg, it is 
the Solange principle—the principle of deference leavened by watchfulness—that 
provides the necessary doctrinal instrument for articulating each actor’s viewpoint 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Sabel and Gerstenberg (n 84) at 512. 
87 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland [2005] ECHR 440 at para 156. 
88 Sabel and Gerstenberg (n 84) at 512, emphasis added. 
89 J Rawls ‘The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus’ (1987) 7 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1. 
90 Sabel and Gerstenberg (n 84) at 513. 
Chapter 1: European Constitutional Pluralism 
 42 
while providing the opportunity for this viewpoint to be adjusted in light of those of 
competing actors. 
Coordinate constitutionalism is not a new idea, but it is one with a chequered 
history in the statist constitutional frame; as Bateup notes: 
Coordinate construction is the oldest conception of constitutional 
interpretation as a shared enterprise between the courts and the political 
branches of government, having been first espoused by James Madison. 
While acknowledging that issues of constitutional interpretation would 
normally fall to the judiciary in the ordinary course of government, Madison 
rejected the view that judicial decisions had any unique status, as the [US] 
Constitution did not provide for any specific authority to determine the 
limits of the division of powers between the different branches. Similarly, 
Thomas Jefferson considered that each branch of government must be ‘co-
ordinate and independent of each other,’ and that each branch has primary 
responsibility for interpreting the Constitution as it concerns its own 
functions.91 
Though this idea was eventually torpedoed in the American context by the US 
Supreme Court’s assumption of the ultimate right to determine the meaning of the 
Constitution and the legitimate sphere of action of each actor established 
thereunder92 (as well as the eventual acquiescence of competing actors in this 
analysis), it is not difficult to transplant the idea to the modern, postnational 
configuration. The ‘deliberative polyarchy’93 of the ECHR takes the place of the 
constitutional state, and each normative order within the polyarchy takes the place of 
the constitutional actors empowered under coordinate constitutionalism to make their 
own interpretations of what the consensus requires, subject to an ongoing dialogic 
reframing and re-evaluation of these interpretations. 
 
3.1.1 Interface norms under polyarchic coordinate constitutionalism 
The explanatory claim of constitutional pluralism is evident in polyarchic coordinate 
constitutionalism’s acknowledgment of the messy reality of coexisting, competing, 
cooperating normative orders (the explanatory claim), and—although the authors are 
not explicit on the point—seems to agree with the normative claim in that this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 C Bateup ‘The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of Constitutional 
Dialogue’ (2005–2006) 71 Brooklyn Law Review 1109 at 1137 (footnotes omitted). 
92 Marbury v Madison (1803) 5 US 137. See further, RH Jackson The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 
(New York NY: Knopf, 1941). 
93 Sabel and Gerstenberg (n 84) at 513. 
Chapter 1: European Constitutional Pluralism 
 43 
incipient dialogic polyarchy is presented as being preferable to the full-scale, 
hierarchical constitutionalisation of the EU or ECHR orders. Moreover, the 
statement, quoted above, that coordinate constitutionalism ‘carefully builds on 
national constitutional traditions, but does not create a new, encompassing sovereign 
entity’94 clearly casts the theory as a species of metaconstitutional pluralism. 
However, the theory is unique among metaconstitutional pluralisms in its conception 
of interface norms. Rather than positing specific, universally applicable interface 
norms in the abstract and in advance, it is the principles of overlapping consensus 
themselves that do the substantive work of regulating relations between the legal 
orders in the polyarchy, and this only at the point of application. Sabel and 
Gerstenberg note two essential features of an overlapping consensus. First, it is: 
[A] freestanding political view, which draws on shared democratic ideals of 
the parties to the consensus and which can be affirmed by them on the basis 
of their opposing, but reasonable, comprehensive outlooks.95 
Secondly, and crucially, it: 
[A]rises in practice not from a simultaneous deduction from overlapping 
first principles to convergent conclusions, but rather from an ongoing 
historical interaction between the emergent, common political view and the 
diverse comprehensive views underlying it.96 
The centrality of this temporal element, with its focus on the ongoing (and 
potentially permanent) dialogue between sites in the polyarchy, is what most 
distinguishes coordinate constitutionalism from the metaconstitutional pluralisms to 
be discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.2 below, and what marks the theory as the least 
prescriptive of the three. The emergence of an overlapping consensus is an iterative 
three-stage process whereby certain (unspecified, varying) liberal principles first 
come to be accepted as ‘boundary conditions on political contest’.97 There then 
emerges ‘agreement on the kind of public reason—the kinds of reasons acceptable in 
arguments—that applying liberal principles of justice involves’,98 followed by the 
third stage, in which there is the secular dialogic reinforcement of these liberal 
principles by the use of public reason by actors within the polyarchy.99 Sabel and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Ibid at 512. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid, citing Rawls (n 89) at 159ff and 161. 
98 Ibid, citing Rawls (n 89) at 162 
99 Ibid. 
Chapter 1: European Constitutional Pluralism 
 44 
Gerstenberg write that this three-stage process is exactly what has happened in the 
sphere of European integration: first, ‘certain areas of decision making … were taken 
off the agenda of exclusively domestic decision making and established as European 
supranational norms with primacy over domestic law’100 both as a response to the 
European experience of war and in order to solve political and economic problems 
that states could not deal with alone. Secondly, the Solange dialogue was the means 
by which the ECJ began to take seriously fundamental rights protection. Thirdly, 
continuing dialogue regarding fundamental rights in the EU legal order—and in the 
legal order overseen by the ECtHR—constitutes the secular reinforcement of this 
overlapping consensus.101 
It is therefore through the principles of overlapping consensus and its 
operationalisation by means of the Solange principle that specific interface norms 
emerge under coordinate constitutionalism over time, rather than being posited 
beforehand.102 Solange is on this view ‘a master framework for creating other 
frameworks and with them the necessity and methods for establishing mutual regard 
of constitutional traditions.’103 Though Sabel and Gerstenberg do not posit specific 
interface norms in advance, the claim of universality that is at the heart of the 
research question of this thesis is present in their theory: this master framework 
creates a ‘de-nationalised precedent for de-nationalising precedents, which, loosened 
from their moorings in national constitutional tradition, can become part of the 
overlapping consensus.’104 Moreover, this conception of constitutional pluralism is 
broad enough to encompass not just the EU and its Member States but also the legal 
order of the Convention. 
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3.2 Maduro: contrapunctual law 
The aim of Maduro’s theory is twofold: the avoidance of constitutional conflict, 
followed by its effective management when it does arise.105 This he attempts by 
analogy to the musical theory of counterpoint, whereby different voices exhibit both 
independence and interdependence simultaneously, resulting not in cacophony but in 
harmony. 
Maduro describes his principles of contrapunctual law as: 
the principles to which all actors of the European legal community must 
commit themselves and according to which the EU legal order must be 
structured as a system of law. This commitment is voluntary but it may still 
be presented as a limit to pluralism. It can nevertheless be argued that this is 
the limit to pluralism necessary to allow the largest extent of pluralism 
possible.106 
This is quite a useful way of looking at the tightrope problem adverted to in Section 
1.3 above, and it contains within it echoes of pragmatic arguments commonly found 
elsewhere in the law—for example, that limits to free speech are simultaneously 
ways of guaranteeing free speech, or that the review of legislation by unelected 
judges is in fact a method of preserving democracy. 
Maduro explicitly does not set out to provide a completely theorised third way 
between national and European monism. Borrowing a phrase from Sunstein, he 
writes that the aim of the contrapunctual principles is to achieve ‘incompletely 
theorised agreements’,107 whereby different actors may proceed from different bases 
and by different routes, but nevertheless come up with the same (or at least different 
but compatible) results. We can further see the absence of an attempt to construct a 
via media in the following statement: 
Borrowing the language of systems theory, we may say that the problem of 
compatibility between different legal systems or sub-systems is presented as 
a problem of coordination whose only answer can be found in each system 
adapting its own set of perspectives to the possible contacts and collisions 
with other systems.108 
Maduro’s approach is therefore aimed at modification of the existing, internal 
perspectives of both national and EU apex actors, instead of leaving them intact and 
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bridging them with an entirely new discourse or philosophy. In this sense it shares 
more of Walker’s third claim of pluralism, that of epistemic indeterminacy, than does 
the more concrete theory of Kumm, discussed below at Section 3.3. However, the 
theory is still metaconstitutional in nature in that Maduro posits specific principles of 
contrapunctual law by which this internal modification of perspectives is to be 
achieved. 
 
3.2.1 Interface norms under contrapunctual law 
The principles of counterpoint are how Maduro conceives of interface norms under 
contrapunctual law. First, there is the principle of pluralism itself, which has two 
elements: (1) different legal orders must expressly acknowledge the existence and 
autonomy of their counterparts, which ‘entails the recognition and adjustment of 
each legal order to the plurality of equally legitimate claims … made by other legal 
orders’;109 and (2) ‘pluralism requires such a discourse to take place in such a way as 
to promote the broadest participation possible.’110 Here we see quite some overlap 
with Walker’s requirement of inclusive coherence for constitutionalism,111 that it 
must be attentive to its own democratic deficit, along with acceptance and 
endorsement of the explanatory and normative claims of constitutional pluralism.  
The second contrapunctual principle is constituted by the requirements of 
consistency and vertical and horizontal coherence, whereby the decisions of courts 
across Europe must fit not only with the jurisprudence of the ECJ, but also with that 
of other national courts.112 The reasons for this are practical as well as theoretical: 
Maduro notes that the sheer weight of the Court of Justice’s caseload means that ‘an 
increased amount of the burden of interpreting and applying EU law will fall de facto 
even if not de iure upon national courts.’113 However, this increased (and necessary) 
role for national courts must not undermine the coherence and uniformity of the EU 
legal order and, for this reason, requires the development of a strong tradition of 
dialogue and mutual interest between national legal systems. 
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The third principle, universalisability, is related to but separate from the second. 
National judgments on EU law should be structured so as to permit their application, 
in principle at least, not just in the deciding Member State but also in any other. 
Maduro suggests that the taking seriously of this requirement would lead national 
courts to internalise the consequences of their judgments not just for their own legal 
system, or for the EU legal order itself, but for the whole pluralist array of legal 
orders existing in Europe. This, Maduro claims, ‘will prevent national courts from 
using the autonomy of their legal system as a form of evasion and freeriding’,114 and 
so create a virtuous cycle whereby courts across Europe cooperate in the 
development and application of EU law, without insult to the autonomy of either 
their own legal systems or that of the EU, thereby avoiding the danger of 
fragmentation that lead MacCormick from radical pluralism to pluralism under 
international law in the first place. 
Finally, there is the principle of institutional choice. This recognises that an 
exclusive focus on the judgments and actions of courts is necessarily distorting, 
particularly when we adopt a pluralist conception of legal orders. Just as pluralism 
means that there is no one court of wise judges to whom we can turn when we need a 
final answer, nor is there one parliament, one government, or one administration that 
can decide legal, political and social issues. Pluralism necessarily multiplies and 
complicates the range of legal actors in and across polities, as well as the internal 
self-images of these actors; their relationships amongst themselves within polities; 
and their attitudes to other polities (and the actors these polities contain). Here 
Maduro refers to the dangers of what Neil Komesar has called single institutional 
analysis,115 and suggests that multiple institutional analysis is a requirement of 
contrapunctual law. He does not, however, elaborate on the precise contours and 
meaning of this requirement.116 
Before elaborating on the nature of these interface norms, let us outline one 
further conception of metaconstitutional pluralism. 
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3.3 Kumm: cosmopolitan constitutionalism 
In his 1999 analysis of the relationship between the BVerfG and the ECJ, Mattias 
Kumm defined the two courts’ opposing theses as ‘European monism’ in the case of 
the ECJ and ‘democratic statism’ on the part of the BVerfG, and proposed a via 
media in the form of ‘European constitutionalism’.117 He subsequently broadened his 
argument by not focusing exclusively on the jurisprudence of one national court and 
relabelled the positions as ‘European constitutional supremacy’, ‘national 
constitutional supremacy’ and ‘constitutionalism beyond the state’.118 Most recently, 
Kumm has expanded the analysis further in order to encompass the question of the 
relationship between the EU and the UN,119 and has relabelled the positions as 
‘legalist monism’,120 ‘democratic statism’121 and ‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’.122 
These more recent labels will be used below. 
Under legalist monism, EU law, of any kind, is supreme over national law in 
cases of conflict; only the ECJ may review EU norms, and national constitutional 
provisions may not be relied upon by national courts to justify any decision to 
disapply or suspend the application of EU law in any given state—a decision that 
national courts have no jurisdiction to make in the first place.123 Of course, this is 
merely a succinct restatement of a long line of ECJ case law,124 which is mostly—but 
by no means always125—followed by national supreme and constitutional courts. 
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Conversely, democratic statism holds that national apex courts, as creatures of 
their domestic constitution, are bound to regard that constitution as the font of all 
legal authority. This statism is democratic126 because it is justified by reference to 
democratic constitutional theory: 
State law ultimately derives its authority from ‘We the People’ imagined as 
having acted as a pouvoir constituant to establish a national Constitution as 
a supreme legal framework for democratic self-government. International 
law, on the other hand, derives its authority from the consent of states.127 
The consequences of democratic statism are twofold: first, the national constitution, 
being the supreme law of the land, is the sole point of reference for determining 
whether and under what circumstances international law (which on this analysis must 
include EU law128) is to be applied within the state. The legal universe is therefore 
dualist in its structure, and ‘[t]he only relevant question is how to interpret the 
constitution with regard to the status it ascribes to EU law.’129 Secondly, the lack of 
authority derived from ‘We the People’ in the international sphere means that 
international law remains afflicted with an ‘aura of illegitimacy’.130 
Kumm’s third approach, cosmopolitan constitutionalism, derives from that of 
what he calls the ‘sui generists’. Here, the important question is not whether the final 
say rests with Luxembourg or with national courts. Instead, the emphasis is on the 
procedural and jurisprudential factors (that is—though he did not initially use the 
phrase—the metaconstitution) that may serve to prevent constitutional conflict in the 
first place: the problem of the final say is thereby left unresolved because it is a 
problem that should never arise.131 The problem with the sui generist approach for 
Kumm is that it is undertheorised and, as a result, cannot adequately answer the 
question of what kind of legal order the EU actually is. Here, the present author 
agrees, and recalls the further problem, noted by Tom Eijsbouts and others, that the 
language of ‘sui generis-ness’ serves only to ‘veil, or even wall off, the Union as a 
paradise for single-issue experts and officials, inaccessible to the common man and 
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sometimes impervious to common sense’,132 a critique that ties in directly with 
Walker’s account of the alleged limits of constitutionalist discourse.133  
Kumm is essentially sympathetic to the sui generist approach,134 and it is in 
response to its theoretical shortcomings that he develops his theory of cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism, under which ‘a set of universal principles central to liberal 
democratic constitutionalism undergird the authority of public law and determine 
which norms take precedence over others in particular circumstances.’135 As will be 
immediately clear, Kumm’s conception of cosmopolitan constitutionalism is a 
species of (meta)constitutional pluralism, seeking, through his various principles, to 
provide precisely the Archimedean point, the metaconstitutional norms about 
constitutional norms, from and through which constitutional conflict can be resolved 
or avoided in the postnational legal landscape. In positing specific principles for the 
avoidance and ultimate resolution of conflict, it is perhaps the most prescriptive 
accounts of metaconstitutional pluralism in the literature. Though it might seem that 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism owes rather more to democratic statism than to 
legalist monism—indeed, Kumm tacitly admits as much when he states that ‘[f]or so 
long as structural deficits remain on the level of the [EU], [EU] law will [not be], and 
should not be, recognised by national courts as the supreme law of the land without 
qualification’136—it should not be supposed that cosmopolitan constitutionalism is a 
kind of reactionary constitutional nationalism, insufficiently cognisant and respectful 
of the authority of EU law. Indeed, Kumm explicitly does not regard heterarchy as 
being always and in every case the best way of conceptualising the relationships 
between legal orders:  
[C]onstitutional pluralism is no panacea and is not always attractive. … [It] 
is not inherently superior to hierarchical constitutionalism. Whether it is or 
not itself depends on how potentially competing constitutional principles 
play out in particular contexts.137 
Cosmopolitan constitutionalism therefore serves a dual purpose: it provides 
principles that allow us to determine, first, when heterarchy is preferable to hierarchy 
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in the relations between legal orders, and, second, how the heterarchical relations 
should be structured in those cases where heterarchy is in fact preferable. Kumm 
summarises this dual function as follows: 
The refusal of a legal order to recognize itself as hierarchically integrated 
into a more comprehensive legal order is justified, if that more 
comprehensive order suffers from structural legitimacy deficits that the less 
comprehensive legal order does not suffer from. The concrete norms 
governing the management of the interface between legal orders are justified 
if they are designed to ensure that the legitimacy conditions for liberal-
democratic governance are secured. In practice that means that there are 
functional considerations that generally establish a presumption in favour of 
applying the law of the more extensive legal order over the law of the more 
parochial one, unless there are countervailing concerns of sufficient weight 
that suggest otherwise.138 
 
3.3.1 Interface norms under cosmopolitan constitutionalism 
The interface norms of cosmopolitan constitutionalism are fourfold: ‘the formal 
principle of legality, [the] jurisdictional principle[] of subsidiarity, the procedural 
principle of democracy, and the substantive principle of the protection of basic rights 
or reasonableness.’139 
The keystone of these principles is legality, by which Kumm means that ‘national 
courts should start with a strong presumption that they are required to enforce EU 
law, national constitutional provisions notwithstanding’,140 a presumption informed 
by the ECJ’s (not at all unfounded) claim that any national review of EU norms 
would threaten the effective and uniform nature of those norms, and would 
undermine the entire scheme of the Treaties. Here we see the operationalisation of 
what we could call Kumm’s ambivalence between hierarchy and heterarchy. As we 
saw in Section 1, the doctrines of primacy and direct effect were neither fashioned 
out of whole cloth nor sprung on unsuspecting Member States, and any deviation 
from their requirements must be justified. 
The first principle that may justify such a deviation is subsidiarity, which 
provides a basis for national review in cases of unjustified EU usurpation of national 
competences. Writing in 2005, Kumm noted that: 
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Much will depend on how the procedural and technical safeguards of the 
Constitutional Treaty will work in practice once the Treaty has been ratified. 
If the structural safeguards will succeed in establishing a culture of 
subsidiarity carefully watched over by the Court of Justice, then there are no 
more grounds for national courts to review whether or not the EU has 
remained within the boundaries established by the EU’s constitutional 
charter.141 
Of course, the Constitutional Treaty never came into force, but the safeguards of 
which Kumm wrote are now to be found in the revised Subsidiarity Protocol and the 
new Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments.142 There is a broad and deep 
literature on the subsidiarity principle,143 which is beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
we can say with a degree of confidence that the ‘culture of subsidiarity carefully 
watched over by the Court of Justice’ spoken of by Kumm does not yet exist.144  
Kumm’s second interface norm is the principle of democracy, or democratic 
legitimacy.145 Of course, stated baldly like this, such a principle is far too broad to 
give us any guidance. Kumm therefore narrows down its implications:  
Given the persistence of the democratic deficit on the European level … 
national courts continue to have good reasons to set aside EU Law when it 
violates clear and specific constitutional norms that reflect essential 
commitments of the national community.146 
The preference for the principle of legality, and thus the application of EU norms 
notwithstanding national specificities, is illustrated by the conditions Kumm attaches 
to the disapplication of EU norms under the principle of democracy: by ‘clear and 
specific’ he means that that the national norm in question ‘has in fact been legislated 
by the constitutional legislator’,147 and not merely derived through interpretation by a 
constitutional court from an unclear or vague constitutional provision. Moreover, 
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even if clear and specific, such a norm may not be a constitutional essential: a close 
analysis of the legislative history and public function of the norm would be necessary 
to establish whether it is in fact.148 
The third and final interface norm is that of the protection of fundamental rights. 
As Kumm makes clear, this is essentially a recitation and condensation of the 
Solange doctrine of conditional recognition: ‘If … the guarantees afforded by the EU 
amount to structurally equivalent protections, then there is no more space for 
national courts to substitute the EU’s judgment on the rights issue with their own.’149 
As will by now be clear, all of these justificatory interface norms are weighted 
towards the threshold principle of legality: taken in reverse, Kumm concedes that the 
EU’s fundamental rights protection is (in general) structurally equivalent to that of 
the Member States; the requirements of clarity, specificity and essentiality heavily 
circumscribe the potential ambit of the principle of democracy; and the principle of 
subsidiarity is seen as being potentially self-extinguishing in the event that the EU 
develops a subsidiarity ‘culture’ overseen by the ECJ. Moreover, the principles of 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism are altogether more prescriptive as interface norms 
than those of contrapunctual law. Maduro’s requirements of pluralism, consistency 
and vertical and horizontal coherence, universalisability and institutional choice—
though they may guide a normative actor in shaping his or her institutional 
viewpoint, or in structuring his or her judgments—provide altogether less concrete 
guidance in cases of constitutional conflict. Whereas Kumm’s principles of 
subsidiarity, the protection of clear, specific and essential national norms, and the 
protection of fundamental rights are not themselves step-by-step guides for resolving 
constitutional conflict, they do provide much firmer bases from which a judge faced 
with such a conflict could proceed. However, what unites Kumm and Maduro’s 
theories is greater than that which divides them. They take as given Walker’s 
explanatory claim of pluralism, and are equally enthusiastic as to the normative 
desirability of such a configuration. Crucially, they both seek to extract or create, 
whether from historical legal practice or from first principles—or some combination 
of the two—a metaconstitutional frame for the management and resolution of 
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conflict. For Kumm, this can be achieved by a set of jurisprudential principles 
separate from the competing legal orders, whereas Maduro focuses more on the 
internal rules that must be developed within the epistemic confines of each system.  
But all these principles have another aspect, crucial for the present analysis: 
Kumm writes that his principles ‘can be applied to the interpretation of constitutions 
in all Member States and the European legal order [itself]’.150 Unlike Kumm, 
Maduro is not explicit on this point, but the universality of the principles of 
counterpoint is inherent in their very nature, particularly in the case of the principles 
of vertical and horizontal coherence, and universalisability. Contrapunctual law is a 
theory of EU law, and these are principles that, for Maduro, can be—and ought to 
be—put into effect throughout the Union. But in both cases, is this really so? 
For Kumm, this ‘universal applicability’151 of cosmopolitan constitutionalism 
and the interface norms thereunder is both a strength of the theory and a weakness. 
The weakness ‘lies in the fact that it does not guarantee that the results such an 
interpretation leads to will be the same in every legal order’.152 But this admission of 
non-universality as to result would seem at least partially to undermine the prior 
claim of universality as to application.153 Moreover, in his development of the 
principles, Kumm does not cast his analytical net particularly widely, and the 
jurisprudence of the BVerfG and the text of the Grundgesetz are the primary 
resources from which he draws. In discussing clear, specific and essential national 
commitments, Kumm does mention the Greek Constitution’s exclusive recognition 
of higher education from public, rather than private, institutions154 and the Irish 
Constitution’s protection of the right to life of the unborn,155 but does not go into 
detail. The question thus remains as to how universal these interface norms really 
are, and it is this question which the thesis seeks to address. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Ibid at 300. 
151 Ibid, see also Kumm (n 119) at 54. 
152 Kumm (n 62) at 300. 
153 Maduro writes of precisely the opposite happening, noting that the principles of contrapunctual law 
allow for incompletely theorised agreements, whereby actors may proceed from different bases but 
still come up with similar results (see Section 3.2.1 above). 
154 Art 16, Greek constitution (Kumm (n 62) at 297. 
155 Art 40.3.3°, Irish constitution (Kumm (n 62) at 297. 
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4 TWO PROBLEMS OF METACONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM 
Having set out these three conceptions of metaconstitutional pluralism, there are two 
important problems that must be addressed. The first is the claim that pluralism, 
whether metaconstitutional or radical, poses a threat to the rule of law. This is a 
serious charge and, as we are about to see, it is not entirely without validity. 
However, it is ultimately better regarded as a factor that may lead us in certain 
circumstances to prefer a hierarchical conception of legal orders, rather than as a 
trump that leads us away from heterarchy in every instance. The second is the issue 
of the universality of interface norms which was adverted to throughout Section 4. It 
is this, second issue that forms the central research question of this thesis. 
  
4.1 Workability, chaos and the rule of law 
The most prominent critic of constitutional pluralism is perhaps Julio Baquero Cruz, 
who writes that: 
[W]e should never feel at home with a ‘system’ that betrays many of the 
basic values of constitutionalism and the rule of law. We have a pluralist 
‘system’, that may be true in descriptive terms insofar as the supremacy 
case-law of the Court is not unconditionally and systematically respected in 
all the Member States. We may want to understand it and also to improve it. 
But should we also justify it in normative terms and try to perpetuate it? For 
radical legal pluralism not only justifies the past and the present erosions of 
the rule of law in the EU: it also acts as a deforming lens that bars any future 
legal development in a non-pluralist direction.156 
While in this instance Cruz directed his criticism specifically at radical pluralism, he 
also applies it more generally, noting that: 
[W]ithout some measure of hierarchy, the ‘contrapuntal’ law of Miguel 
Maduro may easily degenerate into dissonance or outright cacophony, with 
negative consequences for the legal situation of individuals.157 
Constitutional pluralism would certainly be an unorthodox sort of constitutional 
theory if it leads, inexorably, to the destruction of the rule of law. However, a 
number of points can be made. First, the idea that pluralism—and more specifically, 
legal heterarchy—leads to the destruction of the rule of law because of the possibility 
of constitutional clashes ignores a large part of what pluralism, and in particular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 J Baquero Cruz ‘The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement’ (2008) 14 
European Law Journal 389 at 417, citation omitted. 
157 Ibid at 414. 
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metaconstitutional pluralism, is actually concerned with—the avoidance of such 
clashes. Moreover, this avoidance is not attempted through some rough-and-ready 
modus vivendi, but by a genuine attempt to determine—and give a sound theoretical 
basis to—the jurisprudential rules and the adjudicative principles whereby rupture is 
postponed indefinitely, in favour of a dialogic mutual articulation and resolution of 
difference.  
Secondly, there is the possibility that, by regarding a monist, hierarchical 
conception of the EU legal order as the only conceivable guarantor of the rule of law, 
Baquero Cruz simply overstates his case. Kumm put this objection nicely:  
[T]he law is being disobeyed a lot of the time, in lots of systems, in lots of 
situations, by a lot of people. And it tends not to immediately lead into a 
civil war or anarchy. So, just as a sociological point, the practice of law 
tends to be pretty robust. … [I]t is difficult not be amused by the rhetoric of 
disaster, mutually assured destruction, complete disintegration etc. … I 
never understood why only a monist construction of the legal world and an 
unqualified submission to the authority of law could conceivably save 
humanity from disaster.158 
Less snappy, but somewhat more convincing, is Kumm’s earlier analysis of what he 
calls the Cassandra and Pangloss scenarios.159 If Baquero Cruz and Cassandra are 
correct, the review of EU norms by national courts leads to the Union devolving into 
a talking shop, abandoning any pretence at something more. Why engage in 
lawmaking if you know that your law will not be followed? Alternatively, if Dr 
Pangloss has his way, three substantial benefits would accrue to the Union as a result 
of acknowledging national court jurisdiction to review EU norms. First, oversight by 
national courts might enhance the democratic quality of EU legislation and 
encourage more rigour in the ECJ’s exercise of its own jurisdiction regarding Union 
competence and fundamental rights. Second, the horizontal discourse between state 
courts of the kind alluded to above by both Kumm and Maduro would become a 
reality. Third, national courts could act as catalysts for a more informed public and 
enhanced popular debate on Union political issues. However, these possibilities are 
not conclusive—they are just that, possibilities. Moreover, they may be more 
applicable to the structurally ‘looser’ setting of the relationship between the ECtHR 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Kumm (n 119) at 29. 
159 Kumm (n 117) at 359–62. 
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and nation states: they do not address the core issue in the EU context that the EU is 
a legal system based on primacy and direct effect.  
Baquero Cruz describes pluralism as a ‘deforming lens that bars any future legal 
development in a non-pluralist direction’.160 However, the same criticism could well 
be made in reverse: an insistence on a strictly hierarchical conception of the 
relationship between EU and national law might tend to act as a ‘deforming lens’, 
with its focus not on constitutional pluralism’s quotidian aspect—that of conflict 
avoidance—but on the possible nuclear scenario of total breakdown in 
communication and comity. Nor, as Kumm has noted, is it necessarily the case that 
this is more likely under constitutional pluralism than under rigid hierarchical 
constitutionalism. The argument in defence of the rule of law may well be an 
excellent reason not to become too attached to the heterarchical vision of 
constitutional relationships in Europe. But the metaconstitutional species of 
pluralism outlined here go far beyond simple reliance on (judicial) politics. It is too 
broad, then, to apply to all of the various theories of constitutional pluralism—both 
the constitutionally pluralist and the plurally constitutionalist, the radical and the 
metaconstitutional—the charge that the rule of law will inexorably be damaged.161 
Such concern might cause us to move towards and settle upon a conception of the 
relationships which is more constitutionalist—or, in the metaconstitutional frame, it 
may cause us to attach significant weight to the importance of the EU doctrines of 
primacy and direct effect—but this does not necessarily collapse us back to the 
former world of rigidity and hierarchy. It merely reminds us that we are dealing with 
serious matters, and should not be too keen to throw off decades or even centuries of 
experience in seeking to make better sense of the modern world. The criticism can 
then be reconceived: not as a trump, which forces us back into old ways of thinking, 
but as a necessary and important part of the analysis in seeking to theorise and justify 
the present constitutional configuration in Europe. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Baquero Cruz (n 156) at 417. Again, Cruz directs his criticism here at what he calls radical 
pluralism, but it is clear from the context that his understanding of ‘radical’ pluralism is broader than 
the sense in which the term is used throughout this chapter, and includes the metaconstitutional 
theories. 
161 For a defence of an explicitly radical conception of pluralism from the criticism from the rule of 
law, see Krisch (n 42) at 276–285. 
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4.2 The universality of interface norms 
We saw, in Section 4, the different conceptions of interface norms under the various 
models of metaconstitutional pluralism. Fittingly, though the conceptions differed—
from Sabel and Gerstenberg’s evolutive, dialogic account of the emergence of 
interface norms through the jurisgenerative mechanism of the Solange principle; 
through Maduro’s modification of the attitude and self-images of judicial actors; to 
Kumm’s more prescriptive account of specific adjudicative principles—there is 
something of an ‘overlapping consensus’ present in the literature: for example, 
regarding the importance of the mutual recognition of each system’s autonomy or of 
the Solange principle of conditional recognition.  
In particular, however, we saw the claim that these interface norms, whatever 
form they may take, are universal in their applicability. This claim was an explicit 
feature of the work of Kumm, but was also an inherent part of the theories of Maduro 
and of Sabel and Gerstenberg. Problematically, all of these writers draw on similar 
sources in developing their notions of metaconstitutional pluralism—the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ, the ECtHR and (especially) the BVerfG—but without 
focusing much attention on how the specific, contingent relationships between the 
judicial actors in question may have influenced the choice and application of 
interface norms in a given case. 
This problem is relevant in two dimensions. First, ‘horizontally’, it is arguable 
that the relationship between the ECJ and the ECtHR is perhaps more hierarchical in 
nature than is sometimes thought, even prior to the EU’s impending accession to the 
Convention. Moreover, pending this accession, states are interim actors in this 
relationship, and are important sites of constitutional power through which the 
relationship between the two European courts is mediated. Does this extra element 
change the choice and application of interface norms in a given case of conflict 
between legal orders? Secondly, ‘vertically’, there is the question of the relative 
importance of each national polity within the broader legal orders, EU or ECHR, 
notwithstanding the formal principle of equality between states. The BVerfG, the 
jurisprudence of which is of foundational importance to metaconstitutional pluralism, 
is a particularly powerful constitutional actor in a particularly powerful European 
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state. Can doctrines, toolkits, rules and principles developed largely with reference to 
its jurisprudence be transplanted, unchanged, right across the European polyarchy? 
The research question to be addressed in this thesis is therefore as follows: Are 
the interface norms between legal orders the same regardless of the relationship 
between the orders themselves and between the institutional actors involved? 
In this regard, MacCormick wrote that ‘[t]he settled, positive, character of law is 
jurisdiction-relative. … Moral judgments, however personal and controversial, are 
not in this way relativistic … These judgments apply universally’.162 But the kinds 
issues at play in the various conceptions of interface norms—Kumm’s concern for 
democratic legitimacy; Maduro’s principle of universalisability as a safeguard 
against freeriding; Sabel and Gerstenberg’s secular, self-reinforcing dialogue on 
fundamental rights—are frequently both legal and moral in nature. Are they, and 
should they, therefore be universal or particular in their formulation, in their 
application, in both, or in neither? Walker notes that in the development of his ideas 
of constitutional pluralism: 
MacCormick was searching for some notion of a unity of law standing 
beyond particular legal systems, but a unity which was not conceivable in 
terms of a new system to which the original legal systems would inevitably 
become subordinate[.]163 
Precisely the same thing could be said of the metaconstitutional pluralists under 
discussion here. Walker notes—and discounts—one method by which this unity 
could be achieved, the ‘covering-law universalism’ of Michael Walzer,164 which 
entails: 
[A] version of legal unity so strong, so insistent on subordinating the local 
and particular to the epistemic and moral authority of the global and 
universal, that it does not countenance internal differentiation and division at 
all.165 
A more justifiable possibility is Walzer’s ‘reiterative universalism’166 where:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 MacCormick (n 1) at 14–15, citing N MacCormick ‘Comment [on G Postema’s ‘The Normativity 
of Law’]’ in R Gavison (ed) Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987) at 
105–13. 
163 N Walker ‘Reconciling MacCormick: Constitutional Pluralism and the Unity of Practical Reason’ 
(2011) 24 Ratio Juris 369 at 379. 
164 M Walzer ‘Nations and Universe’ in D Miller (ed) Thinking Politically: Essays in Political Theory 
(New Haven CT: Yale UP, 2007) at 187. 
165 Walker (n 164) at 379. 
166 Ibid at 184. 
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[T]here is a general or universal quality to the norms that integrate the 
pluralist configuration. Yet the articulation of these common norms is not 
seen as a matter of simply ‘reading off’ the local version from some inert 
universal covering-law. Rather, it is a continuous and progressive process of 
recontextualization in which the universal is not just realized but also 
reshaped by the particular.167 
My hypothesis is that interface norms under metaconstitutional pluralism are not 
universal, but rather context dependent. The intention in the Chapters that follow is 
similar to Walzer’s reiterative universalism: to apply a model of metaconstitutional 
pluralism to specific examples of constitutional conflict in Europe and to see 
whether, and how, these ostensibly universal interface norms can be ‘not just realized 
but also reshaped by the particular’. 
 
5 OVERVIEW OF METHODS AND STRUCTURE 
5.1 A working model of metaconstitutional pluralism 
The model of metaconstitutional pluralism that I use in the analysis that follows is 
closely based on that of Sabel and Gerstenberg. In analytical terms, it regards the 
legal configuration in Europe today as a deliberative polyarchy, wherein three legal 
orders—state, EU, and ECHR—each make plausible claims as to their own 
autonomy. However, this is done without—at least from an external, freestanding 
perspective—any of the legal orders having entirely subsumed themselves under the 
authority and logic of any of the others. On this view, ‘the constitution’ in any given 
EU Member State is not just the national constitution, but rather the national 
constitution, the Convention, and the legal order of the EU taken together. The 
relationship between the orders is interactive and dialogic, and may be regarded as 
hierarchical or heterarchical, depending on the specific circumstances. This holistic 
constitutional construct is depicted in the thesis as the triangular constitution, with 
the legal orders themselves forming the vertices of the triangle, and the relationship 
and interactions between them constituting the triangle’s sides. 
Where the model breaks with that of Sabel and Gerstenberg is in its conception 
of interface norms. Whereas Sabel and Gerstenberg expressly disclaim the possibility 
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of there being any ‘meta-criteria … by which to harmonise all decision making’,168 
preferring instead to rely on the jurisgenerative possibilities of inter-institutional 
dialogue, I instead leave that question open while undertaking the analysis that 
follows. This agnosticism allows the model to comprehend and probe the 
conceptions of interface norms under cosmopolitan constitutionalism and 
contrapunctual law as well as the principle of overlapping consensus. Being the most 
prescriptive account in the literature, and the one in which the claim to universality is 
at its most explicit and its most central, the work of Kumm will be at the heart of the 
inquiry. Moreover, though Kumm and Maduro’s theories were specifically 
developed within the context of the EU-Member State relationship, imagining the 
triangular constitution as a deliberative polyarchy allows us to broaden the analysis 
to include the Convention system while still encompassing and comprehending the 
interface norms formulated within that bilateral relationship, and enables us to 
investigate the extent to which these norms—and, conceivably, others as yet 
unidentified—may also play a part in the state-Convention and Convention-Union 
relationships. For the reasons outlined in the Introduction to this thesis, the Member 
State chosen as the specific setting for the analysis is Ireland. 
 
5.2 Chapter outline 
The investigation of the universality of interface norms will proceed in three parts, 
focusing on specific instances of constitutional conflict, actual and potential, within 
the triangular constitution. 
Chapter 2 parses the relationships between the legal orders in the ‘vertical’ 
frame: the nature of the relationships between Ireland and the EU, and Ireland and 
the ECHR; the means by which the norms of these non-state legal orders are received 
within the domestic order; and the question of priority in cases of conflict, along with 
the choice and application of interface norms in such cases. 
Chapter 3 examines the ‘horizontal’ side of the triangle, that is, the relationship 
between the Union and the Convention. Importantly, though this relationship is 
characterised as being ‘horizontal’, there is an important ‘triangular’ element to it, 
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given the as yet indirect but concrete nature of the linkages between the systems, and 
the status of states as intermediaries between the two European orders. 
Chapter 4 is the broadest in scope, and investigates a specifically ‘triangular’ 
instance of interaction between all three orders: the issue of the regulation of 
abortion in Ireland. Importantly, the substantive question of the rights and wrongs of 
abortion is largely (but not necessarily entirely) irrelevant for this analysis. Instead, 
the focus is on the metaconstitutional aspects: how each legal order conceives of its 
role, its rights and its duties; and how these potentially competing conceptions find 
expression in interface norms. 
Chapter 5 draws the three frames together, with a theoretical examination of what 
became clear when the inter-order relationships were looked at in isolation, and what 
becomes clear when all three are pulled together into one holistic frame. Finally, a 
brief conclusion restates the answer to the research question of interface norm 
universality, in light of the empirical evidence in Chapters 2–4, and the theoretical 
analysis in Chapter 5: that the norms are not in fact universal. As a result, theories of 
metaconstitutional pluralism need to pay much greater attention to the specific nature 





CHAPTER 2:  
THE VERTICAL FRAME 
INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter parses the relationships between the legal orders of the triangular 
constitution in the ‘vertical’ frame: the two sides of the triangle that deal with the 
relationship between state and non-state legal orders. As explained in Chapter 1, the 
central research question of the thesis concerns the universality or otherwise of 
metaconstitutional interface norms, but this question cannot be engaged with (or 
answered) without first demonstrating that the conception of the three legal orders as 
being part of a deliberative polyarchy is in fact accurate. Accordingly, along with a 
discussion of interface norms, this chapter also aims to demonstrate the correctness 
of such a conception, and will proceed in two major parts. 
Section 2 seeks to set out the precise means by which the Irish constitutional 
order was ‘opened’ to that of the EU. In demonstrating the non-hierarchical nature of 
the relationship between these two orders, it examines two instances of the national 
constitutional review of EU norms—ex post and ex ante—and engages in a 
preliminary analysis of the nature of the interface norms employed. 
Section 3 performs the same function with respect to the relationship between the 
Irish legal order and that of the ECHR, setting out the evolution of the relationship 
from being a standard dualist relationship between national and international legal 
orders to something more integrated and interactive.  
The Chapter concludes by suggesting that the relationship between the national 
system and both European systems is best regarded as being heterarchical; that the 
three systems form part of a tripartite deliberative polyarchy; and that rather than 
being simple applications of the universal metaconstitutional interface norms posited 
by Kumm and Maduro, the norms that regulate the relationships between the orders 
are frequently constitutional or legislative in nature. That is, they are conflict-of-laws 
rules internal to the national legal system, and particular to that system. Whether 
(and how) they can be metaconstitutionalised—transplanted from their national site 
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of origin, departicularised, and made relevant to different national sites in the 
polyarchy—remains an open question. 
 
1 THE TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN IRISH LAW AND EU LAW 
1.1 Incorporating EU law in Ireland 
1.1.1 A closed legal order 
The classical story of the constitutional evolution of the EU was recounted in 
Chapter 1. Quite aside from that narrative of judicial constitutionalisation, the 
Communities consisted of various institutions from the very beginning—an 
Assembly (later a Parliament), a Commission, a Council and a Court—which were to 
exercise very real normative power of a legislative, executive, judicial or 
administrative character, necessarily implying the delegation or transfer of some 
aspects of these powers from national institutions to those of the Communities. As 
originally enacted in 1937, the Irish Constitution contained a number of provisions 
that would complicate—if not definitely exclude—membership of an international 
organisation of the scale, depth, and breadth of the Communities and their later 
incarnations.1 
First is the general issue of the source of constitutional authority, and the identity 
of those entitled to exercise it. Article 6 of the Constitution states that:  
All powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial derive, 
under God, from the people, whose right it is to designate the rulers of the 
State and, in final appeal, to decide all questions of national policy, 
according to the requirements of the common good.2 
Having identified ‘the people’ as the source of all constitutional power (leaving the 
role of God to one side as essentially unknowable), and having invoked tripartite 
separation of powers theory to divide the powers of government into legislative, 
executive and judicial, Article 6.2 goes on to state that ‘[t]hese powers of 
government are exercisable only by or on the authority of the organs established by 
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since Ireland’s accession to the Union in 1972/73. For the sake of clarity, the current numbering as at 
November 2013 will be used throughout. 
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this constitution.’ The particular institutions invested with governmental power are 
specified in later articles, following the tripartite scheme. As regards the legislative 
power, Article 15.2.1° vests the ‘sole and exclusive power of making laws’ in the 
Oireachtas. Article 28.2 vests the executive power in the government, subject to the 
other provisions of the Constitution; and Article 29.4.1° vests the executive power 
insofar as it relates to external relations in the government in accordance with Article 
28. Articles 34–37—grouped under the heading ‘The Courts’—deal with the judicial 
function. They provide that ‘[j]ustice shall be administered in courts established by 
law by judges appointed in the manner provided by this Constitution’;3 that the High 
Court shall have ‘full original jurisdiction in and power to determine all matters and 
questions whether of law or fact, civil or criminal’;4 and that the Supreme Court is 
the final court of appeal, whose decisions ‘shall in all cases be final and conclusive’.5 
Finally, there is the Constitution’s dualist attitude to international law, Article 29.6 
providing that ‘[n]o international agreement shall be part of the domestic law of the 
State save as may be determined by the Oireachtas.’ 
As will be clear, a dualist national constitutional scheme of this sort is essentially 
‘closed’ in nature. It identifies ‘the people’ as the source of all governmental 
authority; vests the exercise of that authority in named institutions set up by the 
Constitution itself; and makes the domestic applicability of international law 
conditional on the specific incorporation of that law into the national legal system. A 
self-contained and self-referential normative order such as this is essentially 
incompatible with the autonomous and autochthonous jurisgenerative power of the 
Communities, as they then were. It was therefore clear that some form of amendment 
to the Irish Constitution would be necessary to ‘open’ the constitutional order in 
order to allow for Community membership. 
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5 Article 34.4.6°. Note that the Thirty-third Amendment of the Constitution (Court of Appeal) Bill 
2013 was approved in a referendum on 4 October 2013. Accordingly, a new Court of Appeal, situated 
between the High and Supreme Courts in the judicial hierarchy, will be established in the near future. 
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1.1.2 Opening the legal order—a three-pronged approach 
Accession to the Communities was achieved, and EC law made domestically 
effective, by three legal mechanisms: a constitutional ‘licence to join’, a 
constitutional ‘exclusion clause’, and a legislative measure giving effect to EC law 
within the jurisdiction.6 Each of these will be set out in turn. 
The first two were contained within the Third Amendment of the Constitution 
Bill 1972, which proposed the insertion into the Constitution of the following 
provision, originally as Article 29.4.3°: 
The State may become a member of the European Coal and Steel 
Community … , the European Economic Community … and the European 
Atomic Energy Community … . No provision of this Constitution 
invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State 
necessitated by the obligations of membership of the Communities or 
prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the Communities, 
or institutions thereof, from having the force of law in the State. 
The first sentence of the Third Amendment has been termed the ‘licence to join’,7 
and has repeatedly been updated by referendum in order to enable the ratification of 
subsequent EU treaties.8 The second sentence—italicised above—has been termed 
the ‘constitutional exclusion clause’,9 and is now to be found on its own in Article 
29.4.6°.10 The Third Amendment Bill was passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas, 
triggering a referendum in accordance with the terms of Article 46.11 This was held 
on 10 May 1972, and was approved by 83% of the electorate, on a turnout of 71%.12 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Contemporary accounts of the instruments of accession are given in J Temple Lang ‘Legal and 
Constitutional Problems for Ireland of Adhesion to the EEC Treaty’ (1972) 9 Common Market Law 
Review 16; and M Robinson ‘The Irish European Communities Act 1972’ (1973) 10 Common Market 
Law Review 352. 
7 Crotty v An Taoiseach [1987] IR 713 at 756 per Barrington J. 
8 As the Constitution now stands, Art 29.4.3° authorises membership of Euratom; Art 29.4.4° states 
that ‘Ireland affirms its commitment to the European Union within which the member states of that 
Union work together to promote peace, shared values and the well-being of their peoples’; and Art 
29.4.5° authorises ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and membership of the EU established thereunder. 
9 M Cahill ‘Constitutional Exclusion Clauses, Article 29.4.6°, and the Constitutional Reception of 
European Law’ (2011) 18(2) Dublin University Law Journal 74 at 78. 
10 The text of the exclusion clause has been updated to take into account the expiry of the ECSC and 
the depillarisation of the EU, but its meaning and effect have not been materially affected. 
11 Article 46 sets out the only procedure by which the Constitution may be amended, ‘whether by way 
of variation, addition or repeal’ (Article 46.1), and requires a popular referendum, with a simple 
majority of votes cast for the amendment to be approved. 
12 Referendum Results 1937–2009 (Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, 
Dublin 2009) available at 
<http://www.environ.ie/en/LocalGovernment/Voting/Referenda/PublicationsDocuments/FileDownLo
ad,1894,en.pdf>. It is worthwhile to note, in relation to the issue of democratic legitimacy that informs 
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The third provision enabling membership was the European Communities Act 
(ECA) 1972, a short piece of ordinary legislation. Section 2 provides, in full, that: 
From the 1st day of January, 1973, the treaties governing the European 
Communities and the existing and future acts adopted by the institutions of 
those Communities shall be binding on the State and shall be part of the 
domestic law thereof under the conditions laid down in those treaties. 
Taken together, these three provisions enabled the direct and full-throated 
incorporation of Community law into the domestic legal order. The ECA 1972 
performed the substantive legwork of making EC law domestically effective within a 
dualist system, backed up by a constitutional authorisation for membership of the 
Community, and a clause which ostensibly sought to immunise EC law from 
constitutional scrutiny. It might therefore appear that constitutional pluralism of any 
sort, and particularly a heterarchical conception of the power relations between 
domestic and EU constitutional orders, is simply inapt for describing the Irish 
constitutional configuration. On this analysis, the three-pronged method of accession 
simply subsumed Irish constitutional law within the mantle and the logic of the 
Treaties, replacing dualism with monism, and that is all there is to it. Indeed, as we 
shall soon see, this has been the long-standing orthodoxy in Ireland, particularly as 
regards the ‘exclusion clause’ of Article 29.4.6°. 
But the reality is altogether more complex. A close reading of the ‘license to 
join’ and the ‘exclusion clause’—and the case law surrounding them—suggests that 
a monist reading of the relationship is inaccurate; provides an opening for a pluralist 
analysis of the terms of engagement between the legal orders; and, more than this, 
demonstrates that a polyarchic arrangement is in fact the most convincing way of 
conceptualising these relations. In developing his theory of contrapunctual law, 
outlined in Chapter 1, Maduro identified two different types of national 
constitutional challenge to the claim to ultimate authority made by European 
constitutionalism: first, there is the ex ante constitutional review of EU norms, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
much of Kumm’s conception of cosmopolitan constitutionalism—and, more generally, the resistance 
of metaconstitutional pluralism to the wholesale primacy of EU law—that this was the second-highest 
turnout in a referendum in Ireland’s history, beaten only by the 76% turnout in the referendum on 
adopting the Constitution itself in 1937. Moreover, in 1937, the Constitution was approved by only 
57% of those voting. Accordingly, in 1937, only 39% of the total electorate endorsed the Constitution, 
whereas, in 1972, fully 58% of the total electorate voted in favour of accession to the Communities—
a fact rarely remembered in debates surrounding the Union’s democratic legitimacy in Ireland. 
(Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole figure). 
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especially including Treaty amendments.13 Though the particular way in which such 
a review is conducted varies widely throughout the Union, ‘[t]his is effectively 
required by all national legal orders with regard to Treaty changes’.14 Secondly, there 
is the altogether more controversial ex post national constitutional review of EU 
norms,15 epitomised by the Solange jurisprudence of the BVerfG. This occurs in 
different ways and to greatly varying degrees across the Union, depending on the 
existence of mechanisms of constitutional judicial review, the status ascribed to the 
EU by the national constitution, and the attitudes of national constitutional courts.16 
This typology fits well with the case law on the ‘authorisation’ inherent in Article 
29.4.3° and the ‘exemption’ suggested by Article 29.4.6°, and will therefore be used 
to examine the nature of the relationship between the Irish Constitution and EU law, 
and the nature of the interface norms—constitutional and metaconstitutional—
regulating the relationship. 
 
1.2 The ‘license to join’ and the ex ante review of EU norms 
We have seen that Ireland’s initial accession to the EU was backed up by a relatively 
impressive expression of popular constitutional authorisation. However, if we are to 
take seriously the argument that 1 January 1973 was a watershed, after which 
provisions of the Irish Constitution could never outweigh the exigencies of European 
integration, it would follow that subsequent Treaty amendments would be entirely 
within the initial popular authorisation for EU membership. Indeed, this was 
essentially the state’s argument in its role as defendant in Crotty v An Taoiseach,17 
‘the only case solely dedicated to an analysis of the constitutional problems posed by 
membership’18 and the proximate cause of much subsequent pan-European grief 
resulting from what now appears to be the Irish tradition of the ‘neverendum’. As we 
shall soon see, the state’s argument was unsuccessful: instead, Crotty provides 
convincing evidence for the proposition that at least prior to the coming into force of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 M Poiares Maduro ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’ in N Walker 
(ed) Sovereignty in Transition (Hart, Oxford 2003) at 506–508 
14 Ibid at 506. 
15 Ibid at 508–511. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Crotty v An Taoiseach [1987] IR 713. 
18 Phelan (n 1) at 335. 
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EU norms, the question of the compatibility of these norms with the Irish 
Constitution cannot be ignored or papered over. Accordingly, there remains at the 
very least a residual or gatekeeping role for national constitutionalism, and the 
argument of all-purpose subordination to EU law is weakened. From the internal 
perspective of a (dualist) national constitutional order, a non-state legal order that 
relies on national constitutional law for its validity cannot in any meaningful sense 
be considered hierarchically superior in normative terms.19  
Crotty, an Irish citizen, sought an injunction restraining the Irish Government 
from finalising the ratification of the Single European Act (SEA); a declaration that 
the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1986 (which purported to make the 
SEA domestically effective) was repugnant to the Constitution; and a declaration that 
ratification of the SEA without a constitutional amendment would be in breach of the 
Constitution. The injunction was initially granted by the High Court, but upon full 
hearing of the issues, the Court discharged the injunction and the plaintiff’s relief 
was denied. The plaintiff immediately appealed, and had his injunction re-granted 
pending the hearing. It was finally held by the Supreme Court that the 1986 Act was 
not repugnant to the Constitution.20 However, while the Supreme Court held 
unanimously that the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere with the government’s 
conduct of foreign policy, it went on to hold—by a 3:2 split21—that in any case 
where the Government, in conducting foreign policy, purported to alienate any 
powers of government or fetter the sovereignty of the state, such purported action 
would be beyond the power conferred upon the government by the Constitution. On 
this basis, the majority held that the State’s purported ratification of Title III of the 
SEA22 was outwith the executive powers of the Government in the sphere of external 
relations, and thus was void without specific constitutional license to ratify, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Maduro (n 13) at 507–508. 
20 This part of the judgment was unanimous, and without dissenting opinions, as was required under 
the circumstances by Article 34.4.5°: ‘The decision of the Supreme Court on a question as to the 
validity of a law having regard to the provisions of this Constitution shall be pronounced by such one 
of the judges of that Court as that Court shall direct, and no other opinion on such question, whether 
assenting or dissenting, shall be pronounced, nor shall the existence of any such other opinion be 
disclosed.’ 
21 Article 34.4.5°’s unanimity requirement not applying, as this issue did not concern the 
constitutionality of a statute. 
22 Entitled ‘Treaty Provisions on European Co-operation in the Sphere of Foreign Policy’, the 
forerunner of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
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could be achieved only by referendum. The issues of the constitutionality of the 1986 
Act and Title III SEA will be dealt with in turn.23 
 
1.2.1 Domestic reservation of ultimate constitutionality by conditional 
recognition: the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1986 
The 1986 Act purported to amend the ECA 1972 to make domestically effective 
certain provisions of the SEA, all of which consisted of amendments to the Treaties 
of Paris and Rome. Because the State was explicitly authorised to ratify these 
Treaties by the electorate in 1972, the question was therefore whether the license to 
join of Article 29.4.3° entitled the State to ratify the Treaties as they stood in 1972, 
but not to ratify any subsequent treaties without a further Constitutional amendment 
(as the plaintiff alleged); or, as the Government claimed, whether it entitled the State: 
[T]o join Communities which were established by Treaties as dynamic 
and developing entities and that it should be interpreted as authorising the 
State to participate in and agree to amendments of the Treaties which are 
within the original scope and objectives of the Treaties.24 
In a passage much subsequently quoted, the Court held that: 
[Article 29.4.3°] must be construed as an authorisation given to the State 
not only to join the Communities as they stood in 1973, but also to join in 
amendments of the Treaties so long as such amendments do not alter the 
essential scope or objectives of the Communities. To hold that [Article 
29.4.3°] does not authorise any form of amendment to the Treaties after 
1973 without a further amendment of the Constitution would be too narrow 
a construction; to construe it as an open-ended authority to agree, without 
further amendment of the Constitution, to any amendment of the Treaties 
would be too broad.25 
Straightaway, we can see from the words italicised an—unreferenced—application 
of the Solange principle of conditional recognition. The Supreme Court chose a 
middle path between the outright denial or wholesale embrace of the evolutionary 
nature of the EC legal order. The acceptability of EC constitutional evolution to the 
national constitutional order was made conditional, and the Court reserved to itself 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 It was not contended, and the Court held it to be clear, that ratification of the SEA—which, despite 
its name, was an international treaty between states referred to using the public international law 
terminology of ‘High Contracting Parties’, and not an infra-Community measure agreed upon 
between fellow Member States (Crotty (n 17) at 784 per Henchy J)—was not an act ‘necessitated by 
the obligations of membership of the Communities’: therefore we need not consider the ‘exclusion 
clause’ of Article 29.4.6° for present purposes (ibid at 767 per Finlay CJ (per curiam)). 
24 Crotty (n 17) at 767 per Finlay CJ. 
25 Ibid, emphasis added. 
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the power to determine the breach or fulfilment of the substantive condition that the 
‘essential scope or objectives of the Communities’ not be altered. The Court 
therefore conducted its own analysis of the SEA, the Treaties, and the 1986 Act, 
without (direct) reference to the jurisprudence of any other court, including the ECJ. 
The plaintiff alleged four areas where the 1986 Act went beyond what was 
permissible under Article 29.4.3°. First, a shift in the Council’s voting procedures in 
six areas from unanimity to a qualified majority was alleged to be an unauthorised 
surrender of sovereignty.26 Second, the establishment of the then-Court of First 
Instance (CFI) was said to be an unauthorised surrender of judicial power.27 Third, 
the SEA added five new objectives to the EEC Treaty, allegedly taking it outside the 
terms of the initial authorisation of 1972.28 Finally, the SEA gave the Council new 
powers relating to the provision of services, the working environment, and the health 
and safety of workers ‘which could encroach on existing guarantees of fundamental 
rights under the Constitution’.29 
In its decision, the Court noted that: 
The capacity of the Council to make decisions with legislative effect is a 
diminution of the sovereignty of Member States, including Ireland, and this 
is one of the reasons why the Third Amendment to the Constitution was 
necessary. Sovereignty in this context is the unfettered right to decide: to say 
yes or no. 30 
However, the Court went on to note that whereas unanimity was a ‘valuable shield’31 
against proposals the State might oppose, qualified or simple majority voting was of 
significant assistance with respect to proposals the State might support. Moreover, 
the EC Treaty itself contemplated that decision-making in various areas would 
initially be unanimous, but would, over time, require only a qualified majority.32 
Accordingly: 
The Community was thus a developing organism with diverse and changing 
methods for making decisions and an inbuilt and clearly expressed objective 
of expansion and progress, both in terms of the number of Member States 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Crotty (n 17) at 768. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. The new objectives added by Articles 20–21 and 23–25 SEA concerned economic and 
monetary policy; the health and safety of workers; economic and social cohesion; research and 
technological development; and environmental protection. 
29 Ibid at 768. 
30 Ibid at 769. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
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and in terms of the mechanics to be used in the achievement of its agreed 
objectives.33 
The changes envisaged by the SEA as regards the Council’s voting procedures were 
therefore neither unforeseeable nor unjustifiable, and did not go beyond what had 
initially been authorised in 1972. The plaintiff’s other objections fell on similar 
grounds, the Court noting that some of the judicial power of the State had been ceded 
to the ECJ by virtue of Ireland’s accession to the Communities; and that the 
establishment of the CFI was an internal re-organisation of power already ceded, and 
did not involve any further cession of power.34 Though the SEA’s separate and 
specific statement of various objectives was indeed an innovation, they were within 
the original objectives of the Communities, as set out in Articles 2 and 3 EEC.35 
Moreover, the Council’s new powers did not ‘alter the essential character’36 of the 
Communities, and the plaintiff had not shown that they could threaten fundamental 
constitutional rights.37 Within the hermetically-sealed boundaries of Irish 
constitutional law, the changes to the Treaties effected by the SEA were held not to 
alter substantially the scope or objectives of the Communities, and accordingly, the 
1986 Act, which incorporated those changes into domestic law, was constitutional. 
This first part of the judgment in Crotty shows that it is for the Irish courts, and 
none other, to determine what does and does not constitute the essential scope and 
objectives of the Communities, and later the Union. Two consequences flow from 
this as regards the powers of the domestic judiciary vis-à-vis EC/EU law. As Phelan 
notes, if the Community law interpretation of the scope and objectives of the 
Community were to go beyond that that of Irish constitutional law ‘then the 
European Communities Act (as amended) would be open to constitutional challenge 
so far as it purports to import into domestic law a rule which goes beyond the Irish 
constitutional law version’.38 Second, acts or measures of Community law or 
implementing Community law which go beyond the Irish interpretation of the scope 
and objectives would not be ‘necessitated’ within the meaning of Article 29.4.6°, and 
would therefore prima facie be vulnerable to Irish constitutional attack, regardless of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





38 Phelan (n 1) at 337. 
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how one interprets Article 29.4.6°. It is submitted that despite the changes that have 
taken place since Phelan first proposed this analysis, his logic stands.39 
Before moving on from the 1986 Act, there is another aspect of the decision 
which is important for present purposes, because it relates to the acceptance or 
otherwise of the ECJ’s doctrine of primacy, and therefore to the question of 
hierarchy and heterarchy. The headnote to the case report of Crotty states that ‘the 
proposed new Court of First Instance did not in any way extend the primacy of the 
[ECJ] over the Irish Courts beyond that already authorised in [Article 29.4.3°].’40 But 
nowhere in the relevant part of the judgment did the Supreme Court advert to the EU 
legal concept of primacy.41 Instead, according to the Court, the ECJ was established 
‘to ensure that in the interpretation and the application of the Treaty the law is 
observed’42—a simple recitation of what is now Article 19 TEU. Furthermore, the 
Court only recognised the finality of the ECJ’s jurisprudence insofar as it relates to 
the interpretation of the Treaty and on questions of its implementation. Recognising 
the ECJ’s authority to interpret the Treaty is hardly a recognition of the absolute 
primacy of its judgments over those of national courts. Just as the only bodies 
competent to interpret the Irish Constitution authoritatively are the High and 
Supreme Courts established thereunder—and specifically empowered to do so and 
for that interpretation to be final—the ECJ is the only body competent to interpret the 
Treaties authoritatively, and to have its interpretation taken as final. This in no way 
amounts to the all-purpose subordination of one legal system to another—rather, it is 
a good example of exactly the sort of arrangement described by deliberative 
polyarchy. It stretches the Court’s judgment—which at this point did not even refer 
to any cases of the ECJ, let alone Costa v ENEL43 or Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft44—past breaking point to regard the above as a wholesale 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See further M Cahill ‘A Critical Assessment of Irish Scholarship on the Constitutional Reception of 
European Law’ in T Mohr and J Schweppe (eds) Thirty Years of Legal Scholarship (Dublin: 
Roundhall, 2011) 234 at 244–246. 
40 Crotty (n 17) at 714–5. 
41 Curiously, the only mention of ‘primacy’ in the relevant part of the case is with regard to the 
Council, ‘whose decisions have primacy over domestic law’—a statement made in passing, and 
without reference to authority (ibid at 769). 
42 Ibid at 769 per Finlay CJ per curiam. 
43 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
44 Case 11/70 International Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125. 
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endorsement of the ECJ’s conception of primacy, regardless of what the headnote to 
Crotty may say. For judicial endorsement of the Costa jurisprudence, as we shall see 
in Section 3, one must look elsewhere. 
 
1.2.2 ‘Penultimate judicial supremacy’ and the boundaries of government 
action: Title III SEA 
Though the plaintiff was unsuccessful in challenging the constitutionality of the 1986 
Act, the claim that Title III SEA could not be ratified without a referendum was 
upheld. The Court was in total agreement that Article 29.4.1° vests in the 
Government the executive power of the State in connection with its external 
relations, and that the conduct of this power is outwith the purview of the courts (in 
that the courts have no foreign policy role or voice whatsoever). However, Article 
29.4.1° specifically states that this foreign policy power is to be exercised in 
accordance with Article 28, which provides, at Article 28.2, that ‘[t]he executive 
power of the State shall, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, be exercised 
by or on the authority of the Government.’45 For the majority of the Court, the 
portion of Article 28.2 emphasised above was sufficient to impart to the 
Government, along with the right to conduct the State’s foreign policy without 
judicial interference, the obligation not to go beyond what is permissible with respect 
to the totality of the Constitution. The threshold question of what is and is not 
permissible with respect to the Constitution is then a matter for the courts 
exclusively.46 This idea was put most succinctly by Hederman J, whose brief 
judgment contains a neat précis of the majority’s reasoning: 
The State’s organs cannot contract to exercise in a particular procedure their 
policy-making roles or in any way to fetter powers bestowed unfettered by 
the Constitution. They are the guardians of these powers—not the disposers 
of them.47 
According to the reasoning of the majority, Title III SEA obliged the State, and each 
ratifying State, ‘to surrender part of its sovereignty in the conduct of foreign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Emphasis added. 
46 Crotty (n 17) at 778 per Walsh J, at 786 per Henchy J. 
47 Ibid at 794 per Hederman J. 
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relations’,48 which, in Ireland’s case, directly went against the claims to national and 
state sovereignty in Articles 1 and 5 of the Constitution. Furthermore, according to 
Henchy J’s reading of Article 6.1, ‘the common good of the Irish people is the 
ultimate standard by which the constitutional validity of the conduct of foreign 
affairs by the Government is to be judged.’49 For the State to be bound to ‘take full 
account’ of the common positions of the Member States, as provided for by Title III 
SEA, was therefore enough of a derogation from the ‘ultimate standard’ of the 
common good of the Irish people to render the State’s purported ratification of Title 
III SEA null and void, in the absence of a new ‘license to join’ along the lines of that 
in the Third Amendment, which could only be provided by the people by way of 
referendum. Thus the coming into force of the SEA was delayed pending such 
referendum, which was held in May 1987 and was carried by a large majority, albeit 
on a turnout of only 44%.50  
This part of the judgment in Crotty demonstrates that the system of authority 
under the Irish Constitution can be regarded as one of ‘penultimate judicial 
supremacy’. The reason that this judicial supremacy is ‘penultimate’, rather than 
final, is that the final say on each matter (insofar as constitutional decisions can ever 
be truly ‘final’) is reserved to the citizens themselves, acting in concert, by way of 
referendum. Though the Constitution provides for a wide degree of autonomy for 
and separation between the legislative, executive and judicial powers, it is the 
judicial power that is charged with the penultimate defence of the Constitution. The 
judiciary may not interfere with the legislative process while it is ongoing, 51 but may 
rule on the constitutional validity of legislative norms once enacted. Equally, the 
judiciary has no role or voice in the government’s exercise of its foreign policy 
powers, except for a residual, threshold power to prevent the government ‘fetter[ing] 
powers bestowed unfettered by the Constitution’. Whatever its merits and demerits—
and no doubt there are many—this strong judicial power is the long-established 
orthodoxy in Ireland, as evidenced by the foundational statement of Ó Dálaigh CJ in 
The State (Quinn) v Ryan: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Ibid at 787 per Henchy J. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Referendum Results (n 12) at 39. 
51 Wireless Dealers’ Assocition v Fair Trade Commission (Unreported, Supreme Court, 14 March 
1956); Roche v Ireland (Unreported, High Court, 17 June 1983). 
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It was not the intention of the Constitution in guaranteeing the fundamental 
rights of the citizen that these rights should be set at nought or 
circumvented. The intention was that rights of substance were being assured 
to the individual and that the Courts were the custodians of these rights. As a 
necessary corollary it follows that no-one can with impunity set these rights 
at nought or circumvent them, and that the Court’s powers in this regard are 
as ample as the defence of the Constitution requires.52 
A necessary corollary of this, taken in conjunction with the Constitution’s 
amendability by way of referendum, is that if the citizenry believes the judiciary to 
have been wrong in its defence of the Constitution, that decision can be reversed and 
corrected by popular vote. Of the 36 constitutional referenda held in Ireland since 
1937, nine have been in response to judicial decisions,53 with some endorsed and 
others reversed. 
 
1.2.3  Analysis: conditional recognition, ‘scope and objectives’, and the 
attitude of the Court 
The overview above has demonstrated that Crotty provides an exemplar of Maduro’s 
first leg of the national legitimation of EU law: ex ante constitutional review. The 
question of the compatibility of the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1986 
with the Constitution was a matter solely of Irish law, and was therefore apt for 
review by an Irish court without reference to other authorities (‘higher’ or 
otherwise). The Government’s ability to ratify Title III SEA without consent was, 
under the accepted Irish theory of the separation of powers, subject to the control of 
the judiciary, and ultimately the electorate. These facts go some of the way towards 
demonstrating that the Irish and EU legal orders can be regarded as part of a 
polyarchy—each order having ultimate authority on its own terms in its own 
domain—rather then being hierarchically integrated. 
The substantive interface norm adopted by the Supreme Court with respect to the 
1986 Act was the principle of conditional recognition subject to the ‘scope and 
objectives’ test, a standard noted by Phelan to be ‘extremely vague … the essential 
scope of the Community is far from clear, and what can come under its objectives is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 The State (Quinn) v Ryan [1965] IR 70 at 122. 
53 Updated from C Costello ‘Ireland’s Nice Referenda’ (2005) 1 European Constitutional Law Review 
357 at 382. 
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potentially limitless.’54 Vague or otherwise, what it is important is that this is a norm 
internal to the Irish legal order. This manifests in two senses. First, rather than being 
an overarching (metaconstitutional) rule, straddling legal orders and managing the 
relationships between them, it is a conflict-of-laws rule purely from within the 
national system. It is in this sense constitutional, not metaconstitutional. Secondly, 
and relatedly, because this is a norm particularly and logically within the domain of 
Irish law, it is subject to the final say of domestic constitutional actors.55 The 
question of the legitimacy of the Government’s purported ratification of Title III 
SEA was similarly internal in nature.  
Let us recall that Kumm posits the principle of conditional recognition as a 
universal, metaconstitutional interface norm justifying the disapplication of EU 
norms in the face of deficient protection for fundamental rights, whereas Sabel and 
Gerstenberg regard the principle as a more general doctrinal tool by which an 
overlapping consensus can be constitutionalised. Neither of these descriptions quite 
captures the Court’s decision here, however, though the notion of conditional 
recognition as a doctrinal tool comes closest. The question of fundamental 
constitutional rights had been raised by the plaintiff, but the Court merely pointed out 
that no threat had been identified, and therefore engaged in no inquiry as to whether 
the EC legal order was equipped to guard against such a threat. Rather, the Court’s 
concern—though expressed in both parts of the judgment in the language of 
sovereignty, defined as the unfettered right to decide—was democratic legitimacy. 
Accession to the Communities, and the diminution of sovereignty that this entailed, 
had been democratically authorised. With respect to the 1986 Act, the principle of 
conditional recognition was therefore employed as a means by which the Community 
legal order could be prevented from going beyond this authorisation without further 
recourse to the electorate. With respect to Title III SEA, the focus was similarly on 
democratic legitimacy, but here conditional recognition played no role—rather, the 
Government, in purporting to ratify Title III SEA without a referendum, had strayed 
beyond the bounds of the authority in foreign affairs granted to it by the Constitution. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Phelan (n 1) at 336. 
55 Ibid at 336–7. 
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Being a rule internal to a national system, the ‘scope and objectives’ test, though 
having democratic legitimacy as its central concern, does not fit with Kumm’s 
conception of democratic legitimacy as a metaconstitutional interface norm capable 
of universal application—the protection of a ‘clear and specific constitutional norm 
that reflect[s] essential commitments of the national community’.56 It is clear from 
the examples Kumm gives—the right to the life of the unborn in Ireland and the non-
recognition of private higher education in Greece57—that, by this, he meant an 
instance of national constitutional specificity, something particularly important in 
one state, which does not necessarily have echoes in other European constitutional 
orders. While it may well be possible to construct a retrospective argument that the 
Supreme Court was protecting the ‘clear and specific’ constitutional norm of Article 
6 of the Constitution—its reservation to the people of the ultimate right to decide all 
questions of national policy—the Court framed its arguments in altogether more 
general terms. Moreover, there is nothing nationally specific about the Irish 
Constitution’s claim of popular sovereignty. Rather, the ‘scope and objectives’ test 
derives from the particular, historically contingent means by which the Irish legal 
order had been opened to that of the Communities, and the legitimacy of the 
ratification of Title III SEA depended solely on how the Irish Constitution confers 
authority on the executive.  
The Irish Supreme Court is a national court, and as such is obliged to operate 
within the terms of the national constitution. Constitutional pluralism, and 
particularly metaconstitutional pluralism, by contrast, is a specifically external 
explanatory discourse. This being the case, the question then arises whether the 
internal, nationally-specific approach of the Supreme Court in Crotty can be 
‘metaconstitutionalised’—that is, explained in more general, universal terms, from a 
perspective outwith the national legal system. In his discussion of the ex ante review 
of EU norms, Maduro notes the variety of ways that Member States deal with the 
issue: an express requirement in the constitutional text for national ratification of any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 M Kumm ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe 
Before and After the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal 262 at 300 
57 Ibid at 297. 
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‘constitutional amendment’ of the EU;58 the imposition of substantive conditions 
regarding the content and manner of the transfer of sovereignty;59 and the imposition 
of conditions relating to other constitutional values and rules.60 In terms of the 
decision in Crotty, the second of these categories describes the scope and objectives 
test, and the third describes the judicial oversight of the government’s exercise of its 
foreign policy. However, these various methods of national oversight of EU 
constitutional development are so generally phrased, and subject to such diversity in 
their application, that they bear little resemblance to the clearly specified, narrowly 
delimited universal metaconstitutional interface norms posited by Kumm. It may 
well be the case that any attempt to zoom out from a national constitutional order in 
order to formulate universal principles by which the ex ante review of EU norms 
could be conducted results in ‘principles’ so wide in their statement and general in 
their application that they cease to be in any way action-guiding and instead become 
broad categories, encompassing different, potentially conflicting approaches. Let us 
bear this thought in mind for now, before returning to it in considering the question 
of ex post constitutional review in Section 2.3 
While the specific principles that the Supreme Court applied in Crotty are deeply 
embedded in the text and nature of the Irish Constitution, the Court’s general attitude 
to the autonomy of EC law does fit quite well with one of Maduro’s principles of 
contrapunctual law, the principle of pluralism itself, whereby different legal orders 
must expressly acknowledge the existence and autonomy of their counterparts, which 
‘entails the recognition and adjustment of each legal order to the plurality of equally 
legitimate claims … made by other legal orders’.61 The Court described the 
Community as ‘a developing organism with diverse and changing methods for 
making decisions and an inbuilt and clearly expressed objective of expansion and 
progress’.62 While it is perhaps odd to describe a legal order as an ‘organism’, the 
metaphor nicely illustrates the great extent to which the Court was prepared to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Maduro (n 13) at 506–507, citing the constitutions of Italy (Article 11); Spain (Article 93 ff); 
Belgium (Article 34); Germany (Article 23); Denmark (Article 20); Portugal (Article 7); and the 
Netherlands (Article 92). 
59 Ibid at 507, citing Denmark (Article 20); Sweden (Article 5); Austria (Article 92); and Belgium 
(Article 25). 
60 Ibid, citing the Maastricht decisions of the French, German and Spanish courts. 
61 Maduro (n 13) at 526. 
62 Crotty (n 17) at 770. 
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recognise the (‘organic’) growth of the Community, and, by holding that this growth 
was still within the initial ‘license to join’ of 1972, to adjust the domestic 
constitutional order to accommodate it. But whereas the Court’s decision fits well 
with one of the principles of contrapunctual law, it is much less in line with another, 
the principle of universalisability. In the High Court, counsel for the defendants in 
Crotty specifically invited the Court to ‘have regard to the fact that its decision will 
affect not only Ireland, but the other Member States of the European Communities as 
well, of which the total population affected comprises 300 million.’63 Nowhere in 
their judgments did the High or Supreme Court Justices take counsel up on his 
suggestion, preferring, as I have shown, to regard themselves as purely domestic 
actors, and to treat the issues as being ones of exclusively domestic law.  
In Crotty, the impugned legislation and Treaty provisions had not yet come into 
force, and were thus not yet ‘immunised’ from review by the exclusion clause of 
Article 29.4.6°. If one believes that the exclusion clause of Article 29.4.6° is in fact 
completely exclusionary, ex ante constitutional review can be seen as a kind of once-
off, ‘last-chance-saloon’ jurisdiction. Difficult questions of normative effectiveness 
and democratic legitimacy can be answered once, but only once, and consent once 
granted can never be withdrawn without the ‘nuclear option’ of complete withdrawal 
from the Union. This can cause great difficulty in cases of subsequent, unforeseen 
constitutional conflict, and raises questions about just how exclusionary the 
exclusion clause can—or should—be. The resounding popular endorsement of 1972, 
and the less impressive but no less effective endorsements of 1986 and later, 
certainly provide a democratic basis for the effectiveness of EU law in Ireland, but 
they raise deep questions about the very nature of constitutions and constitutional 
law: once power has been democratically delegated, how and under what 
circumstances can it be reclaimed if necessary? With these questions in mind, let us 
turn to Article 29.4.6°, and the second, much more controversial leg of Maduro’s two 
conceptions of national constitutional challenge: the ex post national constitutional 
review of EU law. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Ibid at 723 per Eoghan Fitzsimons SC for the defendants. 
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1.3 The ‘exclusion clause’ and the ex post review of EU norms 
1.3.1 Ripples and torpedoes 
Article 29.4.6° is a remarkable constitutional provision. At first blush, it seems to 
subordinate the entirety of the Irish Constitution to Union law without exception. 
Indeed, it would seem to do this at the second and subsequent blushes as well: Cahill 
notes that this criticism was levelled at the amendment by a Labour Deputy during 
the Third Amendment Bill’s passage through the Dáil,64 and cites some statements 
from the Bench that are supportive of this idea: in Meagher v Minister for 
Agriculture,65 for example, Blayney J stated that ‘[i]t is well established that 
Community law takes precedence over our domestic law. Where they are in conflict, 
it is the Community law that prevails.’66 Four years later, the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court stated that ‘[t]he democratic system in Ireland functions through 
three branches of government. However, in addition, the State is subject to the 
European institutions and provisions made therein.’67 To see the practical effect of 
this, we can usefully add the earlier statement of Murphy J in Lawlor v Minister for 
Agriculture that ‘it is no part of the function of this Court to determine whether or 
not any part of the EEC regulations were invalid’.68 Though it was suggested in 
Section 2.2.1 that the headnote to Crotty jumped the gun in alleging unqualified 
acceptance of the ECJ’s doctrine of primacy, there is plenty judicial support for the 
idea to be found elsewhere. Indeed, the received interpretation of Article 29.4.6° is 
that it has what Cahill calls a ‘torpedo effect’ on the whole of the Constitution, 
‘whereby [it] destroy[s] the effect of every other provision’,69 rather than a ‘ripple 
effect’, ‘whereby [it] temporarily displace[s], without destroying the effect, of the 
other provisions.’70 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Justin Keating TD, 2 Dec 1971, available at <historical-
debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0257/D.0257.197112020003.html>, cited in Cahill (n 9) at 81. 
65 Meagher v Minister for Agriculture [1994] 1 IR 329. 
66 Ibid at 360, citing (without comment) Case C–106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional 
de Alimentación SA [1990] ECR I–4135 and Case C–6/90 Francovich v Italy ECR I–5357. Cahill 
notes that this statement was quoted and endorsed in the Supreme Court by Hamilton CJ in the later 
case of Nathan v Bailey Gibson [1998] 2 IR 162 at 173–4 (Cahill (n 9) at 92 fn 52). 
67 Nathan v Bailey Gibson [1998] 2 IR 162 at 222 per Hamilton CJ, emphasis added.  
68 Lawlor v Minister for Agriculture [1990] 1 IR 356 at 378, following the ECJ judgment in Case 
314/85 Firma Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199. 
69 Cahill (n 9) at 90. 
70 Ibid. 
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Nor are Irish judges and politicians alone in adopting the ‘torpedo’ explanation, 
that the function of Article 29.4.6° is automatically and irreversibly to neuter the 
Constitution when it comes to Union law. On the occasion of a visit to the ECJ in 
Luxembourg by the President of Ireland in 1995, then-President of the Court, Judge 
Gil Carlos Rodríguez Iglesias, stated in his welcoming address that: 
The Irish judiciary have been active in ensuring that the Community is based 
on the rule of law. The principle of primacy, which is specifically 
recognised in the Constitution of Ireland, and that of direct effect, are 
regularly applied in the Irish Courts. The procedure by way of preliminary 
ruling, which transforms every national judge into a Community judge and 
thus constitutes one of the dynamic forces of European integration, is one to 
which Irish judges have untrammelled access and of which they make 
regular use. By their vigilance, the Irish courts ensure that the rights of the 
citizens of the Union receive adequate protection and are properly 
safeguarded.71 
With respect to Judge Rodríguez Iglesias, it is submitted that the emphasised part of 
the above statement is based on a superficial reading of Article 29.4.6°. In order for 
the principle of primacy to be ‘specifically recognised’, the Constitution would first 
have to specify—that is, mention—primacy, which it does not, and then endorse it, 
which it cannot, because it never mentions it. Be this as it may, if the Chief Justice of 
the Irish Supreme Court72 and the President of the European Court of Justice take as 
their reading of Article 29.4.6° that it renders all Union law, without exception, 
permanently immune from constitutional challenge in Ireland, one could be forgiven 
for expecting this to be the end of the matter. However, there is a unanimous 
judgment of the Supreme Court, SPUC v Grogan,73 which predates the above-quoted 
judgments in Lawlor, Meagher, and Nathan, that has never been expressly 
overturned, and which provides a quite different—more convincing and more 
principled—account of the effect of Article 29.4.6° and of the terms of engagement 
between Irish law and European law. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 GC Rodríguez Iglesias ‘Memorandum: Visite de Mme le Présidente d’Irlande, le 16 mai 1995’ (No 
212/95) (Internal ECJ Memorandum, copy with author). Emphasis added. 
72 Nathan (n 67) at 222 per Hamilton CJ. 
73 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children v Grogan [1989] IR 753. 
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1.3.2 SPUC v Grogan: an aberration? 
SPUC v Grogan is the only case where the Irish judiciary dealt head-on with a case 
of potential conflict and collision between a right protected under the Irish 
Constitution and a right protected under EU law. This unanimous decision of the 
Court is directly along the lines of the German Solange jurisprudence,74 but has come 
to be regarded as an outlier, and would seem to have been effectively reversed—
though never explicitly—despite its obvious precedential value. In this regard, 
Gerard Hogan and Gerry Whyte state that the arguments in Grogan are ‘isolated 
ones and entirely confined to an area of great sensitivity and it is unlikely that they 
would nowadays be followed’.75 This is an unprincipled approach. Why should the 
mere fact that abortion is an area of great sensitivity lessen the precedential value of 
a unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court? Far preferable is to investigate the 
implications that Grogan may have for our understanding of Article 29.4.6°, rather 
than turning a blind eye and hoping that constitutional collision never happens. 
The facts of the case may be familiar to the European lawyer, on account of the 
preliminary reference sought by the High Court.76 Briefly, the plaintiff society, an 
anti-abortion campaign group, sought an injunction restraining various student 
groups from publishing information on identity, location, and method of 
communication with abortion clinics outside the jurisdiction. The argument of the 
defendants was that pregnant women had a right under EU law to travel to another 
Member State to receive services, including therefore a right to travel in order to 
procure an abortion in a Member State where it is legal to do so. As a corollary, they 
also had a right under EU law to receive information about abortion clinics outside 
Ireland but within the Communities; and by extension, the defendants had a right to 
publish and distribute such information. This argument was made despite the fact 
that none of this series of mutually-dependent and mutually-reinforcing rights had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Cahill (n 9) at 75. Cahill, like Maduro (see n 58–n 61), notes other courts which have taken similar 
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75 G Hogan and G Whyte JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution (4th edn, Dublin: Tottel, 2003) at 535. 
76 Which was handed down by the ECJ in Case C–159/90 SPUC v Grogan [1991] ECR I–4685 
(referred to in this thesis as Grogan (ECJ)). 
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actually been recognised in EU law at that time, whether by Treaty provision, 
legislation, or judgment of the ECJ.  
Article 40.3.3° of the Constitution, inserted by referendum in 1983, provides 
(now in part, but at the time in full) that: 
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard 
to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, 
as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right. 
The defendants’ argument in Grogan was thus predicated on the widespread belief—
indeed, the judicial, political and social orthodoxy—that Article 29.4.6° has Cahill’s 
‘torpedo effect’ on the rest of the Constitution. 
In the High Court, Carroll J considered the year-old Supreme Court judgment in 
Attorney General (SPUC) v Open Door Counselling Ltd,77 but distinguished it on the 
ground that that case had turned on the question of whether there was a right to 
receive information about abortion services abroad in the context of one-to-one 
counselling (the Supreme Court had held that there was not). Because the present 
case was concerned with the question of whether there was a stand-alone right, 
outside the counselling context, to receive information relating to abortion services 
outside the jurisdiction, Carroll J held that a preliminary reference to the ECJ was 
necessary to determine the matter. Pending word from Luxembourg, Carroll J made 
no decision as to the injunction sought by the plaintiff. 
 
1.3.3  The ‘torpedo effect’ torpedoed 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Carroll J’s judgment was overturned in unusually 
strong terms, and SPUC’s injunction granted and made permanent. Though the Court 
was unanimous as to the result of the case, the reasons contained in the three written 
judgments are quite diverse. However, two major threads can be drawn out for the 
present analysis. First, the paramount importance of the fundamental rights 
provisions of the Constitution was emphasised, offering little support for the ‘torpedo 
effect’ orthodoxy surrounding the ‘exclusion clause’ and preserving for the domestic 
judiciary a role in their vindication, even in the face of EU norms. Secondly, the 
Court hinted darkly as to possible repercussions if the ECJ were ever to hold that the 
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defendants were in possession of the rights they had claimed. Though these two 
threads are conceptually distinguishable, they are inextricably linked and will be 
discussed together. 
Finlay CJ ‘rejected as unsound’78 the idea that the facts of the case could be 
meaningfully distinguished from those in Open Door as Carroll J had held—the 
application for the injunction was in reality: 
An application to restrain an activity which has been clearly declared by this 
Court [in Open Door] to be unconstitutional and therefore unlawful and 
which could assist and is intended to assist in the destruction of the right to 
life of an unborn child, a right acknowledged and protected under the 
Constitution. That constitutionally guaranteed right must be fully and 
effectively protected by the courts.79 
Here we see the first of SPUC’s major threads: it would seem that when it comes to 
at least one right guaranteed by the Constitution, the Supreme Court saw itself as 
being obliged to protect that right, regardless of any other provision of the 
Constitution, emphatically including Article 29.4.6°. Indeed, Finlay CJ went on to 
suggest as much in his very next sentence: 
If and when a decision of the [ECJ] rules that some aspect of European 
Community law affects the activities of the defendants impugned in this 
case, the consequence of that decision on these constitutionally guaranteed 
rights and their protection by the courts will then fall to be considered by 
these courts.80 
The conclusion that Cahill draws from this is, I argue, entirely correct and essential 
to any analysis of the relationship between Irish and EU law: specifically, she asserts 
that the Chief Justice ‘expressly acknowledged and established for the Irish courts 
the power to review a decision of the European Court of Justice on the grounds that it 
was contrary to a fundamental right protected by the Irish Constitution.’81 The words 
italicised in the above quote encapsulate this second major thread of SPUC. They 
were a shot across the bow: a warning, in no uncertain terms, that if the ECJ were 
ever to hold that, as a matter of EU law (recognised, polyarchically, as the exclusive 
interpretive domain of the ECJ), pregnant women had any of the rights claimed by 
the defendants, then the response of the Irish courts could not be predicted and 
obedience could not be guaranteed. As we can see, this part of the judgment in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Grogan (n 73) at 764. 
79 Ibid at 764–765, emphasis added. 
80 Ibid at 765, emphasis added. 
81 Cahill (n 9) at 95. 
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Grogan very much lessens the force of the argument that Article 29.4.6° 
subordinates the entire Constitution, without exception, to EU law for all time 
coming. 
The judgment of Walsh J, with whom Hederman J concurred, was particularly 
scathing of Carroll J’s judgment at first instance, and lends further weight to the 
‘ripple’ interpretation of Article 29.4.6°: 
When the present matter came before the High Court it was clear beyond all 
doubt that the activities complained of were contrary to the Constitution. 
The decision of the High Court judge to adopt the course which she did, 
namely, to leave the matter undecided, was in effect to suspend the 
provisions of [Article 40.3.3°] for an indefinite period. It is not open to any 
judge to do anything which in effect suspends any provisions of the 
Constitution for any period whatsoever.82 
Walsh J continued in equally strong terms, holding that ‘[i]t is the undoubted duty of 
this Court to ensure that the protection guaranteed by [Article 40.3.3°] is not put in 
abeyance.’83 He then discussed, without deciding, an argument of counsel for the 
plaintiff that had been raised during the hearing, and which merits quoting at length: 
It has been sought to be argued in the present case that the effect of [Article 
29.4.6°], which was necessary to permit our adhesion to the treaties of the 
European Communities, is to qualify all rights including fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution. [The insertion of Article 40.3.3° was] 
subsequent in time, by several years, to the [insertion of Article 29.4.6°]. 
That fact may give rise to the consideration of the question of whether or not 
[Article 40.3.3°] itself qualifies [Article 29.4.6°]. Be that as it may, any 
answer to the reference received from [the ECJ] will have to be considered 
in the light of our own constitutional provisions. In the last analysis only this 
Court can decide finally what are the effects of the interaction of [Article 
40.3.3°] and [Article 29.4.6°].84 
This paragraph triggers a number of observations. First, Walsh J noted, but did not 
explicitly accept or reject, the argument that Article 29.4.6° has a ‘torpedo effect’ on 
the rest of the Constitution. Second, he raised the possibility that a subsequent 
amendment to the Constitution could qualify the effect of the alleged ‘exclusion 
clause’. On one view, this would render the clause not very exclusionary after all. 
Alternatively, if the exclusion clause was capable of being qualified, then it must 
have had at least some exclusionary effect prior to such popular qualification, but 
presumably more of the ‘ripple’ than ‘torpedo’ variety. Third, Walsh J followed 
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83 Ibid at 768. 
84 Ibid at 768–9, emphasis added.. 
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Finlay CJ in implying that any future ECJ jurisprudence on point would be 
‘considered’ in the light of Irish constitutional provisions and not automatically 
followed, as the ECJ would argue it should be. Fourth, Walsh J reserved to the Irish 
courts all interpretive power over the Irish Constitution—hardly a revolutionary 
proposition, but again one that lends itself to the idea of polyarchy rather than to 
agreement either with a monist conception of the EU legal order, or to a national 
constitutional supremacist vision of the relations between legal orders. 
Before we leave Walsh J, one final line of his judgment is worthy of inspection: 
[I]t cannot be one of the objectives of the European Communities that a 
member state should be obliged to permit activities which are clearly 
designed to set at nought the constitutional guarantees for the protection 
within the State of a fundamental human right.85 
Let us remember that only a few years previously, in Crotty, the Supreme Court had 
held unanimously that, as a matter of Irish law, just what constitutes the scope and 
objectives of the Community in the context of Treaty amendment falls to be 
determined by the Irish courts, and no other. Because Grogan concerned certain 
substantive (claimed, but not explicitly granted) rights under EU law and not Treaty 
amendments, this part of Walsh J’s judgment echoes the scope and objectives test but 
transplants it to a different frame. His reference to the objectives of the Communities 
would thus seem to have at least the potential to qualify the exclusionary effect of 
Article 29.4.6°. This can be analogised to the ‘penultimate judicial supremacy’ leg of 
Crotty, i.e. though the Constitution provides for no judicial role in the Government’s 
exercise of its foreign policy powers, such powers are ultimately subject to the 
provisions of the Constitution as a whole, the interpretation of which is a matter for 
the judiciary (subject, in the final instance, to override and reversal by the electorate). 
Extending the analogy, Article 29.4.6°, on its face and in its ordinary everyday 
effect, immunises EU law from constitutional challenge, but does not go so far as to 
oblige the judiciary ‘to permit activities which are clearly designed to set at nought 
the constitutional guarantees for the protection within the State of a fundamental 
human right.’ The fact that this sentence was expressed in general terms, and was not 
confined to the protection of the right to life of the unborn, makes even less 
convincing the idea that SPUC v Grogan is ‘confined to an area of great sensitivity’ 
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and lends weight to the argument that the ‘ripple effect’ is the preferable 
interpretation of Article 29.4.6°. 
 
1.3.4 Analysis: democratic legitimacy, ‘areas of great sensitivity’, and a 
hierarchy of norms 
The parallels between the decision in Grogan and Kumm’s conception of the 
principle of democratic legitimacy as an interface norm are immediately apparent. 
This is hardly surprising, given that the Irish constitutional provision on the right to 
life of the unborn was specifically given by Kumm as an example of where the 
application of the principle might justify the rebuttal of the presumption of legality of 
EU norms.86 But the specific circumstances under which the case arose; the way in 
which the principle was applied; and how all of this differs from Kumm’s 
conception, are especially interesting. Rather than being a case of straightforward 
conflict between a norm of EU law and a ‘clear and specific constitutional norm that 
reflect[s] essential commitments of the national community’,87 Grogan was more 
contingent and conditional in nature. The rights under EU law claimed by the 
defendants were derived from the Treaties but not specified therein, and their 
existence had never been confirmed by the ECJ. As a result, the overall effect of the 
decision in Grogan was one step removed from how Kumm conceives of the 
principle of democratic legitimacy. Rather than relating directly to the relationship 
between EU and Irish constitutional norms, the principle was adopted in interpreting 
the Irish constitutional provision that itself regulates the relationship. This extra layer 
of abstraction shifts the principle from the realm of the metaconstitutional to that of 
the constitutional—the Supreme Court used Kumm’s principle of democratic 
legitimacy not to disapply a norm of EU law, but to interpret one norm of Irish 
constitutional law—the exclusion clause—in such a way that it assumed a position 
subordinate to another norm (protecting a fundamental right).  
The fact that the fundamental right in question in the case was the right to life, 
and specifically the right to life of the unborn, raises two related questions. First, was 
the Court’s approach focused specifically on the protection of the right to life of the 
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87 Ibid at 300 
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unborn and limited to that right, or might other constitutional rights warrant similar 
vigilance? The judgments were clearly phrased in general terms, capable of 
application to any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. At no 
point did the Supreme Court give any indication that the right to life of the unborn 
was being afforded protection above and beyond any other constitutional right. This 
leads to the second question, whether the Supreme Court was relying—though not 
explicitly—on a hierarchical conception of constitutional rights and norms. The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognised a hierarchy of norms under the 
Constitution when two provisions are in seemingly irresolvable conflict, with a 
particularly heavy weight attached to the right to life.88 However, the difficulty 
inherent in trying to formulate a definitive and all-encompassing hierarchy has also 
been recognised,89 most relevantly for present purposes in the statement of Henchy J 
in The State (Keegan) v Stardust Compensation Tribunal that: 
The concept of ‘accepted moral standards’ [by which the ranking in a 
hierarchy of norms may be judged] represents a vague, elusive and changing 
body of standards which in a pluralist society is sometimes difficult to 
ascertain.90 
By ‘pluralist’, Henchy J was referring here to social pluralism—i.e. a society 
consisting of individual citizens with varying political, religious, social and moral 
beliefs—but the point holds when one extends it from the realm of diversity among 
citizens to that of diversity among legal systems. In the modern European state, 
where the individual must daily navigate a plurality of legal orders—both in the 
sense of ‘hard’ law (state law, EU law) and ‘soft’ law (religious codes of practice, 
rules of social interaction)91—the difficulty of determining a universal standard, 
whether moral or legal, against which conduct can be judged becomes even more 
pronounced. We can further extend this difficulty to the attempt to posit overarching 
metaconstitutional rules by which conflicts between heterarchically-arranged legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 On the importance of the right to life see, inter alia, The People (DPP) v Shaw [1982] IR 1 (right to 
life superior to right to personal liberty); AG v X [1992] 1 IR 1 (superior to right to travel, see Chapter 
4 of this Thesis); DPP v Delaney [1997] 3 IR 453 (superior to inviolability of the dwelling). 
89 See Egan J’s example in AG v X [1992] 1 IR 1 at 92 of a woman’s right to bodily integrity 
outweighing a rapist’s right to life in the case of her rescue during a rape resulting in the death of the 
attacker. 
90 The State (Keegan) v Stardust Compensation Tribunal [1986] IR 642 at 658. 
91 On this kind of pluralism, see W Twining ‘Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective’ 
(2010) 20 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 473. See also, by the same author, 
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orders may be regulated. It was noted in Section 2.2.3 that Kumm’s conception of 
the principle of democratic legitimacy seems largely concerned with instances of 
national constitutional specificity. There is therefore a twofold problem with the 
principle. First, it means that the number of cases to which it could apply is 
essentially limited—it is therefore a rather narrow means of dealing with cases at the 
boundaries, rather than a general principle of (meta)constitutionalism. Examples of 
Greek and Irish constitutional specificity have already been mentioned, to which we 
could add the laïque nature of the French State;92 the particular way in which the 
right to human dignity is expressed in the Grundgesetz;93 and no doubt as many 
others as there are Member States. This is the mirror image of the problem discussed 
above in Section 2.2.3: whereas the attempt to take decisions predicated on specific 
national circumstances and to universalise them may leave us with principles so 
broad as to offer little guidance; similarly, to posit general principles capable of 
being put into effect universally may leave us, at the level of application, with 
nothing more than an exceptional method of dealing with a few dozen exceptional 
instances of national specificity, or, at worst, recalcitrance.  
Related to this is the second issue, that national specificity is not necessarily 
something to which the ECJ is blind in its jurisprudence, and therefore may not 
necessarily be best protected (if indeed it ought to be protected at all) primarily or in 
the first instance at the national level. An example is the case of Omega,94 where the 
issue was whether it was permissible for the German authorities to ban the 
importation from elsewhere in the EU of equipment for the game of ‘laser-tag’, 
whereby participants could ‘play at killing’ other human beings. For the national 
authorities, such activity contravened Article 1(1) of the Grundgesetz, which 
provides specific protection for the concept of human dignity—the importance and 
sensitivity of which for the German constitutional order is evidenced by its 
prominent placement within the Basic Law and its unamendability. While the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 French Constitution, Article 1. 
93 German Constitution, Article 1. 
94 Case C–36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der 
Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I–9609. For analysis see MK Bulterman and HR Kranenborg ‘Case 
Comment: What if Rules on Free Movement and Human Rights Collide? About Laser Games and 
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protection of human dignity is inherent in, if not the basis of, the protection of all 
human rights, nowhere else in national European constitutions does it receive the 
specific formulation to be found in the Grundgesetz. Accordingly, the question was 
whether the national ability to restrict such activity was dependent on ‘the condition 
that that restriction be based on a legal conception that is common to all Member 
States’.95  
The ECJ emphasised the centrality of proportionality to its framing of the 
relevant test: while the question of whether the formulation given to the national 
protection of a right is common to all Member States is a legitimate part of the 
analysis, it is not the only concern. At the level of determining whether there had 
been a breach of free movement rules, it was the notion of human dignity specific to 
EU law that was relevant, whereas the specific nature of the German Constitution’s 
version of human dignity was relevant to the subsequent proportionality test. 
Critically, the fact that the Grundgesetz formulates the right to human dignity rather 
differently from other constitutions was not enough for the measure to be 
disproportionate.96 The relevance to Grogan is clear: the right to life obviously 
receives some form of protection in all Member State constitutions, but nowhere else 
is it afforded directly to the unborn in the manner of the Irish Constitution. In the 
light of the subsequent Omega judgment, Walsh J’s statement in Grogan that the 
State should not be ‘obliged to permit activities which are clearly designed to set at 
nought the constitutional guarantees for the protection within the State of a 
fundamental human right’ can be seen as entirely justifiable—indeed as positively 
communautaire—and not a mere piece of national supremacist grandstanding. 
An in-depth look at Irish abortion litigation will form the basis of Chapter 4, but 
for now it is worth continuing this line of thought, regarding constitutional traditions 
which are not common to the Member States, with reference to the case of Attorney 
General v X,97 where Costello J said in the High Court that:  
I think the attainment of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty is 
enhanced by laws which assist in the development of a Community in which 
legitimate differences on moral issues are recognised and which does not 
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96 Omega (n 94) at paras 36–40. 
97 AG v X [1992] 1 IR 1. 
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seek to impose a spurious and divisive uniformity on its members on such 
issues.98 
As we shall see, the Supreme Court did not address this reasoning, finding itself able 
to resolve the case as a matter of domestic law. But Costello J’s statement is at least 
conceptually compatible with Walsh J’s judgment in Grogan and the ECJ’s approach 
in Omega. ‘Unity in diversity’ is obviously not the same thing as ‘spurious and 
divisive uniformity’, and it is for precisely this reason that the ECJ has recognised, to 
an extent, the legitimacy of difference in national approaches to questions of 
fundamental rights.99 The effective and uniform application of Union law is 
doubtless important, perhaps foundationally so, but it is a stretch to say that it is the 
most important norm in the European constitutional constellation. 
 
1.4 Conclusion: hierarchy and polyarchy, specificity and universality 
This Section has demonstrated the means by which the Irish constitutional order, 
initially self-contained and ‘closed’ in nature, was ‘opened’ to enable membership of 
what is now the EU. Between them, the ECA 1972, the ‘license to join’, and the 
‘exclusion clause’ incorporated EU law into the Irish system, democratically 
authorised membership of the Union and ostensibly immunised EU law from 
constitutional challenge. However, analysis of Crotty and Grogan, the leading cases 
on the issues, demonstrates that to regard the Irish and EU legal orders as being 
hierarchically integrated in all circumstances—the widespread orthodoxy—is 
mistaken. While in the ordinary, quotidian run of things, norms of EU law enjoy 
hierarchical superiority in the Irish legal order, the judicial imposition of the ‘scope 
of objectives’ test in Crotty—which has in practice resulted in the requirement of a 
referendum for Treaty amendments—demonstrates that EU law is received into the 
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Irish legal order on terms set by the Irish order itself, undermining, from the 
domestic perspective, the ECJ’s autonomy claim, while still being respectful of the 
‘organic’ nature of the EU legal order, and this without contradiction. Moreover, 
Grogan demonstrates that Cahill’s interpretation of Article 29.4.6° as having a 
‘ripple’ rather than ‘torpedo’ effect on the rest of the Constitution is correct—when 
faced with potential conflict between the two orders, the Irish Supreme Court 
indicated a willingness to enforce a constitutional norm protecting a fundamental 
right in preference to a norm which ostensibly neutered that right’s effectiveness. 
The vision of the two legal orders that results from this is polyarchic in nature: both 
legal orders make justifiable claims to legislative and interpretive autonomy in their 
own domains. Though this may in result in the appearance of hierarchy in the 
ordinary course of affairs, the two legal orders remain distinct and separable—part of 
a polyarchy. But the analysis above only focused on the decisions and attitudes of 
one part of this polyarchy, and so it has not yet shown to be deliberative. This will be 
done in Chapter 4, with reference to the interactions and dialogue that have occurred 
regarding the question of abortion. 
In demonstrating the polyarchic nature of the relationships between the legal 
orders, close attention was paid to the specific principles applied by the Irish 
Supreme Court in its decisions. The principle of conditional recognition—Sabel and 
Gerstenberg’s doctrinal tool for the constitutionalisation of an overlapping 
consensus—was of fundamental importance in both Crotty and Grogan. The Irish 
legal order permits the evolution of the EU legal order so long as it does not go 
beyond the ‘scope and objectives’ of the Treaties. If this condition is breached, a 
further popular authorisation is necessary. Similarly, the Supreme Court loyally and 
dutifully applies norms of EU law, including judgments of the ECJ, so long as these 
norms do not—to borrow Walsh J’s phrase—‘set at nought the constitutional 
guarantees for the protection within the State of a fundamental human right.’100 
However, being a national court bound by a national constitution, the Supreme Court 
formulated and applied its interface norms based on the specific text of the 
Constitution and on the historically contingent means by which EU law had been 
made effective in the State. They are therefore internal interface norms, 
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constitutional in nature, and not metaconstitutional. They deal with matters that are 
both nationally specific—e.g. the right to life of the unborn—and much more 
general—e.g. the Constitution’s conception of popular sovereignty. The question 
then arises as to whether they can be universalised into metaconstitutional interface 
norms, independent of any one legal system; and, relatedly, whether they bear any 
resemblance to the metaconstitutional interface norms posited by Kumm and 
Maduro. It was suggested above that any such attempt is beset by difficulty, and that 
the specific principles posited by Kumm, in particular, do not reflect Irish 
constitutional experience. 
These questions will be analysed further in the chapters to follow, but for now let 
us turn our attention to another ‘vertical’ side of the triangle, the relationship 
between Irish law and the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
2 THE IRISH LEGAL ORDER AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
The nature of the Convention legal order and the method of its reception in Ireland 
make the task of positing the two as part of a deliberative polyarchy more 
straightforward than is the case with reference to Ireland and the EU. Though the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) reserves supreme interpretive authority 
over the Convention to itself, it has never claimed for its judgments the same kind of 
primacy over national law as does the ECJ. Moreover, as we shall see, the method by 
which the Convention has been incorporated into the Irish legal system has no 
parallel with the ‘exclusion clause’ of Article 29.4.6°, simplifying the task of 
presenting the two systems as being non-hierarchically arranged. 
While Ireland was a founding member of the Council of Europe, an original 
signatory to the Convention in 1950, and one of the first States to accept the right of 
individual petition to Strasbourg in 1953, it was not until 2003 that the Convention 
was made domestically effective, making Ireland the last Contracting Party to 
incorporate the Convention into its own legal system. The method chosen for 
incorporation was legislative, under the European Convention on Human Rights Act 
2003, rather than constitutional. In this Section, the nature of the relationship 
between the two legal orders will first be set out, both prior to and after incorporation 
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in 2003. This will then be followed by an outline of how this incorporation justifies a 
polyarchic conception of the relationship between the legal orders. 
 
2.1 The relationship defined, pre- and post-incorporation 
2.1.1 1950–2003: Dualism, pride and prejudice 
In a comprehensive comparative study of the effect of the Convention on the legal 
systems of Ireland and the UK (or rather, England and Wales), Besson states that 
‘[b]ecause Irish courts always had to enforce the Irish Bill of Rights, there was no 
domestic pressure for the development of a European human rights catalogue and 
court.’101 While it is true that there was little domestic pressure for something along 
the lines of the Convention, it is not quite true that the Irish courts ‘always’ had to 
enforce constitutional rights. The 1937 Constitution, like the 1922 Constitution 
before it, contains a catalogue of justiciable rights, but these rights had little real 
impact until the 1960s. In the (extra-curial) words of a former Chief Justice of the 
Irish Supreme Court: 
[W]hile the Constitution was successfully invoked in scattered instances [in 
the first two decades of its existence], it was the appointment of Cearbhall Ó 
Dálaigh as Chief Justice in 1961 which signalled the beginning of the new 
era. He was joined on the court on the same day by Brian Walsh and it soon 
became clear that litigants and advocates who looked to the text of the 
Constitution itself, rather than to constitutional theory as expounded in the 
British tradition by Dicey and others, would receive a sympathetic 
audience.102 
For all its superficial and substantive resemblance to the written, republican 
constitutions of the US or France, and notwithstanding the changed understanding 
and reality of rights adjudication from the 1960s, the Diceyan seam runs deeply in 
both the text of the Constitution and the body of law constructed around it. To take 
just two examples, its model of parliamentary democracy is in many regards a carbon 
copy of Britain’s;103 and the law relating to the judicial review of administrative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 S Besson ‘The Reception Process in Ireland and the United Kingdom’ in A Stone Sweet and H 
Keller A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems (Oxford: OUP, 2008) 
31 at 43. 
102 R Keane ‘Judges as Lawmakers: The Irish Experience’ (2004) 4 Judicial Studies Institute Journal 
1 at 9–10. 
103 Note, for instance, that the provisions of Articles 20–25, under the heading of ‘Legislation’, bear 
more than a passing resemblance to the UK Parliament Act 1911 and to the general British theory of 
the power-relations between the upper and lower houses of Parliament. 
Chapter 2: The Vertical Frame 
 96 
action borrows heavily from the judgments of English courts, both before and after 
Irish independence. The legacy of British constitutionalism can also be detected in 
the Constitution’s embodiment of the concept of dualism, and the courts’ enthusiastic 
defence thereof. 
As was mentioned above in Section 2, Article 15.2.1° vests the legislative 
function in the Oireachtas, and Article 29.6 provides that ‘[n]o international 
agreement shall be part of the domestic law of the State save as may be determined 
by the Oireachtas’. As early as 1960, the Supreme Court held in Ó Laighléis104 that, 
taken together, these provisions created an ‘insuperable obstacle to importing the 
provisions of the [Convention] into the domestic law of Ireland’.105 The courts over 
the next forty years held fast to this strict approach to the direct application of the 
Convention, approving the rule in Ó Laighléis as late as 2003, just prior to the 
enactment of the ECHR Act.106 One important side effect of this judicial resistance to 
reliance on the Convention is described by O’Connell:  
[T]his view of dualism, as a legal fact, has permeated the discourse on 
human rights in the political domain. Thus, dualism has become 
‘internalised’ as a political value with the result that international human 
rights obligations have been ‘externalised’, as it were, as matters to be 
resolved exclusively through arguably flawed international enforcement 
mechanisms and, ultimately, international diplomacy. In other words, the 
separation of international and domestic law under the concept of dualism 
can be seen as an effectively immutable norm.107 
This is the leitmotif of the Convention’s reception in Ireland prior to incorporation. 
Before we explore the reasons for this ‘externalisation’ of human rights discourse, 
and its consequences for a pluralist analysis of the Irish and Convention legal orders, 
it is worth noting that the courts’ strict adherence to dualism did not result in the 
Convention having no effect upon the Irish legal order. The relatively few cases 
decided by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights against Ireland 
did lead to reform, though this was often piecemeal and belated. For example, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 In re Ó Laighléis [1960] IR 93. 
105 Ibid per Maguire CJ at 124. Notably, this case went on to become the very first case decided by the 
ECtHR (with the plaintiff using the English language form of his name): Lawless v Ireland [1961] 1 
EHRR 15. 
106 The People (DPP) v MS [2003] 1 IR 606, per Keane CJ at 611. 
107 D O’Connell ‘Watched Kettles Boil (Slowly): The Impact of the ECHR Act 2003’ in U Kilkelly 
(ed) ECHR in Irish Law (2nd edn, Bristol: Jordans, 2009) at 5–6. 
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decision in Airey108 that the absence of a legal aid scheme in civil matters amounted 
to a breach of Article 6(1) ECHR led to such a scheme being set up, but on a merely 
administrative rather than legislative basis. In Norris,109 the ECtHR held that the 
provisions of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 1885 (both Acts of the former Parliament of Great Britain and 
Ireland which had the effect of criminalising male homosexual conduct) were a 
violation of Article 8 ECHR. This led to the enactment of the Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences) Act 1993 and the repeal of the impugned provisions five years after the 
ECtHR had handed down judgment in the case. 
However, these are cases where the State had been held to be in breach of its 
obligations under the Convention as a matter of international law by the bodies 
established thereunder, and so executive and legislative remedy of the breaches, 
however tardy, in no way offended the principle of dualism. Judicial opposition to 
the notion of giving effect either to the Convention or to judgments of the ECtHR 
prior to the State having been found in violation is clearly illustrated by the Supreme 
Court’s refusal, in Norris v Attorney General110 (the precursor to the ECtHR case 
mentioned above) to follow Dudgeon v UK,111 in which the ECtHR had already held 
the very same nineteenth century statutes, in the context of Northern Ireland, to be in 
violation of Article 8 ECHR. As Besson notes, despite the increasing frequency of 
judicial references to the Convention in the High Court from the 1980s as an aid to 
legislative interpretation, the Supreme Court was careful not to lend its weight to this 
slight shift in attitudes.112 
Why this insistence on keeping the Convention at (more than) arm’s length from 
the domestic system? The legalistic explanation is that given by the Supreme Court 
in Ó Laighléis—the Constitution’s conception of dualism. This is certainly 
justifiable, though it must be said that the Supreme Court adhered to this very strict 
construction long after such an approach to interpretation gave way to an altogether 
more flexible (or, if you prefer, activist) approach to the protection of fundamental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Airey v Ireland (No 1) [1979–80] 2 EHRR 305. 
109 Norris v Ireland [1991] 13 EHRR 186. 
110 Norris v Attorney General [1984] IR 36. 
111 Dudgeon v UK [1982] 4 EHRR 149. 
112 Besson (n 101) at 52, citing, inter alia, O’Leary v Attorney General [1993] 1 IR 102 (HC), [1995] 1 
IR 254 (SC); Heaney v Ireland [1994] 2 ILRM 420 (HC), [1996] 1 IR 540 (SC). 
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rights from the 1960s. For example, Article 15.2.1°’s reservation of all law-making 
power to the Oireachtas never posed any difficulty for the Supreme Court’s 
development, from 1965, of a doctrine of ‘unenumerated rights’—supposedly 
inherent, but nowhere specified, in the Constitution.113 Whatever other criticisms 
may be levelled at the Irish judiciary, and despite a more recent retreat from judicial 
activism,114 it has rarely been seen since the 1960s as being in hock to textual 
formalism. The dualist approach to international law inherent in Article 29.6 and 
15.2.1°, taken alone, cannot explain this wary judicial attitude to the Convention and 
the judgments of the ECtHR. 
The explanation presented here is twofold. First, there was a widespread 
conviction that the constitutional provisions for the protection of individual rights 
were sufficient, to the extent that placing any reliance on the Convention would be 
otiose (or even lead to a reduction in rights-protection),115 coupled with a 
concomitant suspicion of the interpretive methodology of the ECtHR.116 These two 
ideas, one of pride and one of prejudice, had both legal and political consequences: 
legally, they were instrumental in the judiciary’s largely sceptical treatment of the 
Convention; and, politically, they shed light on why it took fifty years for the State to 
make the Convention domestically effective. 
As regards the first reason—that of the Irish Constitution’s sufficiency on its 
own, or even of its superiority to the Convention—it is worth noting that there are 
areas where the rights afforded by the Convention go above and beyond those 
provided for by the Constitution, and vice-versa.117 This notwithstanding, there is no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Beginning with Ryan v Attorney General [1965] IR 294. See generally GW Hogan and G Whyte 
JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution (4th edn, Dublin: Tottel, 2003) at ch 7.3. 
114 I Bacik ‘A Human Rights Culture for Ireland?’ in I Bacik and S Livingstone Towards a Culture of 
Human Rights in Ireland (Cork: Cork UP, 2001) at 37–42. 
115 KL Bodnick ‘Bringing Ireland Up to Par: Incorporating the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ (2002) 26 Fordham International Law 
Journal 396 at 418; AZ Drzemczewski European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law: A 
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116 O’Connell (n 107) at 8, citing conference papers delivered by the then-Minister for Justice in 
October 2003, and Hardiman J of the Supreme Court in February 2001. 
117 Bacik (n 114) passim, especially at 17–23, noting the wider scope of the ‘family’ under Article 8 
ECHR and the more extensive protection of free speech under Article 10 ECHR. 
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doubting that the Irish record before the ECtHR is quite good. The ECtHR’s database 
shows that only 24 of the more than 100 cases taken against Ireland have proceeded 
to decision on the merits, though 15 of these have resulted in findings of a violation 
of the Convention. However, to suggest that this low number of cases can be 
ascribed in the main to ‘the lively and strong human rights tradition in Ireland’118 is 
to risk letting self-satisfaction obscure the many deficiencies in the protection of 
rights under the Constitution.119 The length and expense of taking a case to 
Strasbourg (particularly given that seeking domestic redress may be just as long and 
expensive, depleting both funds and patience in the exhaustion of domestic remedies) 
and Ireland’s small population should be taken into account. One must also not 
forget the litany of human rights abuses at the hands of (or with the connivance of) 
the State with regard to the treatment of, in particular, vulnerable women and 
children, against which both the Constitution and the Convention were singularly 
useless—an important reminder of the limits of an excessively juridified, legalistic 
approach to the protection of fundamental rights.120 
 
2.1.2  2003 to the present day: the ECHR Act 
2.1.2.1 Origins 
Given the half-century that had passed since ratification without incorporation, one 
might have been forgiven for imagining in the 1990s that the Convention would 
never be given domestic effect in Ireland.121 However, when the impetus to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Besson (n 101) at 61, citing G Hogan ‘Incorporation of the ECHR: Some Issues of Methodology 
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119 Of the 15 cases decided against Ireland, nine have involved violations of Article 6(1) ECHR and 
four have involved violations of Article 8 ECHR (with an overlap of two cases involving both). 
120 See Report of the Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse in the Diocese of Ferns (‘Ferns Report’, October 
2005, available at <http://www.bishop-accountability.org/ferns/>); Report of Dr Kevin McCoy on the 
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November 2007, available at 
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121 Note also that the ECtHR had by the 1980s declared that there was no legal obligation on States to 
incorporate the Convention into domestic law: N Krisch ‘The Open Architecture of European Human 
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incorporate did come, it came neither from Dublin, nor from Strasbourg, but from 
Belfast. The Belfast Agreement of 1998122 contained a number of commitments by 
the governments of both the UK and Ireland regarding human rights in general, and 
the Convention in particular. The UK Government committed itself, inter alia, to 
completing the incorporation in Northern Ireland of the ECHR (which was ongoing 
across the UK in any case, having been a manifesto commitment of the New Labour 
Government in 1997)123 and to establishing a Northern Irish Human Rights 
Commission.124 Though the Irish Government agreed that it would establish a 
Human Rights Commission ‘with a mandate and remit equivalent to that within 
Northern Ireland’, it committed itself only to ‘further examining’ the question of the 
incorporation of the ECHR.125 
This ‘further examination’ led, after five years, to the enactment of the ECHR 
Act 2003, which finally incorporated the Convention but did so in a sub-
constitutional, indirect, interpretive and residual fashion. There is a large and 
growing literature on the origins, provisions and effects of the ECHR Act.126 
Accordingly, only the Act’s major features will be mentioned here, in order to 
ground a discussion of the implications the Act may have for a polyarchic conception 
of the relationship between the Irish and ECHR legal orders. 
 
2.1.2.2 The European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 
The Act’s most controversial feature was the chosen method of incorporation. In its 
1996 report, the Constitution Review Group considered, but ultimately rejected, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Rights Law’ (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 183 at 208, citing, in particular, James and Others v 
United Kingdom App no 8793/79 (judgment, ECtHR, 21 Feb 1986 at para 84). 
122 Agreement Reached in the Multi-party Negotiations, 10 April 1998 (also known as the Good 
Friday or Stormont Agreement) available at 
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constitutional incorporation of the Convention—whether by wholesale replacement 
of the Constitution’s own fundamental rights provisions; or by something along the 
lines of Sweden’s incorporation by reference, forbidding any enactment contrary to 
the Convention.127 The rejection of total replacement is unsurprising and sensible, 
given that it would have involved jettisoning decades of home-grown rights 
jurisprudence. The rejection of the Swedish model is more difficult to understand, 
particularly given the scant attention the Group paid to the possibility. Instead, the 
Group’s recommendation was for piecemeal incorporation, as part of a wider project 
of constitutional reform, drawing on the Convention where: 
i. The right is not expressly protected by the Constitution 
ii. The standard of protection of such rights is superior to those 
guaranteed by the Constitution; or 
iii. The wording of a clause of the Constitution protecting such right 
might be improved.128 
While an interesting proposal, it was, along with most of the Group’s other 
recommendations, quietly shelved. 
Instead, the ECHR Act followed a model not contemplated by the Group, the 
interpretive approach of the UK Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). It is perhaps rather 
odd that this approach was chosen in the Irish context, given that it was developed 
with specific reference to the UK’s tradition of parliamentary supremacy and a 
concomitantly weak role for the judiciary in the vindication of fundamental rights. 
Though the UK and Ireland share a dualist approach to international law, the legal, 
political and social experience of judicial rights-enforcement in Ireland would have 
made some form of constitutional or quasi-constitutional incorporation both 
politically possible and normatively desirable. 
Section 2 of the ECHR Act obliges the judiciary to interpret and apply statutes 
and rules of law in a manner compatible with the Convention ‘in so far as is 
possible’. However, there is an important proviso: that this obligation is ‘subject to 
the rules of law relating to such interpretation and application’. Section 3 obliges 
every ‘organ of the State’ to act in accordance with the Convention. Significantly, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Constitution Review Group Report (Stationary Office, Dublin 1996) at 216–219. 
128 Ibid at 219. 
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the courts are specifically excluded from the definition of an ‘organ of the State’.129 
Section 4 obliges the courts to ‘take due account’ of the jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg bodies in considering the Convention’s provisions. Section 5 furnishes 
the High and Supreme Courts with the jurisdiction to make ‘declarations of 
incompatibility’ against legislation it finds to be incompatible with the Convention, 
but only ‘where no other legal remedy is adequate and available’. These declarations 
do not affect the ‘validity, continuing operation or enforcement’ of the incompatible 
legislation. The Taoiseach is required to bring such a declaration to the attention of 
both the Dáil and the Seanad,130 but there is no legal obligation on the political 
organs to rectify the incompatibility. Finally, Section 5(4) authorises the 
government, at its own discretion, to make an ex gratia payment of compensation in 
the event of a declaration being made, with the amount linked to the ECtHR’s 
practice relating to ‘just satisfaction’ under Article 41 ECHR. 
 
2.2 The ECHR Act and polyarchy 
The method of incorporation adopted in the ECHR Act is residual, interpretive and 
sub-constitutional. Certain provisions, particularly the exclusion of the courts from 
the definition of ‘organs of the State’, render the claim by the Minister for Justice 
who oversaw the Act’s passage that ‘its provisions have exploited, to the utmost 
sinew and limit, the capacity of our legal system’131 rather suspect. The well-known 
limitations of the UK Human Rights Act can at least be explained by the constraints 
in Britain of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, an idea long rejected in 
Ireland as unsound.132 Viewed in this light, the HRA was indeed a revolutionary 
development in the UK context, as evidenced by the present political controversy 
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Human Rights Legislation, 18 Oct 2003 at 3 of the typescript. 
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surrounding it. The former Minister’s claim that the British conception of 
parliamentary sovereignty has ‘different, but no less fundamental, echoes in the 
context of popular sovereignty and the sole and exclusive law-making role of 
Parliament’133 in Ireland sheds little light on the issue. Given the long-standing 
judicial role of parliamentary oversight—which was suggested in Section 2 above to 
be less offensive to the idea of democracy and popular sovereignty than might be 
thought given the system of penultimate judicial supremacy—resistance to giving the 
judiciary a supplementary set of rights provisions to consider, and a supplementary 
jurisprudence to take into account at a constitutional level, must be explained and 
justified by more than simple and simplistic analogy to the constitutional 
configuration of a (very) different jurisdiction. The most likely answer, I suggest, 
refers us back to the twin shibboleths of pride in the domestic constitutional order, 
and prejudice as to the abilities and intentions of a ‘foreign’ supervisory body.134  
The traditional, dualist approach to the Convention in Ireland finally and 
somewhat grudgingly gave way to a form of domestication—and this only as the 
necessary and unfortunate price of peace, stability and a ‘levelling-up’ of rights 
protection in Northern Ireland. It was not necessarily for any intrinsic usefulness or 
goodness in the internalisation of long-standing international standards of human 
rights; nor a recognition of the numerous deficiencies in Ireland’s own constitutional 
order; nor a desire to aid in the progressive realisation of the Convention’s values 
across Europe by way of the Irish judiciary finally engaging in the kind of dialogic 
mutual engagement envisaged by pluralism. However, what the ECHR Act does do 
is make quite credible a pluralist—and specifically polyarchic—analysis of Irish and 
ECHR law for dualism, by definition, is not pluralism: it is plural, in that it 
recognises the concurrent validity, in different spheres, of more than one legal 
system, each independent of the other for their validity; but this is not the same thing. 
As O’Connell noted above, dualism emphasises the ‘otherness’ of international law, 
the idea that it is of relevance only to experts and senior politicians, and not to the 
ordinary business of legislation, administration, adjudication and rights vindication. 
By making the Convention part of Irish law, even if only residually (‘where no other 
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134 Though note Besson (n 101) at 96: ‘Generally speaking, and contrary to the attitude of the British 
(tabloid) press, “international” standards are well regarded by the Irish media.’ 
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legal remedy is adequate and available’), the Act has opened the door to a conception 
of the Irish and Convention legal orders as being, in MacCormick’s foundational 
words, ‘interactive, rather than hierarchical’.135 It enables the Irish judiciary to 
engage with the reasoning of the ECtHR on its own terms, and within the sphere of 
its own jurisdiction. Moreover, despite the limitations of the interpretive obligation 
under Section 2, the tortious action under Section 3 and the declaration of 
incompatibility under Section 5, these remedies do present an important opportunity 
to undo this sense of ‘otherness’ surrounding the Convention, and, after fifty years, 
to regard it as an essential component of the Irish and European constitutional 
polyarchy. 
 
2.2.1 Otherness and embeddedness 
Leaving aside for the moment the particular provisions and provisos of the ECHR 
Act, it is worth examining, in the round, the overall effect of the Act on the 
Convention’s place in the domestic legal order. We saw above how the European 
Communities Act 1972 is the legislative vehicle through which EU law became 
effective in Ireland. The ECA provides that the Treaties as well as the existing and 
future acts adopted by the Union ‘shall be binding on the State and part of the 
domestic law thereof under the conditions laid down in [the] Treaties’.136 The ECA is 
therefore the provision from which Union measures draw legislative force in Ireland, 
but the ECA is not their origin. EU legal norms still originate from outwith the 
domestic order, but are automatically made effective by a domestic legislative 
provision.137 Significantly, this is not the approach employed with respect to the 
Convention by the ECHR Act. Instead of providing that—to borrow the ECA’s 
language—the Convention ‘shall be binding on the State and part of the domestic 
law thereof’ (and thus maintaining the external origin of the Convention provisions), 
the ECHR Act imposed a specific set of obligations on domestic institutional actors, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 N MacCormick ‘Risking Constitutional Collision in Europe?’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 517 at 528. 
136 European Communities Act 1972, S 2. 
137 This is the case even with regulations. Though self-executing, they derive their legal force in 
Ireland from the ECA 1972. 
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set out in the Schedules to the Act.138 This may seem to be a rather nice distinction, 
but it has important consequences for the ‘externality’ of human rights discourse, 
described above by O’Connell. The idea is that rather than being external imports, 
the rights protected under the ECHR Act can be seen as being as domestic in their 
origin as any other national legislative provision, while simultaneously being norms 
of international law to which the State has committed itself. Their interpretation is 
therefore a matter for the domestic courts, taking judicial notice of (but not 
necessarily being strictly bound by) the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.139 Though not 
strictly required by the legislation, this arrangement would logically seem to imply 
that attention should be paid to the interpretation given to the Convention by 
similarly-situated domestic courts in other European jurisdictions, echoing Maduro’s 
contrapunctual principle of horizontal coherence. 
This requirement to take judicial notice of Convention provisions and the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR has necessarily changed the world-view and terms of 
reference of the domestic judiciary. The days when the domestic judiciary was 
precluded from taking into account obviously relevant judgments of the ECtHR, as 
in Norris, are gone. Cases such as Carmody, Doherty v South Dublin County Council 
(No 2),140 and Leonard v Dublin City Council141 all provide instances of detailed and 
sophisticated engagement with external jurisprudence to a degree previously 
foreclosed by dualism. The cases of Foy v an t-Árd Chláraitheoir (No 1)142 and (No 
2)143 demonstrate the integrative, pluralising effect of domestication particularly 
well. Just days after the High Court had found Ireland’s lack of provision for updated 
birth certificates for post-operative transgendered people to be compatible with the 
Convention with reference to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, the European Court 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 In this regard, it is worth noting the statement of Laffoy J in Lelimo v Minister for Justice [2004] 2 
IR 178 that ‘[i]t is not correct to say that the Convention has been incorporated into domestic law. 
What the Act of 2003 has done is to give effect to rights recognised in the Convention in Irish law.’ 
(at 186) and also O’Neill J’s description of the ECHR Act ‘importing’ Convention law into Ireland in 
Dada v Minister for Justice [2006] IEHC 166. See further, F de Londras ‘Using the ECHR in Irish 
Courts: More Whisper than Bang?’ Public Interest Law Association Seminar, Dublin, 13 May 2011. 
<http://www.pila.ie/download/pdf/pilaechrseminar130511fdelondras.pdf>. These comments 
notwithstanding, the standard term ‘incorporation’ is used here. 
139 ECHR Act 2003, S 4. 
140 Doherty v South Dublin County Council (No 2) [2007] 2 IR 696. 
141 Leonard v Dublin City Council [2008] IEHC 79. 
142 Foy v an t-Árd Chláraitheoir (No 1) [2002] IEHC 116. 
143 Foy v an t-Árd Chláraitheoir (No 2) [2007] IEHC 470. 
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handed down judgment in Goodwin v UK,144 reversing its previous holdings on the 
matter and finding the UK in breach of the Convention for its similar refusal to 
accommodate the wishes of transgendered people. Accordingly, in Foy (No 2), Mrs 
Foy was successful in seeking a declaration of incompatibility under Section 5 in 
view of this change in the interpretation of the Convention. No trip to Strasbourg was 
necessary in order to procure a judgment against the state under international law, for 
the ECHR Act’s provisions had allowed for the ECtHR’s jurisprudence to be applied 
domestically. Moreover, the fact that the domestic courts followed the new line of 
European jurisprudence does not privilege the ECtHR over the domestic judiciary, 
nor the Convention over the Constitution. Instead, it was merely that one source of 
authority in the polyarchy had reconsidered its jurisprudence, and the resultant 
conflict was resolved by the domestic adoption of this new jurisprudence, 
commanded by the legislature and thus compliant with the autonomy of the domestic 
order. 
Furthermore, the interpretive obligation in Section 4 ECHR Act is phrased in 
such a way that it is not confined to cases where Convention rights have been 
specifically pleaded. In this regard, Oran Doyle and Desmond Ryan note that:  
In the context of a declaration of unconstitutionality being sought in the 
absence of any ECHR-related claim, the Court has a statutory obligation 
pursuant to this section to have regard to any of the pertinent ECHR-related 
authorities listed in section 4. This point underscores the potential for 
section 4 to create an enhanced impetus for the already-developed practice 
of the infusion of Convention protection into domestic constitutional 
analysis145 
However, for all the integrative effects of the ECHR Act, its long title is clear that it 
is intended ‘to enable further effect to be given, subject to the Constitution, to certain 
provisions of the [ECHR]’. The question of priority must therefore be considered.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Goodwin v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 18. 
145 O Doyle and D Ryan ‘Judicial Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 
2003: Reflections and Analysis’ (2011) 18(1) Dublin University Law Journal 369 at 380, citing F de 
Londras and C Kelly The European Convention on Human Rights Act: Operation, Impact and 
Analysis (Dublin: Round Hall, 2010) at 6–44. 
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2.2.2 Unconstitutionality and unconventionality: a question of priority 
The question of priority is most relevant with reference to the declaration of 
incompatibility under Section 5. The case of Carmody v Minister for Justice146 
concerned the compatibility of the State’s criminal legal aid arrangements with both 
the Constitution and the Convention, and whether an indigent defendant facing trial 
in the District Court on a complex set of charges was entitled to be provided with 
both a solicitor and a barrister. Carmody had simultaneously sought a declaration 
that Section 2 of the Criminal Justice (Legal Aid) Act 1962 was repugnant to the 
Constitution and a declaration of incompatibility with the Convention under Section 
5 of the ECHR Act. In the High Court, Laffoy J applied the long-standing (but not 
absolute) rule that ‘a court should not enter upon a question of constitutionality 
unless it is necessary for the determination of the case before it’.147 This is a sensible 
precautionary measure, in that the ‘nuclear option’ of finding a legislative provision 
or state action contrary to the Constitution should be avoided if the plaintiff’s rights 
can be vindicated by less drastic measures. However, Gerard Hogan points out that 
to decide the question of conventionality before that of constitutionality may result 
in:  
[A] practice that the exhaustion of constitutional remedies [is] the exception, 
not the norm. If that were so, we might well [reach] the point whereby the 
ECHR would de facto have replaced the Constitution as the principal legal 
instrument of protection so far as the protection of fundamental rights is 
concerned.148 
Such an approach would therefore be inconsistent with the ECHR Act’s stated 
intention that Convention rights be protected subject to the Constitution. 
Having made the decision that it was most appropriate to begin by investigating 
the 1962 Act’s compatibility with the Convention prior to deciding the constitutional 
issue, Laffoy J engaged in a wide-ranging and nuanced consideration of the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence on Articles 6 and 14 ECHR, and relevant decisions of the former 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the UK, before eventually holding, on the 
facts, that Section 2 of the 1962 Act was not incompatible with the requirements of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Carmody v Minister for Justice [2005] 1 JIC 2103 (HC); [2010] 1 IR 635 (SC). 
147 The State (Woods) v Attorney General [1969] IR 385 at 400 per Henchy J. 
148 G Hogan ‘The Value of Declarations of Incompatibility and the Rule of Avoidance’ (2006) 28 
Dublin University Law Journal 408 at 418. 
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the Convention. A similar finding was made in relation to the Section 2’s 
compatibility with the Constitution. Accordingly, Carmody lost his case, and then 
appealed. 
Before considering the Supreme Court’s reversal of Carmody, it is important to 
note the High Court judgment of O’Neill J in Law Society of Ireland v Competition 
Authority,149 handed down shortly after Laffoy J’s judgment in Carmody. Rather 
than expressly prioritising Convention arguments over constitutional arguments, or 
vice versa, O’Neill J employed what might be called an ‘exhaustive’ or ‘concurrent’ 
approach: the case was ultimately decided on constitutional grounds, and the order 
for certiorari sought by the applicants was granted on account of the respondents’ 
breach of Article 40.3 of the Constitution, but the Court nevertheless went on to 
evaluate the Convention arguments. In the event, the respondents’ actions were held 
also to amount to a breach of Article 6(1) ECHR However, because a constitutional 
remedy had already been granted, ‘it is impermissible to make the declaration of 
incompatibility envisaged in s. 5, there being another adequate legal remedy 
available.’150 
The approaches of the High Court in Carmody and Law Society differ in 
important respects. In Carmody, Laffoy J set out a clear progression, where 
arguments under the ECHR Act are dealt with before any constitutional arguments 
are entertained; whereas O’Neill J in Law Society considered both sets of claims as 
alternatives, only preferring the constitutional remedy because of Section 5’s 
requirement that there be no other adequate remedy available.151 The Supreme 
Court’s judgment in Carmody reveals, however, a different approach. The Court held 
that the ordinary, Constitution-last approach was inappropriate for cases in which 
both constitutional arguments and a claim under Section 5 ECHR Act are advanced. 
This was predicated on the fact that, in the present case, a declaration of 
incompatibility would not have the effect of ‘determining the issue’152 without 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Law Society of Ireland v Competition Authority [2006] 2 IR 262. 
150 Ibid at 290. 
151 Which can be contrasted with O’Neill J’s decision to grant a declaration of incompatibility in 
Dublin City Council v Liam Gallagher [2008] IEHC 354, where no constitutional arguments had been 
raised, and the alternative remedy of judicial review would not have been adequate given that the facts 
of the case were in dispute. 
152 Carmody (SC) (n 146) at 648, quoting Murphy v Roche [1987] IR 106 at 110 per Finlay CJ. 
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recourse to the Constitution. Because Section 5 specifically states that a declaration 
‘shall not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the statutory 
provision or rule of law in respect of which it is made’,153 Carmody would still have 
faced trial without the assistance of a barrister and, as the Court held, ‘any such 
declaration in this case would leave the plaintiff in the same position with regard to 
his claimed constitutional right … as he was prior to the commencement of 
proceedings.’154 This combined with Section 5(1)’s requirement that ‘no other legal 
remedy [be] adequate or available’ led the Court to conclude that in any case where 
both declarations of unconstitutionality and incompatibility with the Convention are 
sought, the constitutional arguments must be decided first. 
It is therefore clear from the Supreme Court’s judgment in Carmody that for all 
the integrative effect of the ECHR Act, the Constitution remains the supreme law of 
the land; and while the judgment still allows for domestic application and 
interpretation of the Convention, and thus for a growth in domestic Convention 
jurisprudence over time, Convention remedies are still of a residual nature. 
 
2.3 Conclusion: legislative interface norms 
As was stated at the outset of this Section, the relationship between the Irish legal 
order and that of the Convention is fundamentally different from that between the 
Irish order and that of the Union. This is to be expected, both because of the very 
different natures of the two European legal orders per se, and because of the very 
different means by which the entry of these orders to the Irish system is regulated. 
Outlining the terms of engagement between Irish and EU law necessarily involved 
discussion of cases of actual and potential conflict between the legal orders, 
especially Crotty and Grogan, and thus the interface norms involved, whether 
constitutional or metaconstitutional. This was particularly the case given the 
remarkable nature of Article 29.4.6°, and the orthodoxy surrounding it. The 
relationship between Irish law and the Convention contains no equivalent to the 
exclusion clause; and, unlike the judicially-formulated constitutional interface norms 
discussed in Section 2, the ECHR Act provides a set of legislative norms regulating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 ECHR Act 2003, S 5(2)(a). 
154 Carmody (SC) (n 146) at 650. 
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the interaction between legal systems. Again, these norms are internal to the Irish 
legal system, and not metaconstitutional. Accordingly, the focus of this section has 
been on outlining the means by which the Convention has been incorporated in 
Ireland and demonstrating the polyarchic nature of the resultant relations, and not on 
the approach of the Irish judiciary in cases of conflict. As we have seen with 
reference to the cases of Foy (No 1) and Foy (No 2), conflict between the two legal 
orders is ordinarily resolved by the adaptation of the domestic order to the norms of 
the Convention. There are, however, examples of altogether more difficult cases of 
conflict between the orders, and these will be discussed in greater detail, in the 
context of the ‘triangular’ frame, in Chapter 4.  
 
3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has set out in detail the means by which the legal orders of the EU and 
the Convention have been received in the Irish legal order. It has demonstrated, first, 
that, in both cases, the relationship between the systems is best regarded as being 
heterarchical and, second, that the three systems form part of a tripartite polyarchy, 
the triangular constitution. With reference to the Irish-EU side of the triangle, the 
interface norms invoked by the domestic judiciary when dealing with cases of 
constitutional conflict—whether before or after the coming into force of EU norms—
are constitutional in nature. That is, they are conflict-of-laws rules internal to the 
national legal system. Whether and how they can be metaconstitutionalised, and 
what resemblance they bear to the interface norms posited by Kumm and others is a 
question that will be addressed further in the chapters to follow, but we can come to 
the preliminary conclusion that the attempt to universalise norms developed with 
reference to a particular national configuration is beset with difficulty, and that the 
external norms posited by Kumm do not quite reflect what has happened in actual 
practice. 
Turning to the Irish-ECHR side of the triangle, we saw that a standard dualist 
relationship between national and international law has given way to the partial 
internalisation of the international system within the national by virtue of the ECHR 
Act. That Act itself provides substantive norms for regulating the relationship 
between the orders, but it does so at the legislative, and therefore subconstitutional, 
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level. Be that as it may, the Act provides convincing evidence for the polyarchical 
arrangement of the two legal systems. Discussion of instances of seeming 
irresolvable conflict between the orders, and the interface norms adopted therein, 
will be engaged in Chapter 4. Before this can be done, however, the third side of the 
triangle must be outlined: the relationship between the EU and the ECHR. This will 




THE HORIZONTAL FRAME 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the interface norms at work on the ‘horizontal’ side of the 
triangular constitution—the relationship between the Union and Convention legal 
orders. Though the relationship can be characterised as ‘horizontal’ within the 
specific Member State-EU-ECHR configuration, this is subject to two important 
provisos. First, there is a ‘triangular’ aspect inherent to the relationship, in that nation 
states have historically served as the intermediaries through which the two European 
legal orders have articulated their relationship with and attitudes to each other, given 
the lack of a direct institutional link between them. As we shall see, the coming into 
force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union1 has partially 
provided the institutional link that was previously missing, and this link will be 
solidified by the impending accession of the EU to the Convention. Second, these 
two developments, the Charter and accession, raise serious questions about how we 
can best conceptualise the EU-ECHR relationship, and whether heterarchy is giving 
way—and ought to give way—to hierarchy. 
The examination proceeds in two parts. Section 2 first sets out the institutional 
relationship between the EU and the ECHR before accession, from the perspective of 
each in turn, and analyses the interface norms regulating the relationship. It then 
discusses the implications of the recently negotiated Draft Accession Agreement. In 
Section 3, the focus narrows to a specific, ongoing case of conflict between the 
orders, investigating how it arose and offering suggestions based on precedent as to 
how it will be resolved. 
The Chapter concludes though there are similarities with the ‘vertical’ frame, the 
specific nature of the EU and the ECHR as non-state legal orders complicates any 
attempt to simply transpose interface norms developed in the context of the EU-
Member State relationship. Moreover, EU accession to the ECHR will shift a large 
part of the work of managing the interface between the orders from the realm of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/02.  
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metaconstitutional to that of the constitutional, posing further difficulties for the 
ostensible universality of metaconstitutional interface norms.  
 
1 THE TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN THE EU AND THE ECHR 
1.1 Pre-Accession 
1.1.1 The ECHR from the ECJ’s viewpoint 
We saw in Chapter 1 how the ECJ’s initial disavowal of any jurisdiction in matters 
of human rights gradually gave way, following pressure from judicial actors at the 
state level, to the development of an expansive EU human (or ‘fundamental’) rights 
jurisprudence. Judge Allan Rosas of the ECJ describes his Court’s attitude to the 
Convention during this process as progressing through five stages:2 the initial denial 
of fundamental rights competence;3 acceptance of fundamental rights as part of the 
general principles of Community law (since 1969);4 explicit reference to the ECHR 
(since 1974);5 characterisation of the ECHR as having ‘special significance’ (since 
1991);6 and reference to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR (since 1996).7 However, 
these developments came about quite separately from the institutional machinery of 
the Convention. Indeed, the ECJ held in 1996 that EU accession to the Convention 
would be outwith the conferred competences of the Union,8 being a change which 
would:  
[E]ntail the entry of the Community into a distinct international institutional 
system as well as integration of all provisions of the Convention into the 
Community legal order[,] [s]uch a modification of the system for the 
protection of human rights in the Community … would be of constitutional 
significance and would therefore be such as to go beyond the scope of 
Article 235. It could only be brought about by Treaty amendment.9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 A Rosas ‘The European Union and Fundamental Rights/Human Rights’ in C Krause and M Scheinin 
(eds) International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook (Turku: Institute for Human Rights, Åbo 
Akademy University, 2009) at 457. 
3 Case 1/58 Stork v High Authority [1959] ECR 17; Cases 36, 37, 38 & 40/59 Geitling v High 
Authority [1960] ECR 423; Case 40/64 Sgarlata and others v Commission [1965] ECR 215. 
4 Case 29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419. 
5 Case 36/75 Rutili [1975] ECR 1219. 
6 Case C–260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I–2925. 
7 Case C–13/94 P v S [1996] ECR I–2143. 
8 Opinion 2/94 Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1996] ECR I–1759 
9 Ibid at paras 34–35.  
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This decision has been criticised on the ground that though the matter was framed as 
one of competence, the Court had an ulterior motive in the protection of its own 
jurisdiction and autonomy from external interference, leading to a decision that was 
‘needlessly restrictive and diffident towards the ECHR.’10 In the words of Giorgio 
Gaja: 
[W]hat is here at stake is the conservation by the Court of Justice of its 
present functions, although understandably the Court has not stressed this 
point in order not to emphasize its concern with its own prerogatives.11 
While this may well have been the case, the Opinion was still highly supportive of 
the Convention’s relevance to the EC legal order. The Court repeated its 
longstanding assertion that ‘fundamental rights form an integral part of the general 
principles of law whose observance the Court ensures’,12 and recalled the further 
holding from ERT13 that the Convention is of ‘special significance’ in the context of 
the Court’s consistent statement that it: 
[D]raws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for 
the protection of human rights on which the Member States have 
collaborated or of which they are signatories.14 
As a result, the general attitude of the ECJ towards the ECtHR in the period since 
Opinion 2/94 has been one of comity in the face of potentially overlapping 
jurisdictions, coupled with (and perhaps tempered by) a desire to preserve its own 
autonomy and interpretive pre-eminence within the Union—the very substance of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 B de Witte ‘The Use of the ECHR and Convention Case Law by the European Court of Justice’ in P 
Popelier, C Van de Heyning and P van Nuffel (eds) Human Rights Protection in the European Legal 
Order: The Interaction Between the European and National Courts (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2011) at 
17. 
11 G Gaja ‘Case-note on Opinion 2/94’ (1996) 33 Common Market Law Review 973 at 988. See, 
further, N Burrows ‘Question of Community Accession to the European Convention Determined’ 
(1997) 22 European Law Review 58 at 62, suggesting that: ‘Perhaps the Court is jealous of its 
jurisdiction and will not lightly give way to an international court which may stand above it.’ But 
compare C Franklin ‘The Legal Status of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights After the Treaty of 
Lisbon’ (2010–2011) 15 Tilburg Law Review 137 at 158 fn 84: ‘[T]he stance adopted in Opinion 2/94 
was in fact no different to that taken in other well-known cases where the Court refused to open the 
door for other international courts, tribunals or bodies to rule on issues covered by Community law.’ 
(citing Opinion 1/91 Draft Agreement Between the Community and the Countries of EFTA Relating to 
the Creation of the EEA [1991] ECR I–6079 and Case C–459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR 
I–4635). 
12 Opinion 2/94 (n 8) at para 33. For a critical view, describing the EU’s fundamental rights narrative 
as an instance of political mythology, see S Smismans ‘The European Union’s Fundamental Rights 
Myth’ (2010) 48 Journal of Common Market Studies 45. 
13 ERT (n 6). 
14 Opinion 2/94 (n 8) at para 33. 
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Sabel and Gerstenberg’s deliberative polyarchy. The purpose of this section is, 
therefore, to examine two related consequences of this generally accommodating 
attitude in the pre-accession era in order to reveal the interface norms—constitutional 
and metaconstitutional—regulating the relationship: first, how the ECJ regards the 
Convention itself, and, second, how it uses the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. 
 
1.1.1.1 The status of the Convention within the EU 
As we have seen, the ECJ’s case law on the general principles of EU law has 
followed a three-step formula in respect of the relevance of the Convention to the EU 
legal order. First, fundamental rights are general principles of Union law; second, 
international treaties between the Member States and others supply ‘guidelines’ from 
which the Court ‘draws inspiration’ in its decisions on these general principles; and 
third, the Convention has ‘special significance’ in this regard.15 This formula leaves 
the formal relationship between Convention rights and the general principles 
somewhat unclear, and does not, of itself, give any particular indication as to the 
normative status of Convention rights within the EU. It cannot therefore be classified 
as an interface norm, even in the loosest sense—rather, it is a broad, general 
statement of openness towards the norms of another legal order, leaving more than 
enough room for those norms to be applied or departed from in a given case. 
The generally accepted view is that, the EU not being a signatory to the 
Convention, the Convention is not binding within the EU legal order (at least not as 
part of the general principles). This is the clear and repeated position of the General 
Court (GC): 
[T]he Court has no jurisdiction to assess the lawfulness of an investigation 
under competition law in light of the provisions of the ECHR, inasmuch as 
those provisions do not as such form part of Community law.16 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In addition to the case law cited in Section 2.1.1 above, see Case 479/04 Laserdisken ApS v 
Kulturministeriet [2006] ECR I–8089 at para 61 for a simple, one-paragraph condensation of this 
approach. 
16 Case T–99/04 AC-Treuhand v Commission [2008] ECR II–1501 at para 45. See also, Case T–
112/98 Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission [2001] ECR II–729 at para 59; and Case T–347/94 
Mayr-Melnhof Kartongesellschaft v Commission [1998] ECR II–1751 at para 311. 
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However, the ECJ has never explicitly endorsed this approach of the GC, and Bruno 
de Witte advances a different interpretation, one based on the actual text of Article 
6(3) TEU: 
Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the [ECHR] and as they result from 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute 
general principles of the Union’s law.17 
For de Witte, this wording, present in the Treaties since Maastricht and justiciable 
since Amsterdam,18 ‘indicates that the rights of the Convention are general principles 
of EU law and not just a source of inspiration for those principles.’19 If this is so, 
then the relationship between the EU and the ECHR is the precise converse of that 
which existed between Ireland and the ECHR prior to the ECHR Act 2003. Whereas 
Ireland is a signatory to the Convention, and is thus bound by it as a matter of 
international law, the Convention itself was not a part of the Irish legal system, and 
could not be relied on directly in Irish courts. Conversely, the EU, not being a 
signatory to the Convention, is neither bound by it under international law nor are its 
institutions directly subject to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR, but Article 6(3) TEU 
has the effect of incorporating the Convention into the EU order. This ‘reverse 
dualism’ finds some support in a number of judgments of the ECJ. In Elgafaji, for 
instance, the Court stated simply, and without more, that ‘the ECHR forms part of 
the general principles of Community law’.20 However, this tendency is not universal, 
and the ‘inspiration; guidelines; special significance’ formula still features in the 
Court’s reasoning in other recent cases, most notably in Kadi,21 revealing a certain 
ambivalence on the part of the ECJ as to the precise nature of the relationship 
between the general principles and Convention rights, despite the wording of Article 
6(3) TEU. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Emphasis added. 
18 Treaty on European Union (Treaty of Maastricht) [1992] OJ C 191, Art F(2) and Treaty on 
European Union (Treaty of Amsterdam) [1997] OJ C 340, Art 6(2): ‘The Union shall respect 
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the [ECHR] … as general principles of Community law’. 
19 De Witte (n 10) at 22, emphasis in original. 
20 Case C–465/07 Meki Elgafaji, Noor Elgafaji v Staatsecretaris van Justitie [2009] ECR I–921 at 
para 28. De Witte also cites Joined Cases C–482/01 and C–493/01 Georgios Orfanopoulos v Land 
Baden-Württemberg [2004] ECR I–5257 at para 98 and Case C–450/06 Varec SA v Etat belge [2008] 
ECR I–581 at para 44 ff (de Witte (n 10) at 23). 
21 Joined Cases C–402/05 P and C–415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I–6351 at para 283, citing Case C–305/05 Ordre 
des barreaux francophones et germanophone and Others [2007] ECR I–5305 at para 29. 
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This view of the direct applicability of Convention rights within the EU is lent 
further weight by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty,22 and with it the elevation 
of the Charter to a status equal to that of the Treaties.23 The general principles of EU 
law have been supplemented with a written bill of rights,24 containing its own 
provisions as to how these rights relate to those of the Convention. Article 52(3) of 
the Charter states that: 
Insofar as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed 
by the [ECHR], the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as 
those laid down by the [ECHR]. This provision shall not prevent Union law 
providing more extensive protection. 
Accordingly, even if one does not accept de Witte’s interpretation of Article 6(3) 
TEU, the combined effect of Article 6(1) TEU and Article 52(3) of the Charter is to 
incorporate into the EU order at least those Convention rights which correspond to 
rights in the Charter. Whether through the general principles (on de Witte’s view) or 
through the Charter, Convention rights may therefore be directly applied within the 
EU, even prior to EU accession to the Convention, and notwithstanding the ECJ’s 
recurrent filtering of the Convention through the ‘inspiration; guidelines; special 
significance’ formula. This view of the Convention’s status within the EU fits well 
with the notion of polyarchy, with two non-state courts interpreting and applying the 
same rights within their own jurisdictional spheres. This being the case, two 
questions then arise relating to the interpretation of these rights: the normative force 
of Strasbourg jurisprudence within the EU, and how this jurisprudence is used by the 
ECJ. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Treaty of Lisbon [2007] OJ C 306. 
23 Art 6(1) TEU: ‘The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the [Charter], 
which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.’ 
24 On the relationship between the general principles and the rights set out in the Charter, see HCH 
Hofmann and C Mihaescu ‘The Relation Between the Charter’s Fundamental Rights and the 
Unwritten General Principles of EU Law: Good Administration as the Test Case’ (2013) 9 European 
Constitutional Law Review 73 (and references therein). See also, K Lenaerts ‘Exploring the Limits of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 8 European Constitutional Law Review 375, especially 
at 384–386.  
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1.1.1.2 ECtHR case law before the ECJ 
The ECJ made no reference to the case law of the ECtHR until P v S,25 a decision 
handed down a month after Opinion 2/94. Having ruled out the possibility of EU 
accession without Treaty amendment, the ECJ appears to have begun citing 
Strasbourg jurisprudence in a compensatory effort to demonstrate its commitment to 
human rights protection.26 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott notes that: 
While the earlier references made to Strasbourg tended to be brief and 
unexpansive, more recent references engage more with Strasbourg 
jurisprudence and tend to be more reliant on it as a ground of justification, 
especially if they are made by Advocates General.27 
Despite this development, the ECJ in its use of ECtHR case law tends not to enter 
into discussion of the case law’s normative force, and has never described it as 
binding.28 Instead, the ECJ has historically restricted itself to an obligation to take 
Strasbourg jurisprudence into account.29 This attitude—of maintaining autonomy on 
one hand, while demonstrating comity on the other—is well illustrated by two sets of 
cases where the ECJ interpreted the Convention in a manner subsequently 
contradicted by the ECtHR. 
The ECJ held in Hoechst—in the absence of ECtHR case law on the point—that 
the right to inviolability of the dwelling under Article 8 ECHR could not be applied 
to a business premises.30 Subsequently, the ECtHR established in Niemitz31 and in 
Colas Est32 that Article 8 did indeed cover business premises—a finding later 
acknowledged by the ECJ in Roquette Frères,33 reversing Hoechst. Similarly, the 
ECJ held in Orkem that Article 6 ECHR did not encompass a right against self-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 P v S (n 7). Note, however, that references to Strasbourg jurisprudence began appearing in the 
Opinions of Advocates General in the 1980s: see S Douglas-Scott ‘A Tale of Two Courts: 
Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing European Human Rights Acquis’ (2006) 43 Common 
Market Law Review 629 at 645. 
26 See de Witte (n 10) at 24. 
27 Douglas-Scott (n 25) at 645. 
28 Ibid at 651. 
29 See, for example, Joined Cases C–238/99 P, C–244/99 P, C–245/99 P, C–247/99 P, C–250/99 P to 
C–252/99 P and C–254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV and Others v Commission [2002] 
ECR I–8375 at para 274. 
30 Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst v Commission [1989] ECR 2859 at para 18. Note, however, 
that the Court held at para 19 that such protection was available under the legal systems of the 
Member States. 
31 Niemitz v Germany (1992) 16 EHRR 97 at para 27–33. 
32 Société Colas Est v France (2004) 39 EHRR 373 at 28–39. 
33 Case C–94/00 Roquette Frères SA v DGCCRF [2002] ECR I–9011 at para 29. 
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incrimination.34 Again, this was later contradicted by the ECtHR in Funke,35 and 
again, the ECJ corrected itself in light of this development in Limburgse Vinyl 
Maatschappij.36 In both of these instances, though Luxembourg ultimately followed 
the lead set by Strasbourg, it was careful to do so by analogy and on its own terms, 
rather than to suggest that it was under any strict obligation to correct itself. 
However, these cases concerned general principles of Union law, and predated 
the coming into force of the Charter. As was the case with the direct applicability of 
the Convention within the Union, the Charter in the post-Lisbon era has altered the 
status of Strasbourg jurisprudence. Article 6(1) TEU, having given the Charter the 
same legal value as the Treaties, goes on to provide that the Charter is to be 
interpreted in accordance with its own provisions on interpretation, and with ‘due 
regard’ to the explanations referred to in the Charter, which set out the sources of its 
provisions.37 These explanations make clear that: 
The reference [in Article 52(3) of the Charter] to the ECHR covers both the 
Convention and the Protocols to it. The meaning and scope of the 
guaranteed rights are determined not only by the text of those instruments, 
but also by the case-law of the [ECtHR] and by the [ECJ]. The last sentence 
of the paragraph is designed to allow the Union to guarantee more extensive 
protection. In any event, the level of protection afforded by the Charter may 
never be lower than that guaranteed by the ECHR.38 
Although this provision, and the other provisions of the Charter regarding its 
interpretation, do not make ECtHR case law binding on the ECJ in specific terms, the 
combined effect is to make the Strasbourg Court’s interpretation of the meaning and 
scope of the Convention rights—and thus many of the Charter’s provisions—an 
authoritative baseline, below which the ECJ’s standards of protection may not fall. 
Furthermore, it is important that this part of the explanations to the Charter also 
charges the ECJ with the interpretation of the Convention, as emphasised in the 
extract above, specifically charging the ECJ with interpreting the Convention as a 
matter of EU law, and providing the institutional means by which this interpretation 
may lead to a higher—but emphatically not lower—level of rights protection. In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Case 374/87 Orkem v Commission [1989] ECR 3283 at para 30. 
35 Funke v France (1993) 16 EHRR 297 at paras 41–44. 
36 Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij (n 29) at paras 258–280. 
37 The general provisions governing interpretation of the Charter are set out in Title VII, and the 
explanations referred to by Art 52(7) are found in Explanations Relating to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C 303/17. 
38 Charter explanations (n 37) at 303/33; emphasis added. 
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post-Lisbon era, therefore, judgments of the ECtHR have greater normative force 
within the EU itself (at least in the interpretation and application of the Charter) than 
they do in the Irish legal order under the ECHR Act 2003, which, as we saw in 
Chapter 2, requires the Irish judiciary only to ‘take due account’ of the ECtHR’s 
decisions.39 In this context, having reviewed the ECJ’s Charter case law since 
Lisbon, Filippo Fontanelli states that: ‘It is clear that reference to the ECtHR and its 
case-law is no longer a matter of nicety and comity but an actual precondition for the 
application of the Charter.’40  
The ECHR’s status within the EU, and that of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, is 
therefore based on much more than mere comity between the Luxembourg and 
Strasbourg courts, although this was previously the case. The EU is not only 
empowered but obliged to accede to the Convention,41 Convention rights are stated 
to be general principles of Union law—though the ECJ has been somewhat 
ambiguous on this point; and, in a very real sense, the Convention and the case law 
surrounding it are incorporated into the EU legal order—and made a baseline or floor 
below which human rights standards may not fall—by means of the Charter. This 
therefore raises the question of whether hierarchy or heterarchy best characterises the 
relationship between the two legal orders; and it is at least arguable that hierarchy 
has the upper hand in the post-Lisbon era. Before this question can properly be 
addressed, however, we must examine the relationship from the other side. 
 
1.1.2 The EU from the ECHR’s viewpoint 
The ECJ’s development of an EU human rights jurisprudence has been broadly well 
received by the ECtHR. A relatively early, and somewhat tentative, example is the 
case of Goodwin v UK,42 where the ECtHR referred to the P v S judgment of the 
ECJ, in which that Court had held that discrimination arising from gender 
reassignment constituted discrimination on grounds of sex under (and contrary to) 
EU law. Though the ECtHR did not go into detail in its analysis of the Luxembourg 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 ECHR Act 2003, S 4. 
40 F Fontanelli ‘The European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights: Two Years Later’ (2011) 3 
Perspectives on Federalism 22 at 39. See also de Witte (n 10) at 24–32, where he describes the ECJ’s 
use of Strasbourg jurisprudence as ‘eclectic and unsystematic’. 
41 Art 6(2) TEU. 
42 Goodwin v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 18. 
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case in this instance, and did not specifically adopt its reasoning, it seems fair to 
regard the ECtHR’s attitude to the case as one of general approval, given that both 
cases had the effect of upholding a complaint of discrimination against transgendered 
people. It is also significant that the ECtHR made reference to the Charter in the 
course of its judgment, which, at the time, the ECJ itself had not yet done.43 
But there is a significant jurisdictional problem that the ECtHR had to resolve. 
The majority of the States that are party to the Convention are also Member States of 
the EU, and are therefore subject to the requirements of the Treaties and the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ. However, as we know, the EU itself is not yet a signatory to 
the Convention and therefore is not subject to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR in the 
same way that its Member States are. What then is to be done in a case where a State 
subject to both the Convention and the Treaties is found to have acted in breach of 
the Convention, but this was only done in order to fulfil obligations under the 
Treaties? The case law on this point can be divided into two categories: review of 
primary EU law, and review of secondary EU law. 
 
1.1.2.1 Review of primary EU law 
As early as 1958, the former European Commission of Human Rights (ECmHR) 
held in X & X44 that if a State’s international obligations prevented it from living up 
to its obligations under the Convention, the State would still be responsible for the 
latter. Later, the ECmHR held in M & Co45 that this responsibility would not apply 
provided that the international organisation to which a State had delegated power 
provided ‘equivalent protection’ of human rights, a decision which Douglas-Scott 
notes has obvious parallels with the Solange jurisprudence outlined in Chapter 1,46 
and thus with the interface norm of conditional recognition. Notwithstanding this 
development, the ECtHR still indirectly reviewed a norm of EU law for compliance 
with the Convention in Matthews.47 The applicant, a Gibraltar resident, alleged that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Ibid at paras 58 and 100. 
44 X & X v Germany App no 342/57 (decision, ECmHR, 4 Sep 1958). 
45 M & Co v Germany [1990] 64 Decisions and Reports 138. 
46 Douglas-Scott (n 25) at 636. 
47 Matthews v UK [1999] 28 EHRR 361. 
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Annex II of the (EC) Direct Elections Act 1976,48 by which the UK declared that it 
would apply the Act only in respect of the UK itself (and not the territories for whose 
foreign affairs the UK is responsible), was in breach of Article 3 of Protocol 1 
ECHR. In holding for the applicant, the ECtHR noted that:  
[A]cts of the EC as such cannot be challenged before the Court because the 
EC is not a Contracting Party. The Convention does not exclude the transfer 
of competences to international organisations provided that Convention 
rights continue to be ‘secured’. Member States’ responsibility therefore 
continues even after such a transfer.49 
Crucially, both the 1976 Act and the Maastricht Treaty—which enhanced the powers 
of the European Parliament, giving it the characteristics of a ‘legislature’ within the 
meaning of the Convention50—were not ordinary EC legal acts, such as regulations 
or directives, but rather were primary law instruments, and thus immune from 
challenge before the ECJ.51 Accordingly, the Convention rights could not be 
‘secured’ in this instance, there being no method by which the law could be 
challenged on human rights grounds at EU level, ‘equivalent’ or otherwise. Clearly 
not content to allow such a lacuna, the Court held the UK directly responsible for the 
failure to hold elections to the European Parliament in Gibraltar.52 Matthews 
demonstrates that the ECtHR is not averse to reviewing primary EU law for 
conformance with the Convention, provided that responsibility for this law can be 
attributed to a State party to the Convention. The case thereby demonstrates the 
partially ‘triangular’ nature of the EU-ECHR relationship, in that the ECtHR’s 
jurisdiction over primary EU law is indirect, mediated through the responsibility of 
States as signatories to the Convention, the UK serving in this case as the necessary 
intermediary to engage the supervision of Strasbourg over norms that would 
otherwise be outwith its jurisdiction. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Act Concerning the Election of the Representatives of the Assembly by Direct Universal Suffrage 
[1976] OJ L 278. 
49 Matthews (n 47) at para 32. 
50 Ibid at paras 45–54. 
51 Ibid at 33. 
52 Ibid at 60–65. 
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1.1.2.2 Review of secondary EU law 
But there still remains the issue of secondary EU law, which can be challenged 
before the ECJ on human or fundamental rights grounds. In this regard, the most 
explicit support from the ECtHR for the human rights turn in the ECJ’s jurisprudence 
is found in Bosphorus v Ireland.53 Echoing the much earlier ECmHR decision in M 
& Co, the ECtHR held that: 
State action taken in compliance with [legal obligations deriving from 
membership of an international organisation] is justified as long as the 
relevant organisation is considered to protect fundamental rights, as regards 
both the substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their 
observance, in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that 
for which the Convention provides.54 
If the ECtHR considers that the organisation at issue does in fact offer an 
equivalent55 level of rights-protection to the Convention, State action taken on foot 
of an international obligation is presumed to be in compliance with the requirements 
of the Convention, though this presumption can be rebutted if, in a given case, ‘it is 
considered that the protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient.’56 In the 
case at hand, the ECtHR first set out the evolution of human rights protection within 
the Union, with particular reference to the ‘special significance’ given to the 
Convention in ERT, and Opinion 2/94’s statement that respect for human rights is ‘a 
condition for the lawfulness of [Union] acts.’57 The Court went on to analyse the 
procedures by which Union acts can be challenged under the Treaties—whether by 
way of direct action before the ECJ or by action before a national court making use 
of the Article 267 TFEU preliminary reference procedure—and held that, at the 
relevant time, the EU had in fact offered an ‘at least equivalent’ level of protection of 
human rights, and that in the given case there was no deficiency or dysfunction in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland [2005] ECHR 440. See 
generally, T Lock ‘Beyond Bosphorus: The European Court of Human Rights’ Case Law on the 
Responsibility of Member States of International Organisations under the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2010) 10 Human Rights Law Review 529; S Peers ‘Bosphorus—European Court of 
Human Rights’ (2006) 2 European Constitutional Law Review 443. 
54 Bosphorus (n 53) at para 155. 
55 Note that: ‘By “equivalent” the Court means “comparable”; any requirement that the organisation's 
protection be “identical” could run counter to the interest of international cooperation pursued … 
However, any such finding of equivalence could not be final and would be susceptible to review in the 
light of any relevant change in fundamental rights protection’ (ibid). 
56 Ibid at para 156. 
57 Opinion 2/94 (n 8) at para 34. 
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this protection.58 Accordingly, the presumption that Ireland’s actions on foot of its 
EU obligations—which, in turn, were on foot of action required by the UN Security 
Council—were compliant with the Convention was not rebutted, and Bosphorus’ 
application failed. As was the case in Matthews, it is important to note the 
triangularity of this interaction—it was State action that was being judged directly. 
The (potential and, in this case, unnecessary) review of secondary EU norms would 
still be indirect in a case finding ‘manifestly deficient’ protection of human rights, 
mediated through the responsibility of the State at issue. 
Two points can be made about the ECtHR’s Bosphorus approach to human rights 
protection at EU level. First—and as Douglas-Scott noted with reference to its 
ancestor, M & Co—it is strikingly similar to the Solange jurisprudence, a point also 
emphasised by Sabel and Gerstenberg59 who note that the decision: 
[R]econciles two conflicting aspects: the recognition of the accommodation 
of human rights concerns by the ECJ and recognition of the specificity and 
autonomy of the Community law system.60 
As we have seen in Chapter 1, in Solange II, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) 
committed itself not to exercise—but did not renounce—its claimed jurisdiction to 
review norms of EU law for rights-compliance, so long as the level of protection 
offered by the ECJ was not less than that offered by the BVerfG in Germany. The 
Bosphorus approach is similarly accommodating, recognising as it does the very real 
progress made in terms of the attention paid by the EU to issues of human rights, 
while still reserving to the ECtHR the right to intervene if it considers such 
intervention necessary for the vindication of the rights protected by the Convention.  
The Bosphorus principle is unique in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, in that the 
Court specifically privileges the jurisprudence of the ECJ in a way that it does not in 
relation to the High Contracting Parties to the Convention. No national legal system 
under the ECHR enjoys a presumption, rebuttable or otherwise, that its whole system 
of law is compliant with the Convention. Quite the contrary: the very raison d’être of 
the ECtHR is to supervise national legal systems party to the ECHR, and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Bosphorus (n 3) at paras 156–166. 
59 CF Sabel and O Gerstenberg ‘Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus: The ECJ and the 
Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order’ (2010) 16 European Law Journal 511 at 519 and 
547. 
60 Ibid at 519, footnote omitted. 
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existence of such supervision logically implies a certain suspicion (though this may 
be too strong a word) that the Convention will not always be upheld at the domestic 
level. The doctrine of the margin of appreciation—whereby the ECtHR allows States 
a certain leeway in their interpretation and application of some of the rights under the 
Convention—may seem comparable to the rule in Bosphorus at first glance, but the 
two notions are fundamentally different: a supervised leeway is not the same thing as 
a (rebuttable) presumption of compatibility. This discrepancy is justified, however, 
by the specific nature of the EU as an autonomous legal order not yet party to the 
Convention, with which the ECtHR must come to terms within the structural 
confines of its own jurisdiction. Furthermore, and as we shall soon see in Section 2.2, 
the Bosphorus privilege is now a temporary state of affairs, which will be lifted upon 
EU accession to the Convention. 
 
1.1.2.3 Institutional matters: the ECJ’s Advocates General and Article 6 
ECHR 
Before moving on to the details of accession, there is one further matter that warrants 
examination: the potential—but averted—conflict between the ECtHR and the ECJ 
on the question of the compatibility of the role of the ECJ’s Advocates General with 
Article 6 ECHR. The Hoechst and Orkem series of cases discussed above at Section 
2.1.1.2 revealed a divergence in the approaches of the two European courts, which 
was ultimately resolved by the ECJ adopting the ECtHR’s jurisprudence and 
correcting its own—an archetypal example of ‘good behaviour’ under the 
Convention, and an instance where the relationship between the orders can well be 
conceived of hierarchically. However, these cases concerned the manner in which 
the EU, and in particular the Commission, went about enforcing EU competition law, 
and did not call into question the substantive nature of that enforcement. Though the 
right to inviolability of the dwelling (or business premises) and the right against self-
incrimination are important in their own right, they do not—and did not in these 
cases—pose constitutional or institutional difficulties for the EU, or offend against 
that legal order’s autonomy. The divergence in the case law outlined in this Section 
had the potential to pose an altogether more serious threat to the autonomy of EU 
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law, and its ultimate resolution demonstrates the extent of the ECtHR’s deference to 
that autonomy under the Bosphorus presumption. 
The ECtHR had held in Vermeulen61 that the impossibility of the defence 
replying to the observations of the Procureur Général before the Belgian Cour de 
Cassation constituted a breach of the right to adversarial proceedings under Article 6 
ECHR, a right that: 
Means in principle the opportunity for the parties to a criminal or civil trial 
to have knowledge of and comment on all evidence adduced or observations 
filed, even by an independent member of the national legal service, with a 
view to influencing the court’s decision.62 
The breach had been aggravated by the Procureur Général’s participation in the 
court’s deliberations, albeit in an advisory capacity.63 Similar decisions were made 
regarding equivalent officers in the courts of Portugal, the Netherlands and France.64 
Vermeulen was subsequently relied on before the ECJ by the applicants in Emesa 
Sugar,65 who had been refused leave to reply to the Advocate General’s Opinion in 
the course of a preliminary reference, since neither the Statute of the ECJ nor the 
Court’s Rules of Procedure made provision for such a submission.66 Emesa argued 
that in the light of the ECtHR’s decision in Vermeulen, the impossibility of replying 
to the AG’s Opinion was in breach of Article 6 ECHR. In its decision, the ECJ 
recounted the ‘general principles; guidelines; special significance’ formula regarding 
the Convention,67 but distinguished Vermeulen on the grounds that the ECJ’s 
Advocates General are full members of the Court, equal in rank to the Judges, and 
are subject to no external authority.68 Moreover, the Court can reopen the oral 
procedure after the delivery of the AG’s Opinion ‘if it considers that it lacks 
sufficient information, or that the case must be dealt with on the basis of an argument 
which has not been debated between the parties.’69 Accordingly, the decision in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Vermeulen v Belgium (1996–I) 32 EHRR 15. 
62 Ibid at para 33. 
63 Ibid at para 34.  
64 Lobo Machado v Portugal (1996) 23 EHRR 79; JJ v the Netherlands (1999) 28 EHRR 168; KDB v 
the Netherlands [1998] ECHR 20; Reinhardt and Slimane-Kaïd v France (1998–II) 28 EHRR 59. 
65 Case C–17/98 Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v Aruba [2000] ECR I–665. 
66 Ibid at para 2. 
67 Ibid at para 8. 
68 Ibid at paras 10–15. 
69 Ibid at para 18. 
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Vermeulen was not ‘transposable’70 to the position of the Luxembourg AGs, and on 
its own—autonomous—interpretation of the requirements of the Convention, the 
ECJ held that its structure and procedures did not constitute a breach of Article 6 
ECHR. 
Later, the decision in Emesa was relied on before the ECtHR by the French 
Government in Kress,71 in respect of an Article 6 ECHR challenge against the 
impossibility of replying to the opinion of the Commissaire du Gouvernement at the 
Conseil d’Etat, who, like the Luxembourg AGs—and unlike the Belgian officials in 
Vermeulen—are members of the Court, and not subject to any external authority. 
Moreover, the EC’s archives show the office of the AG at the ECJ to have been 
inspired in particular by the Commissaire du Gouvernement.72 The French 
Government argued that to find a breach of Article 6 ECHR with respect to the 
Commissaire would be to call into question the system in operation at the ECJ since 
its inception. The ECtHR again found a breach of Article 6 ECHR, but this time 
specifically on the ground of the Commissaire’s participation in the trial bench’s 
deliberations—something which the Luxembourg AGs do not do, though the ECtHR 
did not mention this—and not on the basis of his or her being subject to external 
authority. Such participation—after having submitted an Opinion to the court—may 
seem unfair in the eyes of a layperson ‘not familiar with the mysteries of 
administrative proceedings.’73 The ECtHR reproduced the relevant part of the ECJ’s 
decision in Emesa at length as part of the ‘relevant domestic law and practice’, but 
did not engage substantively with the decision in its judgment. Kress accordingly left 
the issue of the compatibility of the ECJ’s structure and practice with Article 6 
ECHR open. In Kaba II,74 the ECJ ‘failed to reconsider the matter … when presented 
with a chance’.75 The ECJ’s silence on the issue—deciding the case on different 
grounds—was particularly noteworthy given AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer’s highly 
critical overview of the Kress jurisprudence, stating that: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Ibid at para 16. 
71 Kress v France [2001] ECHR 382. 
72 C Ritter ‘A New Look at the Role and Impact of Advocates-General—Collectively and 
Individually’ (2005–2006) 12 Columbia Journal of European Law 751 at 751. 
73 Kress (n 71) at paras 81–83. 
74 Case C–466/00 Arben Kaba v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Kaba II) [2003] ECR I–
2219. 
75 Douglas-Scott (n 25) at 648 fn 83. 
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It seems that what was being sought was not so much the protection of a 
fundamental right as the imposition of a uniform conception of the 
organisation of the procedure [across disparate legal traditions] without 
explaining the need for it in terms going beyond [the perception of a 
layperson].76 
The ECtHR having set itself on a collision course with the ECJ on this issue, the 
dénouement, when it came, was somewhat surprising. In Kokkelvisserij,77 the 
applicants, in the course of an Article 267 TFEU reference, had been denied leave to 
reply to the AG’s Opinion, and the ECJ had refused to reopen the oral procedure. 
The ECtHR held that because the national court had actively sought a preliminary 
ruling from Luxembourg, national responsibility for a potential breach of the 
Convention by the EU institutions was engaged.78 The Court recalled the Bosphorus 
presumption of equivalent protection, and proceeded to an examination of whether 
the EU’s protection of human rights was ‘manifestly deficient’ in this instance. 
Intriguingly, in finding that the presumption of equivalent protection was not 
rebutted by the impossibility of replying to the AG’s Opinion, the ECtHR adopted an 
approach entirely different to that adopted with respect to the national systems in its 
previous case law. It did not focus on the institutional position of the AG (his or her 
independence; the fact that AGs do not take part in the ECJ’s deliberations) or on the 
‘doctrine of appearances’ (how matters may look to a layperson). Rather, it focused 
somewhat narrowly on the specific nature of the Article 267 TFEU procedure.79 The 
Court noted that the protection offered did not need to be identical to that of Article 6 
ECHR, and focused in particular on the possibility of reopening the oral procedure, 
which it held to be realistic and not merely theoretical.80 In the case at hand, the ECJ 
had reviewed the request for a reopening of the oral procedure on the merits, and had 
found that the applicants had submitted no precise information suggesting that a 
reopening would be useful or necessary. Accordingly, the Bosphorus presumption 
was not rebutted, and the case was declared inadmissible. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Kaba II (Opinion) (n 74) at para 105. 
77 Cooperatieve Producentenorganisatie van de Nederlandse Kokkelvisserij UA v the Netherlands 
App No 13645/05 (decision, ECtHR, 20 Jan 2009).  
78 Ibid at section B(3) of the decision as to the law (no paragraph numbers in the decision). 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. The Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C–212/06 Gouvernement de la Communauté française 
and Gouvernement wallon v Gouvernement flamand [2008] ECR I–1683 was particularly influential 
in the ECtHR so deciding. 
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The decision in Kokkelvisserij is a reaffirmation of the Bosphorus presumption of 
equivalent protection, and demonstrates just how difficult it may be to prove 
‘manifestly deficient’ protection of fundamental rights in the EU legal order. Despite 
having made a series of judgments with respect to national legal systems which 
called into question the very structure and procedures of the ECJ—and in the face of 
a refusal by the ECJ to accept that its structure and procedures were in conflict with 
Article 6 ECHR—when the matter came to a head, the ECtHR ‘scrutinized the ECJ’s 
procedures with considerable restraint in comparison to the national procedures.’81 
The ECtHR accepted, without investigation, the ECJ’s finding of ‘no precise 
information’ warranting a reopening of the oral procedure, and though it had 
previously characterised the right to adversarial proceedings under Article 6 ECHR 
as requiring the possibility of responding to ‘all evidence adduced or observations 
filed, even by an independent member of the national legal service’,82 it accepted the 
possibility of the ECJ (at its sole discretion) reopening the oral proceedings as 
sufficient to safeguard that right, with no investigation of the proportionality of the 
possible restriction. Accordingly, the Bosphorus presumption—an application of the 
interface norm of conditional recognition—was employed to avoid a head-on 
collision between the two European courts on a matter of central importance. 
 
1.1.3 Conclusions: metaconstitutional interface norms  
The terms of engagement described above are complex, have changed over time, and 
this process of change is ongoing. The EU has progressed to a situation where the 
Convention is binding within the EU order, and the ECtHR’s case law provides an 
authoritative baseline below which EU protection standards may not fall, but beyond 
which they may go. In recognising this progress, the ECtHR has attempted to 
reconcile its own duties and prerogatives as the overseer of the Convention with the 
EU’s autonomy and specificity as a legal order.  
How does Kumm’s conception of the universal metaconstitutional interface 
norms regulating the relationships between legal orders relate to the specific context 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 C Van de Heyning ‘PO Kokkelvisserij v the Netherlands’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 
2117 at 2124. 
82 Kress (n 71) at para 65. 
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of the relationship between the EU and the ECHR? Though Kumm’s procedural 
principle of democracy—which I characterised in Chapter 2 as a means for the 
protection of national specificity on democratic grounds—may have certain parallels 
in the supranational space with the protection of a supranational organisation’s 
autonomy and uniformity, these are still very different things. Most notably, though 
the protection of the EU’s autonomy may be justified on many different grounds, 
democracy is almost certainly not one of them. As we have seen, neither the ECJ nor 
the ECtHR have employed a principle along these lines in their jurisprudence. 
The formal principle of legality may, however, have some relevance here. Recall 
that this involves a strong presumption that ‘[national courts] are required to enforce 
EU law, national constitutional provisions notwithstanding’.83 Transposing this to the 
supranational domain, such a principle would require the ECJ to enforce the 
Convention, EU law notwithstanding. This being the case, the acquiescence of the 
ECJ to the ECtHR’s divergent interpretation of the Convention in the context of the 
inviolability of business premises and the right against self-incrimination is nothing 
more than the correction of an erroneous interpretation of the Convention in light of 
a subsequent clarification by the body charged with interpreting that document 
authoritatively. It does not threaten the EU legal order’s autonomy—or that of the 
ECJ as the authoritative interpreter of that legal order—and fits well with Kumm’s 
principle of legality. 
The jurisdictional principle of subsidiarity has little relevance to the EU-ECHR 
relationship, predicated as it is on the particular nature of the relationship between 
the EU and its Member States, and it finds no reflection in the non-state context. 
However, the substantive principle of the protection of basic rights finds an almost 
exact reflection in the ECtHR’s Bosphorus presumption of equivalent protection—
the similarity of which to the Solange jurisprudence being what led Sabel and 
Gerstenberg to characterise the EU-ECHR relationship as being part of a deliberative 
polyarchy in the first place. As a result, while there are certain aspects of Kumm’s 
interface norms which are reflected in the case law surrounding the EU-ECHR 
relationship, the specificity of these two legal orders, and the resultant specificity of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 M Kumm ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe 
Before and After the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal 262 at 299. 
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their relationship, means that Kumm’s metaconstitutional interface norms cannot be 
directly transposed from their statist origins. Instead, the less prescriptive notion of 
deliberative polyarchy, epitomised not just by the Bosphorus principle but also, more 
specifically, by its application in the judicial interaction regarding Article 6 ECHR 
and the structure and procedures of the ECJ with respect to the Advocates General, 
better captures the nature of the relationship. 
However, important changes to this relationship will be effected by EU accession 




On 5 April 2013, the Council of Europe and EU negotiators finalised a Draft 
Accession Agreement,84 three aspects of which are particularly important for the 
present analysis: the fact that the EU will accede to the Convention specifically not 
as a state, thus requiring modification to the Convention itself; the ‘co-respondent’ 
mechanism; and the ‘prior involvement’ procedure, whereby proceedings at the 
ECtHR may be stayed and the ECJ given an opportunity to rule on the compatibility 
of Union law with the Convention in cases where it has not already done so. 
 
1.2.1 Accession to the Convention of a non-state legal order 
Until now, all High Contracting Parties to the Convention have been states. Though 
arguably the most successful and the most deeply embedded of all international 
human rights instruments, the ECHR is framed as a standard agreement under 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Fifth Negotiation Meeting between the CDDH ad hoc Negotiation Group and the European 
Commission on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights: 
Final Report to the CDDH (Council of Europe, 47+1(2013)008rev2, available at 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Meeting_reports/47_1(2013)008rev2_
EN.pdf>, hereinafter ‘Draft Accession Agreement’). For academic comment on earlier drafts, and 
more generally, see C Eckes ‘EU Accession to the ECHR Between Autonomy and Adaptation’ (2013) 
72(3) Modern Law Review 254; M Kuijer ‘The Accession of the European Union to the ECHR: A 
Gift for the ECHR’s 60th Anniversary or an Unwelcome Intruder at the Party?’ (2011) 3 Amsterdam 
Law Forum 17; T Lock ‘Walking on a Tightrope: The Draft ECHR Accession Agreement and the 
Autonomy of the EU Legal Order’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1025; T Lock ‘EU 
Accession to the ECHR: Implications for Judicial Review in Strasbourg’ (2010) 35 European Law 
Review 777;  
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international law, using as it does the language of ‘states’,85 ‘national law’,86 the 
‘economic well-being of the country’,87 and ‘territorial integrity’.88 Accordingly, 
Article 1 of the Draft Agreement sets out the scope of the EU’s accession to the 
Convention,89 and provides for the interpretation of such phrases as they occur 
throughout the Convention as applying also to the Union.90 It is noted at Article 3 
that ‘[n]othing in the Convention … shall require the European Union to perform an 
act or adopt a measure for which it has no competence under European Union law’, 
which itself mirrors the language of Article 6(2) TEU, that accession ‘shall not affect 
the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties.’ Christina Eckes is correct to 
note that the fact that: 
The EU is joining an international instrument as important in reach and 
influence as the Convention, and doing so moreover on an equal footing 
with all state parties, is in itself a success for the EU, confirming … its 
particularity and maturity as an integration organisation.91 
What makes this notable for present purposes is the remarkable fact that rather than 
having to become more state-like in order to accede to an international agreement 
between states, the EU has instead succeeded in having that international agreement 
modified in order to accommodate the EU’s specifically non-state legal nature. As 
regards the credentials of the EU as a specifically constitutional non-state legal order 
(or ‘integration organisation’ using Eckes’ term), its accession to the ECHR, and the 
making of modifications to the Convention in order to accommodate this, is of the 
highest order of importance for a conception of the European polyarchy as being 
both constitutionalist and pluralist, without contradiction. The fact that this 
accommodation is necessary is noted in the explanatory report accompanying the 
Draft Agreement:  
The EU should, as a matter of principle, accede to the Convention on an 
equal footing with the other Contracting Parties, that is, with the same rights 
and obligations. It was, however, acknowledged that, because the EU is not 
a State, some adaptations would be necessary.92 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Arts 10(1) and 17 ECHR. 
86 Art 7 ECHR, inter alia. 
87 Art 8(2) ECHR. 
88 Art 10(2) ECHR. 
89 Specifically, the EU will accede to the Convention itself, and to its First and Sixth Protocols. 
90 Art 1(5) Draft Accession Agreement. 
91 Eckes (n 84) at 278, emphasis in original 
92 Art (I)(6) of Annex V to the Draft Accession Agreement. 
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As we shall now see, two specific adaptations to the Convention legal order to 
accommodate the EU are important for framing the post-accession terms of 
engagement between the orders. 
 
1.2.2 The co-respondent mechanism 
As we saw in Section 2.1.2, one problem stemming from the interplay between EU 
and ECHR law is that of the allocation of responsibility between the EU and its 
Member States for (alleged) breaches of the Convention. For the ECtHR to involve 
itself in deciding precisely where responsibility lies in cases involving EU law would 
involve the Strasbourg Court in determining issues of substantive EU law, rather 
than the compatibility of such law with the Convention, which is precisely the sort of 
threat to the autonomy of EU law which so concerned EU actors during the accession 
negotiations.93 The Draft Accession Agreement’s solution is termed the co-
respondent mechanism, and is set out in Article 3: 
Where an application is directed against one or more member States of the 
European Union, the European Union may become a co-respondent to the 
proceedings in respect of an alleged violation notified by the Court if it 
appears that such allegation calls into question the compatibility with the 
Convention rights at issue of a provision of European Union law, including 
decisions taken under the TEU and under the TFEU, notably where that 
violation could have been avoided only by disregarding an obligation under 
European Union law.94 
Particularly important is the last sentence: that the mechanism is to be engaged 
‘notably’ (and not ‘only’) where the Member State had no discretion in its 
application of EU law. As we have seen, the Bosphorus presumption of equivalent 
protection that the ECtHR afforded to the EU—which will be extinguished upon 
accession—arose in circumstances where the Member State was acting on foot of a 
Council regulation, and so had no discretion in its actions. The ECtHR has never had 
the opportunity fully to get to grips with the issue of apportioning responsibility in a 
case where the EU Member State retained some discretion in applying an EU norm. 
Though it held in Bosphorus that a State ‘would be fully responsible under the 
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Chapter 3: The Horizontal Frame 
 134 
Convention for all acts falling outside its strict international legal obligations’,95 the 
presumption of EU conventionality was held not to apply in the more recent case of 
Michaud v France96 (concerning a directive rather than a regulation), due to the fact 
that, in the domestic proceedings, the Conseil d’Etat had not requested a preliminary 
reference from the ECJ, and so that Court had had no opportunity to scrutinise the 
directive in question on human rights grounds. This distinguished the case from 
Bosphorus and brought it more into line with the situation in Matthews, where the 
ECJ could never have scrutinised the laws in question in the first place, being 
primary norms of EU law. The essential factor in the ECtHR’s decision to review the 
impugned legislation on the merits in Michaud therefore seems not to have been the 
fact that France had discretion in its transposition of the directive, but rather the fact 
that the ECJ had not yet been heard on the matter.97 In the event, the Court held that 
the French implementing legislation was not in breach of the Convention; but the 
way in which the Court approached the issue illustrates a certain amount of 
reluctance, first, to get involved in the apportioning of responsibility between the EU 
and its Member States, and, secondly, to rule on the substantive compliance of Union 
measures with the Convention without first having heard the ECJ on the matter. The 
co-respondent mechanism provides a neat way of circumventing this first problem in 
such cases, allowing the ECtHR in the future to treat both the Union and its Member 
States as jointly liable without getting into specifics,98 particularly because the 
mechanism is to be used ‘notably’ but not ‘only’ when the Member State had no 
discretion.  
 
1.2.3 The ‘prior involvement’ of the ECJ 
Article 3(6) of the Draft Accession Agreement provides as follows: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Bosphorus (n 53) at para 157. 
96 Michaud v France [2012] ECHR 2030. 
97 An earlier example of the ECHR not fully engaging with the issue is MSS v Belgium and Greece 
(2011) 53 EHRR 2. 
98 See Art 3(7) Draft Accession Agreement: ‘If the violation in respect of which a High Contracting 
Party is a co-respondent to the proceedings is established, the respondent and the co-respondent shall 
be jointly responsible for that violation, unless the Court, on the basis of the reasons given by the 
respondent and the co-respondent, and having sought the views of the applicant, decides that only one 
of them be held responsible.’ 
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In proceedings to which the European Union is a co-respondent, if the Court 
of Justice of the European Union has not yet assessed the compatibility with 
the Convention rights at issue of the provision of European Union law … , 
sufficient time shall be afforded for the [CJEU] to make such an assessment, 
and thereafter for the parties to make observations to the Court. 
The practical effect of this provision is to introduce to the law of the Convention an 
entirely new mechanism, comparable—though different—to the preliminary 
reference procedure in EU law. Though the action is not formally framed as a 
‘reference’ from Strasbourg to Luxembourg, the result will be similar: proceedings 
will be stayed in order to allow the ECJ to give its interpretation of norms of EU law, 
specifically in relation to conformance with the Convention. Though the ECtHR will 
be obliged to accept the correctness of the ECJ’s interpretation of EU law as a matter 
of EU law itself, it will be under no obligation to accept the ECJ’s assessment of this 
law’s compatibility with the Convention. Gaja has noted that ‘members of the Court 
of Justice have clearly expressed their strong wish that [this] procedure of “prior 
involvement” be introduced’99 as part of any accession agreement. It is interesting to 
note how well the procedure dovetails with the decision in Michaud, where the lack 
of a previous opinion from the ECJ was decisive in rebutting the Bosphorus 
presumption. Moreover, the procedure is justifiable from the perspective of the Draft 
Agreement’s stated aim of ‘not prejudic[ing] the principle of the autonomous 
interpretation of the EU law.’100 However, in her analysis of the proposals for EU 
accession, Eckes writes that  
In many ways, the EU has been privileged for many years, even without 
being a party to the Convention. It enjoys a privileged position within the 
Convention system at least since the establishment of the presumption of 
equivalent protection in Bosphorus … The accession agreement recognises 
the EU’s special position and in a different way codifies and institutionalises 
it. The EU will become primus inter pares, having all the rights of a 
Convention party and more.101 
While it is true that the EU is privileged under the Bosphorus presumption, it does 
not follow that the co-respondent and ‘prior involvement’ mechanisms make the EU 
primus inter pares under the Convention. It does not contravene the principle of 
equality between High Contracting Parties that different situations should be treated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 G Gaja ‘The ‘Co-Respondent Mechanisms’ According to the Draft Agreement for the Accession of 
the EU to the ECHR’ (2013) 2 European Society of International Law Reflections 1. 
100 Article (I)(5) of Annex V to the Draft Accession Agreement. 
101 Eckes (n 84) at 265. 
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differently: in fact, the principle of equality requires this to be the case. In view of 
the particularities of the EU judicial architecture—especially its division of labour 
between the national and Union courts—and given that the EU is acceding to the 
Convention specifically not as a state like any other High Contracting Party, both the 
co-respondent mechanism and the prior involvement mechanism are justified. The 
requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies ensures that national judiciaries will 
have been given the opportunity to be heard as to the compatibility of impugned 
national law or practice prior to the ECtHR being seised of the matter, but there is no 
such guarantee in the case of EU law within the existing Convention framework. The 
proposed ‘prior involvement’ mechanism corrects this potential lacuna and, in any 
event, the ECtHR is not obliged to accept the ECJ’s interpretation of the 
Convention—though the mechanism is a recognition of the autonomy and specificity 
of EU law, the ECtHR remains the Convention’s ultimate interpreter. 
 
1.3 Conclusions: constitutional interface norms 
The EU’s accession to the ECHR will change the nature of the relationship between 
the ECJ and ECtHR. Whereas even prior to accession, the Convention is binding 
within the EU, accession will make the Convention binding on the EU, and the 
ECtHR will no longer be able to rely on the legerdemain of ‘equivalent protection’ 
when it comes to the compatibility of EU law with the Convention. This being the 
case, the EU-ECHR relationship casts further doubt on the possibility of the a priori 
formulation of universal metaconstitutional interface norms regulating such a non-
hierarchical relationship. It was suggested in Chapter 2 that to take the constitutional 
interface norms at work in 28 different legal orders and to attempt to boil them down 
to a single set of universally-applicable metaconstitutional norms was beset with 
difficulties, not least the highly contingent way in which such norms are formulated 
and applied in each system. This observation applies with perhaps greater force with 
respect to the EU and the ECHR, neither of which are states, both of which differ 
from states, and both of which differ from each other. Following EU accession to the 
Convention, the terms of engagement between the two orders will mostly shift from 
the metaconstitutional to the constitutional. There is one metaconstitutional interface 
norm, however, that has historically applied in the EU-ECHR relationship, and will 
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continue to do so, in a different way, after accession—the Solange principle of 
conditional recognition. Whereas the Bosphorus presumption that epitomised this 
principle will no longer apply, it will be replaced with the ECtHR’s margin of 
appreciation—described by Sabel and Gerstenberg as ‘reverse Solange’102—which 
will apply just as much (or as little) to the EU as to any other High Contracting Party. 
How, then, can we best characterise the relationship between the orders after 
accession? I suggest that Sabel and Gerstenberg’s notion of deliberative polyarchy, 
and with it the dialogic reframing and adjustment of viewpoints, will still most 
accurately capture the nature of the interaction between the orders. In order to 
demonstrate this, let us consider the relationship in the round: two non-state courts 
are charged, in different ways, with the interpretation and application of the 
Convention to specific cases. One of these courts, the ECtHR, is charged with the 
final authority to interpret the Convention. The other, within its own legal order, is 
obliged to accept such interpretations as an authoritative baseline, but is free to give 
its own, autonomous interpretations of the Convention’s requirements, provided such 
interpretations provide a higher—and not lower—level of human rights protection. 
Such a state of affairs is inherently polyarchic, with different sites of authority within 
different legal orders. This polyarchy is also deliberative: the Hoechst, Orkem, and 
Vermeulen lines of case law demonstrate a dialogic statement, restatement and 
adjustment of attitudes. The pending formalisation and institutionalisation of this 
dialogue, particularly through the ‘prior involvement’ mechanism, lends weight to 
this view rather than detracts from it. 
In setting out the relationship between the EU and the ECHR, the above 
discussion highlighted several instances of conflict between the orders, all of which 
were ultimately resolved, whether ‘in favour’ of the ECJ or the ECtHR. However, 
there is a further instance of conflict to be examined, which is still unresolved, and is 
of altogether greater constitutional significance, because it concerns the relationship 
between fundamental rights as protected by the Charter and the Convention, and the 
fundamental economic freedoms at the very foundations of EU law. 
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2 LABOUR RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT 
A series of recent decisions by the ECJ and the ECtHR has revealed a wide—and 
perhaps unexpected—gap between the two courts’ understandings of a particular 
subset of human rights—labour rights—and their relative importance vis-à-vis other 
legal rights and principles. This disconnect in the jurisprudence of the two Courts, 
which is still unresolved, poses a fascinating opportunity to analyse further the 
interface norms at work—and that may yet be employed—in the EU-ECHR 
relationship, for three reasons. First, it was noted above in Section 1.1.2.3 that the 
potential conflict surrounding the role of the Advocates General of the ECJ was of 
greater constitutional significance to the EU than the previous conflict concerning 
Article 6 ECHR and the manner of the Commission’s enforcement of EU 
competition law. The current incompatibility between the two Courts’ jurisprudence 
on labour rights is of still greater constitutional significance to the EU, because it 
relates to the balance to be struck between the human rights at the heart of the 
Convention legal order, and the fundamental economic freedoms at the heart of that 
of the EU. Secondly, the conflict relates to labour rights, the precise level and nature 
of the protection of which varies significantly across Europe, touching on exactly the 
sort of concerns regarding national specificity and democratic legitimacy which 
inform Kumm’s conception of metaconstitutional interface norms. More generally, 
the conflict raises questions about the protection of human rights in the social and 
economic sphere which are of particular relevance given the current situation of 
economic crisis and high unemployment. Finally, the ongoing nature of the conflict 
allows us to analyse the different ways it may yet (or may not) be resolved, both 
before and after EU accession to the Convention.  
 
2.1 The ECJ, labour rights and market freedoms:  
an indelicate balance 
2.1.1 The right to take collective action as a fundamental right 
The roots of the controversy are the ECJ’s judgments in a series of cases concerning 
the relationship between the EU’s fundamental market freedoms and fundamental 
labour rights: specifically, freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, 
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and the right to collective action.103 Our starting point in analysing these cases is the 
ECJ’s significant recognition of the right to take collective action—including the 
right to strike104—as a fundamental right forming part of the general principles of 
Union law.105 In so holding, the Court drew on the recognition of the right in a wide 
range of international, Council of Europe, and EU documents: the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention No 87 on Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise; the European Social Charter (ESC); the 
Community Charter on the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (CCFSRW); and 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The attention given to the EU Charter is 
significant because of its lack of specific enforceability at the time of the judgment, 
and because of the Court’s previous reluctance to make use of it.106 Grounding the 
decision more specifically in the Treaties proper, the Court noted that Article 151 
TFEU makes express reference to the ESC and to the CCFSRW in its elaboration of 
the objectives of the Union’s social policy.107 The Court made no mention of the 
ECHR at this point in its judgments, and with good reason, for the categorisation of 
the right to strike as part of the fundamental right to take collective action went far 
beyond the (then) much more limited ECtHR jurisprudence on Article 11 ECHR, 
which had consistently ruled out a right to strike being protected by the Convention 
since Schmidt and Dahlström.108  
However, the way in which the ECJ went on to balance the right to take 
collective action with free movement rights under the Treaties raises serious 
questions as to the depth and quality of the Court’s understanding of the right. In 
their submissions to the ECJ in Viking and Laval, the Danish and Swedish 
Governments had sought to insulate the right to take collective action and the right to 
strike (which are constitutionally protected in those jurisdictions) from regulation by 
EU law in the first place by relying on Article 153(5) TFEU’s exclusion of these 
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in Art 28 of the Charter. 
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rights from the scope of Union action; and, secondly, by arguing that the 
fundamental nature of the right was enough to exempt it from the scope of Article 49 
TFEU’s protection of freedom of establishment in Viking and Article 56 TFEU’s 
protection of freedom to provide services coupled with Directive 96/71/EC109 on 
posted workers in Laval. The Court disposed of the argument based on Article 
153(5) TFEU with ease, relying on its consistent case law that the exclusion of a 
certain area of the law from the scope of the Treaties does not absolve the Member 
State from its general obligation to observe the requirements of Union law in its 
regulation of that area.110  
The second argument, on the fundamental nature of the rights at issue, was also 
rejected, on two grounds: first, because Article 28 of the Charter makes clear that the 
right to take collective action is not absolute but is to be exercised in accordance with 
national and Union law and practice;111 and, secondly, by analogy with the decisions 
in Schmidberger112 and Omega.113 In those cases, the rights to freedom of expression 
and respect for human dignity—though fundamental—were not held to fall outside 
the scope of the Treaties, but rather their exercise had to be reconciled with Treaty 
freedoms and with the principle of proportionality.114 While it is difficult to argue 
with the basic premise of this first ground—very few human rights are absolute—the 
second requires deeper scrutiny, because of what it can tell us about the Court’s 
conception of the relationship between fundamental—which is to say, human—rights 
and the fundamental economic freedoms of EU law.115 
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113 Case C–36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I–9609 at para 35. 
114 Viking (n 103) at paras 45–47; Laval (n 103) at paras 93–95. 
115 For an early critique of the ECJ’s equating fundamental economic freedoms with fundamental 
rights, see J Coppel and A O’Neill ‘The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?’ (1992) 
12 Legal Studies 227 at 242–244. More recently, see J Morijn ‘Balancing Fundamental Rights and 
Common Market Freedoms in Union Law: Schmidberger and Omega in the Light of the European 
Constitution’ (2006) 12 European Law Journal 15. 
 
Chapter 3: The Horizontal Frame 
 141 
2.1.2 Conceptualising collective action 
The Court’s ostensible reliance on Schmidberger and Omega in this context is 
questionable not just because of the differing circumstances of the cases, but also 
because of the differing nature of the rights and actions at issue. In both of the earlier 
cases, EU law was vertical in its effect, i.e. private enterprises were seeking damages 
from the State for infringing their free movement rights. In Schmidberger, this was a 
breach of the right to free movement of goods arising from Austria’s failure to ban a 
demonstration which shut down a motorway; and in Omega, the claim was a breach 
of the right to free movement of services arising from the State authorities’ ban on a 
‘laser tag’ game. In seeking to vindicate fundamental human rights (free expression; 
human dignity), the State had infringed fundamental economic freedoms (free 
movement of goods; services), and the question was therefore whether the State 
infringements were justifiable and proportionate. This is in contrast to the situations 
in Viking and Laval, where rather than seeking ex post reparations from the State for 
the damage already caused by State (in)action, the enterprises were seeking to 
prevent other private actors—trade unions—from continuing to exercise their rights.  
The Court had little difficulty in holding that Articles 49 and 56 TFEU were 
capable of horizontal direct effect in this manner,116 and so the trade union action 
was held to constitute a restriction on Treaty freedoms. However, this reasoning 
ignores the very same fundamental nature of the right to collective action that the 
Court had earlier recognised. Though some of the organisations at the centre of the 
cases cited by the Court in justifying its decision were clearly not State actors, and so 
are legitimate precedents to draw on in applying Treaty freedoms horizontally, none 
of them could have claimed in their cases (and none in fact did claim) that the 
restrictions they had imposed on free movement were the result of their exercise of a 
fundamental right. UEFA,117 the Union Cycliste Internationale,118 and the 
Netherlands Bar Association119 may very well have had an interest (usually 
financial) in acting as they did, but they emphatically did not have a fundamental 
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right to do so.120 From the very beginning of the analysis, then, the right to take 
collective action assumes a position subordinate to the Treaties’ economic freedoms: 
the starting point is the restriction on free movement, and the burden is then on the 
trade unions to justify their actions. Though this was also the approach taken in 
Schmidberger and Omega, those were cases of State liability, where the Court was 
evaluating whether the State’s approach in seeking to vindicate fundamental rights 
was proportionate with respect to the Treaties. Nowhere in the judgments does the 
Court address how the horizontal nature of the actions in Viking and Laval may 
modify the calculus, despite the fact that the approach taken by a State in seeking to 
uphold fundamental rights will of necessity be very different to the approach taken 
by a trade union in deciding whether or not to exercise a fundamental right by 
engaging in collective action. 
 
2.1.3 Justifying its exercise 
Aside from the conceptualisation of the right to collective action as a purely 
defensive mechanism, rather than a freestanding entitlement in its own right, the 
Court’s reasoning also founders on the question of the justification (or otherwise) of 
its exercise. In Omega, the importance attached to human dignity by the German 
Basic Law, coupled with the limited nature of the ban imposed (which was restricted 
to the variant of the game that involved ‘playing at killing’ and not, for example, 
shooting at non-human targets), meant that the State’s restriction was a justifiable 
and proportionate exercise of the public policy derogation envisaged by Articles 62 
and 52 TFEU.121 We saw in Chapter 2 that this was significant from the perspective 
of the Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence because though the right to human 
dignity is a right common to the constitutional traditions of the Member States, its 
particular formulation and expression in the German Constitution differs from that 
found elsewhere. In this way, the Court in Omega was not insisting on the uniformity 
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of Union law at the expense of national specificity, but rather reconciling the two 
through the acceptance of the specific national rule provided its exercise survived the 
proportionality test. 
In Schmidberger, a case dealing with a right which is common to all the Member 
States, the Court allowed the State a wide margin of discretion in determining the 
proportionality of its actions, and noted the facts, specific to the case at hand, that the 
demonstration was limited both in time and in scope, and was widely publicised in 
advance for the avoidance of inconvenience. Importantly, the Court also noted that 
though the State could have imposed more onerous restrictions on the 
demonstration—both in terms of location and duration—such restrictions ‘could 
have been perceived as an excessive restriction, depriving the action of a substantial 
part of its scope.’122 Finally, the Court recognised that public demonstrations  
usually [entail] inconvenience for non-participants … but the inconvenience 
may in principle be tolerated provided that the objective pursued is 
essentially the public and lawful demonstration of an opinion.123 
Importantly, as long as this demonstration of opinion is lawful, it does not matter 
what the opinion actually is. The question had been raised whether the 
environmentalist purpose of the demonstration was relevant, and the Court rightly 
noted that it was not: the case concerned the liability of the Member State, which 
arises solely from state action or omission.124 Whether the purpose and aims of the 
demonstrators were justifiable in Treaty terms was immaterial. 
It is this dual acknowledgement by the Court of the essentially disruptive intent 
of the demonstration and the irrelevance of the purpose of this disruption that makes 
the ostensible application of the Schmidberger reasoning to Viking and Laval so 
problematic. As Anne Davies writes, ‘[t]here is more than a little sleight of hand in 
the Court’s use of Schmidberger as authority for its application of the proportionality 
test in Viking and Laval.’125 In both cases, the Court placed great emphasis on the 
ways in which the trade union action was detrimental to the enterprises concerned: 
action designed to make Laval sign a collective agreement was ‘liable to make it less 
attractive, or more difficult’ to take advantage of the freedom conferred by Article 56 
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TFEU, exacerbated by the prospect of Laval being ‘forced’ into negotiations ‘of 
unspecified duration’.126 This plaintive phrasing—drawn in part from Gebhard,127 
another case where the contested restriction could never be classified as flowing 
from the exercise of a fundamental right—signifies a lack of understanding on the 
part of the Court of the nature and purpose of industrial action. In the sphere of free 
expression, even a non-disruptive demonstration can still serve to highlight a cause, 
and to attract public and political sympathy for the demonstrators. In this context, an 
element of disruption may enhance the effectiveness of a demonstration, but its 
absence does not rob it of all force. But the exercise of the right to collective action, 
including the right to strike, requires this element of disruption. Without it, collective 
action is ‘reduced’ to the level of ‘mere’ expression, and a picket line becomes 
indistinguishable from an ordinary demonstration. 
With this in mind, consider how the Court applied the proportionality test in 
Viking and Laval. In line with the case law on restrictions of free movement, in order 
to be justified the trade union action would (a) have to pursue a legitimate aim 
compatible with the Treaties; (b) be justified by an overriding reason of public 
interest; (c) be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective pursued; and (d) 
not go beyond what is necessary to attain it.128 The focus on the legitimacy or 
otherwise of the union’s aims is in contrast to Schmidberger, where the 
demonstrators’ aims were immaterial to the question of State liability, but this is a 
necessary consequence of free movement provisions being applied horizontally 
without any allowance being made for the difference between a State acting to 
balance one set of constitutional rights (by which I mean EU constitutional rights), 
on the one hand, and a group of citizens collectively exercising other constitutional 
rights, on the other. Additionally, Viking and Laval diverge at this point of the 
justification exercise. Whereas in Viking the legitimacy of the union’s aims was held 
by the ECJ to be a question of fact to be determined by the national court,129 in Laval 
the Court pre-empted this traditional division of labour between it and national courts 
(acting in their capacity as Union courts), holding that the trade union’s blockade in 
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the case could not be justified because it was seeking terms which went beyond the 
‘nucleus of mandatory rules for minimum protection in the host Member State’ laid 
down by Directive 96/71,130 and because the negotiations on pay sought by the trade 
union:  
…form part of a national context characterised by a lack of provisions, of 
any kind, which are sufficiently precise and accessible that they do not 
render it impossible or excessively difficult in practice for … an undertaking 
to determine the obligations with which it is required to comply as regards 
minimum pay.131 
Accordingly, the trade union was effectively being penalised for a legal framework 
that was beyond its control, being the responsibility of the State and not the trade 
union.  
The ECJ went on to elaborate that even though the aim of protecting workers 
may be a legitimate and justifiable one, it would cease to be so if the jobs or 
conditions of the workers in question were not jeopardised or under serious threat.132 
If it were established that the jobs are jeopardised, then the collective action would 
need to be suitable and no more than was necessary in the circumstances.133 
Moreover, the union would need to have exhausted all available alternative avenues 
for redress.134 Two final objections can be raised to these considerations. First, the 
purpose of collective action by trade unions is not necessarily confined to achieving 
more favourable conditions for the specific workers affected, nor even for the 
union’s broader membership, but rather to enhance the position of labour generally. 
The Court’s view—that only a threat to the position of the workers in question is 
relevant—employs a highly individualist approach to an expressly non-individualist 
right and practice. Secondly, considerations such as suitability, necessity in the 
circumstances, the exhaustion of alternatives—indeed, the whole question of 
proportionality—are the stuff of daily life for State agents, with a civil service, legal 
officers and a national budget at their disposal. Imposing such conditions on the 
exercise of a fundamental right by individuals acting in concert potentially 
constitutes a significant restriction on the very essence of the right. 
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134 Ibid at para 87. 
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2.2 The ECtHR and labour rights: the ground shifts 
Whatever criticisms can be made of the ECJ’s recent labour rights jurisprudence 
from the internal perspective of EU law (and as we have seen, there are many135), 
there is a strong argument that, at the time the decisions were handed down, they 
were consistent both with the terms of the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the Court 
of Human Rights. Historically, the ECtHR has been circumspect in its interpretation 
of Article 11 ECHR, holding that while it: 
…safeguards freedom to protect the occupational interests of trade union 
members by trade union action, the conduct and development of which the 
Contracting States must both permit and make possible … . [It] nevertheless 
leaves each State a free choice of the means to be used towards this end.136 
Accordingly, though Article 11 ‘presents trade union freedom as one form or a 
special aspect of freedom of association, [it] does not guarantee any particular 
treatment of trade unions, or their members, by the State.’137 Though the members of 
a trade union have the right that their union be heard,138 this was held not to extend to 
a right to be consulted,139 a right to conclude collective agreements,140 or to a right to 
strike.141 Virginia Mantouvalou has summed up the rationale of Schmidt and 
Dahlström as follows: ‘when a right can be classified as social and is protected in the 
ESC or in instruments of the ILO, it ought to be excluded from the ECHR.’142 This 
she dubs the ‘exclusive’ approach to interpretation of the Convention.143 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 See Joerges and Rödl (n 120) and Davis (n 106). See further, R Eklund ‘A Swedish Perspective on 
Laval (2007–2008) 29 Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 551; N Reich ‘Free Movement v 
Social Rights in an Enlarged Union—The Laval and Viking Cases before the ECJ’ (2008) 9 German 
Law Journal 125; T van Peijpe ‘Collective Labour Law after Viking, Laval, Rüffert and Commission v 
Luxembourg’ (2009) 25 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 
81; K Apps ‘Damages Claims Against Trade Unions after Viking and Laval’ (2009) 34 European Law 
Review 141; C Woolfson, C Thörnqvist and J Sommers ‘The Swedish Model and the Future of 
Labour Standards after Laval’ (2010) 41 Industrial Relations Journal 333. 
136 Schmidt and Dahlström (n 108) at para 36. Citations omitted, emphasis added. 
137 National Union of Belgian Police v Belgium (1979–80) 1 EHRR 578 at para 38. 
138 Ibid at para 39. 
139 Ibid at para 38. 
140 Swedish Engine Drivers Union v Sweden (1976) 1 EHRR 617 at para 39; Schettini and Others v 
Italy App no 29529/95 (decision, ECtHR, 9 Nov 2000). 
141 Schmidt and Dahlström (n 108) at para 36, see also UNISON v UK App no 53574/99 (decision, 
ECtHR, 10 Jan 2002). 
142 V Mantouvalou ‘Labour Rights in the European Convention on Human Rights: An Intellectual 
Justification for an Integrated Approach to Interpretation’ (2013) 13 Human Rights Law Review 529 at 
532, referring also to van Volsem v Belgium App No 14641/89 (decision, ECmHR, 9 May 1990). 
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However, two recent judgments of the ECtHR—Demir and Baykara144 and 
Enerji Yapı-Yol Sen145—have expressly departed from this restrictive approach to 
Article 11 ECHR. In giving an altogether wider interpretation of Article 11’s 
requirements,146 the judgments also raise serious questions about the compatibility of 
the ECJ’s approach with the Convention. As we shall now see, these judgments are 
examples of what has been dubbed the ‘integrated’ approach147 to interpretation, 
whereby the ECtHR draws on the work of other institutional actors—particularly the 
ESC and the ILO—in seeking to determine the contours, requirements and limits of 
the social and labour requirements of the Convention.148 
 
2.2.1 The ‘integrated’ approach to interpretation and Article 11 
One feature that the judgment in Demir and Baykara has in common with the 
decisions in Viking and Laval is reference to a wide range of international legal 
authority, but where Demir and Baykara differentiates itself is in the depth and 
quality of its engagement with this authority. In its survey of the right to organise and 
to bargain collectively, the ECtHR drew on ILO Conventions Nos 87, 98 and 151; 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the ESC; and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. But in doing so, and in contrast with the ECJ’s approach described above at 
Section 3.1.1, the ECtHR went beyond merely adverting to the existence of these 
instruments or the citation of their bare text; it also surveyed the jurisprudence of and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Demir and Baykara v Turkey (2009) 48 EHRR 54. 
145 Enerji Yapı-Yol Sen v Turkey [2009] ECHR 2251 (French only). 
146 See generally, KD Ewing and J Hendy ‘The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara’ (2010) 
39 Industrial Law Journal 2. 
147 The term is Martin Scheinen’s: M Schienen ‘Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights’ in A 
Eide, C Krause and A Rosas (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2nd edn, Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2001) at 29. 
148 The ‘integrated approach’ is a relatively new departure for the ECtHR, and is not universally 
applied in its case law: see N v UK (2008) 47 EHRR 885 at para 44, and compare the joint dissenting 
opinion in the case at para 6. Enthusiastic endorsement of the integrated approach can, however, be 
found in extra-curial statements of current and former judges of the ECtHR: see, for example, J-P 
Costa ‘La Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme (1948–2008): Les droits économiques, 
sociaux et culturels en question’ (Strasbourg, 16 Oct 2008, available at 
<www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/42BD71A1-099A-4B88-B907-
185CFF3B3968/0/2008_Strasbourg_colloque_déclaration_universelle_16_10.pdf>); and F Tulkens 
‘Implementing the European Convention on Human Rights in Times of Economic Crisis’ (Strasbourg, 
25 Jan 2013, available at <www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/201DCAB7-9FB3-4183-A71E-
3ED3EF7D00A4/0/Speech_20130125_Tulkens_ENG.pdf>). 
Chapter 3: The Horizontal Frame 
 148 
literature on the various bodies with responsibility for overseeing their 
implementation, including the ILO’s Committee of Experts, its Committee on 
Freedom of Association, and the European Committee of Social Rights.149 Amid 
such a wide range of sources, the omission of any mention of the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence on Article 28 of the Charter—including the then year-old cases of 
Viking and Laval—is telling, and almost certainly deliberate.150 
The Turkish Government had objected to the ECtHR placing reliance on 
instruments other than the Convention, and in particular on instruments that Turkey 
had not ratified, such as Articles 5 and 6 ESC.151 In rejecting this argument, the 
Court gave a robust defence of its ‘integrated’ approach to interpretation, stating that 
it ‘has never considered the provisions of the Convention as the sole framework of 
reference for the interpretation of the rights and freedoms enshrined therein’.152 In 
the light of the ECtHR’s previous, ‘exclusive’ approach to interpretation, this 
statement (‘has never considered’) may seem somewhat tenuous, but on closer 
investigation it holds true: even when the Court was in the habit of ruling that a right 
was not covered by the Convention because of its protection by the ESC or ILO, this 
did not mean that the Convention was its ‘sole framework of reference’—quite the 
opposite, for excluding a right from the scope of the Convention because of its 
protection elsewhere still counts as placing reliance on instruments external to the 
Convention. Whether such reliance results in a diminution or an enlargement of the 
scope of the Convention makes no difference to the essential point that the Court’s 
epistemic confines are not the four corners of the Convention itself. 
It is this epistemic openness—coupled with the ECtHR’s longstanding principle 
of the ‘“living” nature of the Convention, which must be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions, and … evolving norms of national and international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Demir and Baykara (n 144) at paras 37–52. 
150 There is a parallel here with what Daniel Sarmiento has called the ‘silent judgments’ of the ECJ, 
which enable the ECJ ‘to avoid delicate points, delay an issue for future occasions, or grant a wider 
margin of action to the national court’. See D Sarmiento ‘The Silent Lamb and the Deaf Wolves: 
Constitutional Pluralism, Preliminary References and the Role of Silent Judgments in EU Law’ in M 
Avbelj and J Komárek (eds) Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Oxford: 
Hart, 2012) at 293. 
151 Demir and Baykara (n 144) at para 53. 
152 Ibid at para 67.  
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law’153—that enabled the Court, in rejecting in particular Turkey’s contention that its 
non-ratification of various instruments should shield it from their effects, to state 
with confidence that:  
Being made up of a set of rules and principles that are accepted by the vast 
majority of States, the common international or domestic law standards of 
European States reflect a reality that the Court cannot disregard … . [I]n 
searching for common ground among the norms of international law [the 
Court] has never distinguished between sources of law according to whether 
or not they have been signed or ratified by the respondent State.154 
Having cleared the preliminary hurdles of reliance on extra-Conventional sources 
and Turkish non-ratification, the stage was set for a major departure from precedent. 
The ECtHR surveyed the place of the right to bargain collectively in ILO Convention 
No 98, the ESC, the EU Charter, and the law and practice of European states,155 and 
held that:  
In light of these developments, the Court considers that its case-law to the 
effect that the right to bargain collectively and to enter into collective 
agreements does not constitute an inherent element of Article 11 should be 
reconsidered, so as to take account of the perceptible evolution in such 
matters, in both international law and domestic legal systems.156 
A similar approach, relying on the reasoning developed in Demir and Baykara, was 
employed in Enerji Yapı-Yol Sen v Turkey with respect to the right to strike, the 
ECtHR stating that ‘[l]a grève, qui permet à un syndicat de faire entendre sa voix, 
constitue un aspect important pour les membres d’un syndicat dans la protection de 
leurs intérêts.’157 Here, the Court cited paragraph 38 of its judgment in Schmidt and 
Dahlström, but more important is what it left out: the fatal addendum to ‘un aspect 
important’, ‘but there are others’.158 This completed the about-turn in the ECtHR’s 
labour rights jurisprudence and, as Albertine Veldman notes, reveals that the 
approaches of the two European Courts differ in profoundly important respects, not 
least the general legal methodology applied and the proportionality required.159  
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157 Enerji Yapı-Yol Sen (n 145) at para 24, emphasis added. 
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2.3 Managing impending judicial conflict in Europe 
There is a jarring discordance that runs throughout the ECJ’s judgments between the 
loud noises the Court makes about the fundamental nature of the right to strike and 
importance to the Union of ‘a high level of social protection’,160 on the one hand, and 
the onerous restrictions that the Court imposes on the exercise of the right to strike, 
on the other. Though there was no particular reason to suppose that the judgments in 
Viking and Laval offended the Convention at the time they were handed down, this is 
no longer the case, and it is difficult to see how the ECJ’s understanding of labour 
rights, if it persists, can now be seen as anything but contrary to the ECtHR’s 
standard of protection as constructed through Demir and Baykara and Enerji Yapı-
Yol Sen. This provides an opening for discussion of the possible consequences, both 
before and after EU accession to the Convention, and what this might tell us about 
the interface norms by which the European legal orders relate.  
It was noted above in Section 2.1.2.3 that the ECJ was easily able to adopt 
subsequent ECtHR jurisprudence in the Hoechst and Orkem series of cases, as the 
rights at issue in those cases hardly went to the core of the EU legal order. 
Conversely, with respect to the rather more jealously-guarded role of the Advocates 
General and the ECJ’s Rules of Procedure with respect to Article 6 ECHR, the ECJ 
was altogether less willing to follow Strasbourg’s lead, leaving the ECtHR to settle 
the matter by finding the Bosphorus presumption not rebutted in Kokkelvisserij: 
while the ECJ’s structure and procedures may not equal the standard of protection 
demanded by Strasbourg, they were not ‘manifestly deficient’. However, the 
disconnect between Luxembourg and Strasbourg over labour rights examined in this 
Section emphatically falls into this latter category, dealing as it does with the 
relationship between human rights as protected by the Convention and the free 
movement rights at the very core of the ECJ’s jurisdiction and jurisprudence. How, 
then, is this disconnect to be resolved? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Viking (n 103) at para 78, quoting then-Art 2 EC. It is perhaps important, and telling, that this ‘high 
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protection in Art 9 TFEU and ‘proper’ social protection in Art 151 TFEU: aims which Alain Euzéby 
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As we saw in Section 2.1.2, membership of an international organisation, even one 
of the scope and breadth of the EU, does not absolve parties to the Convention of 
their obligations thereunder. Though the EU institutions themselves are not directly 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court, the Member States remain so in 
their application of EU law, regardless of whether they had any discretion or room 
for manoeuvre in so doing. The question of discretion is only relevant to whether the 
Bosphorus presumption of equivalent human rights protection applies, but we can 
deduce from Michaud that the more important factor is not necessarily whether the 
Member State had any discretion, but rather whether the ECJ has yet had an 
opportunity to scrutinise the norm of EU law at issue on grounds of fundamental 
rights. This being the case, as things stand, the EU’s Member States may find their 
actions on foot of the judgments in Viking and Laval subject to the full measure of 
the ECtHR’s scrutiny in an appropriate case. Concerning, as they do, the 
interpretation of directly effective Treaty norms, such cases will not leave much in 
the way of discretion to the Member States; but given the disparity between the 
recent approaches of the ECJ and the ECtHR on the issue of labour rights, it is 
difficult to see how the ECtHR could justify applying the Bosphorus presumption 
where a State gives precedence to the EU ‘version’ of labour rights. Of course, at the 
time of the decisions in Viking and Laval, the ECJ did not have the benefit of the 
ECtHR’s later Article 11 judgments, and so the ECtHR might prefer first to have the 
benefit of the ECJ’s response to this change in direction under the Convention. But 
in the current state of relations between the legal orders, the ECtHR cannot itself 
request such a response, and must await future developments at the ECJ. 
This leaves us in an interesting situation. The ECJ is bound under the Charter not 
to go below the level of rights protection provided by the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. 
Similarly, the ECtHR has expressed both a great deal of confidence in the ECJ’s 
competence as a court with a human rights jurisprudence and a great deal of concern 
for the autonomy of EU law as a distinct and unique legal order. Yet this mutual 
respect and comity cannot allow for clearly divergent approaches towards the 
meaning and requirements of the Convention: put bluntly, something will have to 
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give. As will be clear from the tenor of the above, I prefer the ECtHR’s approach to 
the issues, but this is for reasons of process as much as for reasons of outcome. The 
Strasbourg cases engage in a more sophisticated manner with the international 
jurisprudence on labour rights than their Luxembourg counterparts, and they do so in 
a way that takes a holistic, evolutionary and interactive view of the protection of 
labour rights both within the Council of Europe and worldwide—even to the extent 
of applying norms of international law to which Turkey was not a party. This 
pluralism is rooted in a deep understanding of the Convention as an expressly 
constitutional instrument, devoted to the limitation of coercive state power against 
the individual.  
On the other hand, there is little of pluralism in the ECJ judgments: the cases pay 
scant attention to national specificities in terms of the operation of labour relations 
(both in the Member States directly concerned and across the Union more widely), 
and instead are altogether more concerned with the vindication of the EU’s 
fundamental market freedoms. This is an approach that fits well with the ECJ’s 
previous constitutionalising tendencies, and thus what Kumm would call European 
(Union) constitutional supremacy, but it sits uncomfortably with the (limited) 
deference shown to national specificity in Omega. Moreover, given the quality of the 
reasoning in the ECtHR cases, the force with which they were phrased, and their 
status as being subsequent in time to the relevant ECJ judgments, it is the Strasbourg 
Court’s approach that should prevail. Importantly, this is not to say that the 
judgments of the ECtHR are to be preferred to those of the ECJ always and in every 
case, and thus to be regarded as hierarchically superior. Rather, the point is that, in a 
deliberative polyarchy, such conflicts will naturally arise and ought to be worked out 
dialogically in a way that best realises the shared ideals underlying the overlapping 
consensus.  
The critical question is, therefore, how this is actually to happen. There are two 
possibilities: in light of the new turn in the Convention jurisprudence, the ECJ could 
correct itself in a future case; or, in a different case, the ECtHR could specifically 
find the ECJ’s interpretation of Article 11 ECHR to be contrary to the Convention. 
However, for this latter possibility to occur, a case would have to find its way to the 
ECtHR, having exhausted domestic remedies, which would include opportunities for 
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the issue to be referred to the ECJ by national courts. Pending the accession of the 
EU to the Convention, this latter course of events is most likely, and most desirable 
in the circumstances. Of course, all of this is predicated on the assumption that the 
ECJ will in fact acquiesce to the new and somewhat unexpected turn in the ECtHR’s 
Article 11 ECHR jurisprudence. 
 
2.3.2 Post-accession 
But what if this incompatibility between the two legal systems does not get resolved 
until after the EU’s accession to the Convention? The co-respondent mechanism of 
the Draft Accession Agreement seems almost tailor-made for such a situation. Rather 
than the ECtHR having to address the compatibility of EU law with the Convention 
indirectly through the Member States’ implementing measures and actions, both the 
State and the Union could be joined as co-respondents. This allows the two actors to 
be regarded as indivisible parts of a whole, and relieves the ECtHR of the 
responsibility of apportioning responsibility between them, this instead becoming a 
matter for internal resolution within the Union. 
Moreover, the co-respondent mechanism’s prior involvement provisions would 
solve the procedural difficulties adverted to above, providing an institutional 
mechanism whereby the ECJ could be prompted by the ECtHR to consider the more 
recent Convention jurisprudence and—ideally—make whatever adjustments it 
considers necessary to its own.  
 
3 CONCLUSION 
The most obvious feature that emerges from surveying the current and future 
relationship between the EU and the ECHR is that this relationship is entirely unlike 
that which exists between the EU and its Member States or between the ECtHR and 
the States party to the Convention. For the ECJ and the ECtHR, both being non-state 
actors, the norms that regulate their interaction cannot be analogised directly to those 
developed with reference to the relationship between national and EU law. Certainly, 
similarities exist, as in the strong presumption that ECtHR jurisprudence should be 
followed which informed the ECJ’s decisions in Roquettes Frères and Limburgse 
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Vinyl Maatschappij, as well as the principle of conditional recognition inherent in the 
Bosphorus presumption. However, as the ongoing conflict regarding Article 11 
ECHR demonstrates, the EU’s nature as a supranational organisation, and the ECJ’s 
status as a court with transnational jurisdiction—particularly, in this instance, in 
economic matters—means that the polyarchic relationship between the orders cannot 
be boiled down to a simple set of universal rules or principles. Contrary to the 
assumption in the metaconstitutional literature, it is only through the actual, case-
specific engagement of different legal orders that the norms regulating the 
relationship emerge. 
Moreover, the relationship is further complicated by the important and 
continuing role of the Member States, who, even after EU accession, will continue to 
be important intermediaries given the specific division of competences within the 
Union. In the next Chapter, this tripartite polyarchy—the triangular constitution—
will be looked at in the round.
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CHAPTER 4:  
THE TRIANGULAR FRAME 
INTRODUCTION 
Aims and structure of the chapter 
Abortion is illegal in Ireland in almost all circumstances. The one exception is when 
the procedure is carried out in order to save the life (but not the health) of a pregnant 
woman, including—in certain circumstances—from possible suicide. This narrowly-
drawn exception, nowadays set out in and governed by the Protection of Life During 
Pregnancy Act 2013, arose from the Supreme Court judgment in Attorney General v 
X,1 where it was held to be inherent in Article 40.3.3° of the Constitution, which 
states (in part, but at the time in full) that:  
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard 
to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, 
as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right. 
Of course, this state of affairs is controversial, from the perspective of those who 
would rather an absolute ban on abortion, and of those who would like to see the 
restrictions lifted for various reasons, and to a greater or lesser degree.  
It was mentioned previously but bears repeating here that this case study is 
emphatically not about the substantive moral and ethical questions of abortion: when 
human life begins; the morality of terminating a foetus’s gestation; the relative 
strength and importance of the rights of women as autonomous individual agents and 
equal citizens; and much else. Instead, the Chapter evaluates the metaconstitutional 
aspects of how the issue of abortion has played out as a domestic and European legal 
issue. The Irish constitutional provisions on abortion provide an archetypal example 
of national constitutional specificity, and, given the means by which they were 
(rightly or wrongly) adopted, they also engage questions of democratic legitimacy. 
The case law surrounding them therefore provides an ideal field for analysing the 
research question of interface norm universality. 
Section 2 sets out the two pivotal domestic cases through which the regulation of 
abortion under national constitutional law entered European legal discourse. Section 
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3 will outline how the European legal orders and the domestic order interacted 
regarding three specific aspects of the abortion issue: the right to receive and impart 
information; the right to travel; and the right to a private and family life. Finally, 
Section 4 will examine what this interaction tells us about the self-images and 
attitudes of the three legal orders, or at least of their judicial branches; about the 
nature of the relationships between them; and, therefore, about the particularity or 
universality of the interface norms regulating the relationship. The Chapter 
concludes that though (very) broad, general metaconstitutional principles can be 
drawn out from the various judgments, we cannot derive hard and fast, universally 
applicable norms from them without stripping these norms of the content and 
meaning which made them capable of guiding judicial action in the first place. 
It is first important properly to situate the argument by outlining the history of 
Irish abortion law prior to the addition of Article 40.3.3° to the Constitution, which is 
the constitutional provision around which the subsequent legal controversy revolves. 
	  
Prologue: the situation prior to 1983 
Though the right to life of the unborn has only been specifically recognised in the 
Constitution since 1983, the ban on abortion in Ireland is much older. For centuries 
an offence at common law, the crime was put on a statutory footing by sections 58 
and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, an Act of the then-British and 
Irish Parliament at Westminster. First ‘carried over’ to the legal order of the Irish 
Free State by Article 73 of that State’s 1922 Constitution,2 and again in 1937 by 
Article 50.1 of the Constitution,3 these sections of the 1861 Act were not repealed 
until July 2013.4 They provided as follows: 
58. Every woman, being with child, who, with intent to procure her own 
miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to herself any poison or other 
noxious thing or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other means 
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3 Which reads: ‘Subject to this Constitution and to the extent to which they are not inconsistent 
therewith, the laws in force in Saorstát Éireann immediately prior to the date of the coming into 
operation of this Constitution shall continue to be of full force and effect until the same or any of them 
shall have been repealed or amended by enactment of the Oireachtas.’ 
4 Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013, S 5. 
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whatsoever with the like intent, and whosoever, with intent to procure the 
miscarriage of any woman, whether she be or not be with child, shall 
unlawfully administer to her or cause to be taken by her any poison or other 
noxious thing, or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other means 
whatsoever with the like intent, shall be guilty of a felony, and being 
convicted thereof shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude for life. 
59. Whoever shall unlawfully supply or procure any poison or other noxious 
thing, or any instrument or thing whatsoever, knowing that the same is 
intended to be unlawfully used or employed with intent to procure the 
miscarriage of any woman, whether she be or be not with child, shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanour, and being convicted thereof shall be liable to be 
kept in penal servitude.5 
The recurrence of the word ‘unlawfully’ in Sections 58 and 59 was crucial in Great 
Britain, where medical opinion came to regard abortion as a legitimate therapeutic 
practice where the pregnancy posed a danger to the woman’s life or mental or 
physical health. As Casey notes, there is little evidence that Irish medical practice 
ever adopted this stance, but this was for moral and religious, not legal, reasons.6 No 
one was prosecuted under the 1861 Act between independence in 1922 and the Act’s 
repeal in 2013.7 
Following the coming into force of the 1937 Constitution, and particularly since 
the beginning of its judicial exegesis in the 1960s (discussed in Chapter 2), the ban 
on abortion both gained a basis in constitutional theory and faced a new—potential—
threat. In Ryan v Attorney General,8 it was held that the rights guaranteed to the 
citizen by the Constitution were not limited to those specifically mentioned in the 
text of the document itself. Instead, Article 40.3.1°’s statement that ‘[t]he State 
guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and 
vindicate the personal rights of the citizen’ was held to include ‘all those rights 
which result from the Christian and democratic nature of the State.’9 These 
‘unenumerated’ constitutional rights were later held, in McGee v Attorney General,10 
to include a right to marital privacy. The statutory ban on the sale, manufacture or 
importation of contraceptives at issue in that case was struck down for breaching this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, Ss 58–59, as amended by the Statute Law Revision Act 1892 
and the Statute Law Revision (No 2) Act 1893. 
6 J Casey Constitutional Law in Ireland (3rd edn, Dublin: Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) at 
433–434, citing J Keown Abortion, Doctors and the Law (Cambridge: CUP, 1988) Ch 3. 
7 Though Casey notes that charges of murder have been brought where women have died following an 
abortion: Casey (n 6) at 434, citing People (Attorney General) v Cadden (1956) 91 ILTR 97. 
8 Ryan v Attorney General [1965] IR 294. 
9 Ibid at 312 per Kenny J. 
10 McGee v Attorney General [1974] IR 284. 
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right, at least with respect to married couples. The Supreme Court in McGee made 
very clear that the unenumerated right to (marital) privacy could not trump the 
State’s abortion laws, Walsh J in his judgment holding that:  
[A]ny action on the part of either the husband and wife or of the State to 
limit family sizes by endangering or destroying human life must necessarily 
not only be an offence against the common good but also against the 
guaranteed personal rights of the human life in question.11 
Accordingly, even prior to the insertion of Article 40.3.3° by the Eighth Amendment 
to the Constitution in 1983, the constitutional right to life contained in Article 
40.3.2° had been interpreted as applying equally to the born and the unborn. This 
was made explicit in G v An Bord Uchtála,12 an adoption case, where it was held 
(again by Walsh J) that:  
[All children have] the right to life itself and the right to be guarded against 
all threats directed to [their] existence whether before or after birth. … The 
right to life necessarily implies the right to be born, [and] the right to 
preserve and defend (and have preserved and defended) that life … . It lies 
not in the power of the parent who has the primary, natural rights and duties 
in respect of the child to exercise them in such a way as intentionally or by 
neglect to endanger the health or life of the child or to terminate its 
existence. The child’s natural right to life and all that flows from that right 
are independent of any right of the parent as such.13 
Given these strong judicial statements of support for the idea that the constitutional 
right to life extended to the foetus, what happened next was perhaps surprising. The 
‘potential threat’ to the 1861 Act adverted to above arose from the doctrine of 
unenumerated rights itself. Despite the Supreme Court’s assurances on the issue, 
there was thought to be nothing in theory definitively to preclude a future Supreme 
Court—or, ‘worse’, a future European court—from liberalising the law on abortion. 
The American experience was crucial here. The US Supreme Court’s striking down 
of a statute criminalising contraception in Griswold v Connecticut14 was seen as a 
stepping stone towards its later finding, in Roe v Wade,15 that the right to privacy 
(unenumerated, but held to flow from the due process clause of the 14th Amendment 
to the US Constitution) extended to a woman’s choice as to whether to have an 
abortion, within gestational limits. The parallels between Griswold and McGee, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid at 312. 
12 G v An Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32. 
13 Ibid at 69.  
14 Griswold v Connecticut (1965) 381 US 479. 
15 Roe v Wade (1973) 410 US 113. 
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what this might mean for the future of abortion in Ireland,16 unnerved anti-abortion 
campaigners, who—not content either with judicial statements confirming a pre-natal 
right to life or with the specific invocation and reaffirmation of Sections 58 and 59 of 
the 1861 Act in the statute enacted to regulate contraception on foot of McGee17—
began to campaign for a constitutional amendment to settle the issue conclusively. A 
referendum on the Eighth Amendment was held on 7 September 1983, and passed by 
a majority of 66.9% to 33.1%, on a turnout of 53.4%.18 Accordingly, Article 40.3.3° 
(or rather, what is now its first paragraph) was added to the Constitution. 
 
1 AVOIDANCE, ENGAGEMENT AND CONDITIONAL RECOGNITION 
This section will set out the High and Supreme Court judgments in the cases which 
triggered the engagement of the European legal orders on the question of abortion 
regulation in Ireland: AG (SPUC) v Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well 
Woman19 and SPUC v Grogan.20 As we shall see, the reasoning in the cases is 
diverse, and there is a variety of interface norms at work—from a principle of 
avoidance, through to a (threatened) application of the Solange principle of 
conditional recognition—depending on the circumstances and the position of the 
court in the domestic hierarchy. 
 
1.1 AG (SPUC) v Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well Woman 
The first case to call for judicial interpretation of Article 40.3.3° was Open Door. 
The defendants were organisations offering non-directive counselling services to 
pregnant women; critically, both organisations were prepared, in the course of this 
counselling, to discuss with clients the possibility of travel to England to procure an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 This also raises interesting questions about judicial ‘borrowing’ and the interaction of legal orders 
beyond the European, which is beyond the scope of the present study. For a (somewhat dated) account 
of the US influence on Irish constitutional jurisprudence, see PD Sutherland ‘The Influence of United 
States Constitutional Law on the Interpretation of the Irish Constitution’ (1984) 28 St Louis University 
Law Journal 41. 
17 Health (Family Planning) Act 1979, S 10. 
18 M Gallagher ‘Referendum Campaigns in Ireland’ (paper presented at the 8th international SISE 
conference on ‘Le Campagne Elettorali’, Venice, 18–20 December 2003, available at 
<www.studielettorali.it/convegni/paper/Gallagher_ing.pdf>) at 21. 
19 Attorney General (Society for the Protection of Unborn Children) v Open Door Counselling and 
Dublin Well Woman [1988] IR 593, hereinafter Open Door. 
20 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children v Grogan (No 1) [1989] IR 753, hereinafter Grogan. 
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abortion in accordance with English law. If the client wished to consider this option 
further, they would make arrangements to refer her to a medical clinic in England 
(with which the counselling organisations had no formal relationship, financial or 
otherwise). The plaintiff society sought a declaration that the activities of the 
defendants were unlawful having regard to Article 40.3.3° and an injunction 
prohibiting the defendants from continuing to counsel, advise or assist pregnant 
women regarding the procurement of an abortion abroad.21 
The first defendant, Open Door, denied that its activities were unlawful having 
regard to Article 40.3.3°, and further claimed that it was entitled to engage in these 
activities ‘by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution’.22 Oddly, in making this 
defence, it did not claim reliance on any specific provision of the Constitution, such 
as Article 40.6.1°i’s guarantee of freedom of expression,23 or on the unenumerated 
right to privacy established in McGee. Additionally, no provision of EU law or of the 
ECHR was raised.24 
The second defendant, Well Woman, also denied that it had acted unlawfully, 
and raised in its defence the constitutional rights to privacy, to freedom of 
expression, to freedom of communication, and to freedom of access to information in 
the course of counselling and generally.25 Importantly for present purposes, however, 
Well Woman also claimed reliance on certain rights arising from EU law, made 
effective in Ireland by the European Communities Act 1972 and, as we have seen in 
Chapter 2, allegedly immunised from constitutional challenge by the ‘exclusion 
clause’ then to be found at Article 29.4.3°.26 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The plaintiffs also sought a declaration that the defendants’ activities amounted to the common law 
offence of conspiracy to corrupt public morals. Hamilton P, in the High Court, held that the activities 
could amount to the commission of such an offence, but that to make such a declaration would be to 
usurp the authority of the criminal courts, the offence being a misdemeanour triable on indictment 
before a judge and jury. Hamilton P was not prepared to run the risk of ‘treating conduct as criminal 
when a jury might consider otherwise’ (at 615). This leg of the case will not, therefore, be discussed. 
22 Open Door (n 19) at 604. 
23 Though note the proviso at Article 40.6.1° itself, that such right is ‘subject to public order and 
morality’. 
24 The ECHR was not incorporated into the domestic order at this time, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
25 Though note that this last right had never been ‘discovered’ by the Courts as being inherent in the 
Constitution. 
26 Now Article 29.4.6°. 
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1.1.1 Avoidance of triggering engagement: the High Court judgment 
Hamilton P, for the High Court, found for the plaintiff and granted the declaration 
and injunction sought. In the course of his judgment, he noted that Article 40.3.3° of 
the Constitution, like any other constitutional provision granting or recognising 
rights, is self-executing and thus requires no subsequent legislation to give it effect. 
Accordingly, the fact that there had been no legislation on foot of Article 40.3.3° in 
the years since the passage of the Eighth Amendment was neither here nor there.27 
Hamilton P evaluated the history and present of the right to life in Ireland, and 
invoked the dicta of Walsh J in McGee and G v An Bord Uchtála (quoted in Section 
1.2 above), along with the plain text of Article 40.3.3° and the following statement of 
McCarthy J in Norris v Attorney General:  
[T]he provisions of the preamble [to the Constitution] … would appear to 
lean heavily against any view other than [that] the right to life of the unborn 
is a sacred trust to which all the organs of government must lend their 
support.28  
On the strength of this, the High Court held that: 
[T]he judicial organ of government is obliged to lend its support to the 
enforcement of the right to life of the unborn, to defend and vindicate that 
right and, if there is a threat to that right from whatever source, to protect 
that right from such threat, if its support is sought.29 
The High Court went on to find that the defendants’ activities amounted in fact ‘to 
counselling and assisting pregnant women to travel abroad to obtain further advice 
on abortion and to secure an abortion’,30 and that that such activities must be 
unlawful with regard to Article 40.3.3°: 
Obedience to the law is required of every citizen and there exists a duty on 
the part of the citizens to respect that right [to life of the unborn] and not to 
interfere with it. The court is under a duty to act so as not to permit any body 
of citizens to deprive another of his constitutional right, to see that such 
rights are protected and to regard as unlawful any infringement or attempted 
infringement of such constitutional right as constituting a violation of the 
fundamental law of the State. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Open Door (n 19) at 605–607, relying on the traditionally very strong judicial authority to vindicate 
constitutional rights: Educational Company of Ireland v Fitzpatrick (No 2) [1961] IR 345; Byrne v 
Ireland [1972] IR 241; Meskell v CIÉ [1973] IR 121 and Mead (Supreme Court, unreported, 26 July 
1972). 
28 Norris v Attorney General [1984] IR 36 at 103. 
29 Open Door (n 19) at 597–599. 
30 Ibid at 617. 
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The qualified right to privacy, the rights of association and freedom of 
expression and the right to disseminate information cannot be invoked to 
interfere with such a fundamental right as the right to life of the unborn, 
which is acknowledged by the Constitution of Ireland.31 
Finally, the High Court dealt with the issues of EU law raised by Well Woman: the 
effect of the Constitution’s EU ‘exclusion clause’; of then-Articles 59 and 60 EEC 
with regard to services; and of the provisions of Council Directive 73/148/EEC,32 
dealing with free movement and residence within the Community for Member State 
nationals with regard to establishment and the provision of services.33 In a brief 
passage at the end of his judgment, Hamilton P took pains to point out how seriously 
he had taken and studied these submissions, but concluded that all of the activities at 
issue in the case had occurred within Ireland, and, there being no cross-border 
element, that no issue of EU law therefore arose.34 Because such questions might be 
considered in a future case, he made no finding as regards the interaction or 
relationship between the EU law rights relied on and the provisions of Article 
40.3.3°. 
The possible relevance of EU law having been ruled out, the High Court 
judgment in this case is an ordinary instance of domestic constitutionalism. While 
arguments based on EU law had been advanced—and the trial judge tried to stress 
his communautaire credentials in stating that the submissions on EU law ‘warranted 
[full and careful] consideration’,35 echoing, to a limited extent, Maduro’s 
contrapunctual principle of pluralism itself—the reasoning behind his finding that 
EU law had not been triggered was threadbare, contained no reference to the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ, and, as we shall see in Section 3.1.1, was later indirectly 
contradicted by that Court. The view of the relationship between the domestic and 
EU legal systems arising from the judgment is not one where the two are 
interweaved in any particular way, but where they are imagined to be neatly 
separable. There being no cross-border issue, this must therefore be a purely national 
issue, and was treated as one. However, this analysis ignores the extensive case law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid. 
32 Council Directive 73/148/EEC of 21 May 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and 
residence within the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the 
provision of services [1973] OJ L 172. 
33 Open Door (n 19) at 618. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid 
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of the ECJ on potential restrictions of free movement rights.36 Accordingly, the only 
metaconstitutional interface norm that can be derived from the judgment is one 
which plays no part in Kumm or Maduro’s theories—a principle of avoidance, 
whereby matters are kept firmly within the domain of the national constitution, and 
within the jurisdiction of the national courts.  
	  
1.1.2  Engagement avoided, narrowly: the Supreme Court judgment 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendants were similarly unsuccessful. In a 
brief, unanimous judgment delivered by Finlay CJ, the Supreme Court held that it 
was ‘satisfied beyond doubt that having regard to the admitted facts the defendants 
were assisting in the ultimate destruction of the life of the unborn by abortion’.37 As 
a result:  
[T]here could not be an implied and unenumerated constitutional right to 
information about the availability of a service of abortion outside the State, 
which, if availed of, would have the direct consequence of destroying the 
expressly guaranteed constitutional right to life of the unborn.38 
Furthermore, the argument that Article 40.6.1°’s guarantee of freedom of expression 
implied an ancillary right to receive information was also unsuccessful, the Court 
holding that ‘no right could constitutionally arise to obtain information the purpose 
of the obtaining of which was to defeat the constitutional right to life of the unborn 
child.’39 
As part of their appeal, the defendants asked the Supreme Court to make a 
preliminary reference to the ECJ under then-Article 177 EEC in order to determine 
whether a pregnant woman resident in Ireland had the right, under Articles 59 and 60 
EEC, to travel to another Member State ‘for the purpose of being the recipient of a 
service consisting of the performing of an abortion upon her’, and whether ‘a 
necessary corollary to that right … was the right to information about the availability 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 See, with reference to the trade in goods, Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837 at para 5: ‘All 
trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually 
or potentially, intra-community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to 
quantitative restrictions.’ This approach has long been extrapolated beyond goods to services: for an 
overview, see the Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C–34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I–1177 at 
paras 69–74. 
37 Open Door (n 19) at 624. 
38 Ibid at 625. 
39 Ibid. 
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of that service.’40 However, the reference was not made, for a reason different from 
that of the High Court, but similarly narrow. Counsel for the defendants had 
conceded that the corollary right ‘was confined to the obtaining of information about 
the availability or existence of the service’ and ‘could not be extended to the 
obtaining of assistance to avail of or receive the service.’41 The order of the High 
Court was not confined to the question of information, and nor did it seek to ‘prevent 
a pregnant woman from becoming aware of the existence of abortion outside the 
jurisdiction.’42 Instead, it sought to restrain ‘assistance to a pregnant woman to travel 
abroad and obtain the service of abortion.’43 Because the defence had made no claim 
that this was a right flowing from the Treaty, the Supreme Court held on this very 
narrow ground that no question of the interpretation of the Treaty arose, and the 
Court was therefore not obliged to make a reference to Luxembourg. Accordingly, 
the Court expressed no opinion on three issues which had arisen in argument: 
whether the Treaty grants pregnant women a right to travel for the purpose of having 
an abortion; whether the defendants would be entitled to rely on such a right despite 
it being vested in pregnant women and not in them as counselling services; and the 
general nature of the right to travel to receive services under then-Articles 59 and 60 
EEC. 
Again, the only metaconstitutional interface norm at work in the judgment is a 
principle of avoidance. However, there is an important difference between the 
reasoning of the High Court and the Supreme Court as to why EU law had not been 
engaged in the case, and thus how the principle of avoidance was applied: whereas 
for the High Court the lack of actual cross-border activity was decisive, the Supreme 
Court made no mention of this finding, depending instead on the rather nice 
distinction between providing ‘assistance’ and providing ‘information’. The EU law 
arguments therefore failed because of the defendants’ concession that the EU rights 
they claimed were narrower than the restrictions that had been placed upon them. 
This concession is rather strange, in that it can at least be argued that providing 
assistance to someone to avail of a service must necessarily include the provision of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Ibid at 622. 
41 Ibid at 626, emphasis added. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid, emphasis added. 
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information about that service—indeed, the defendants would have failed in their 
primary duty as counsellors had they not provided this information. On this analysis, 
the fact that the injunction’s restrictions were broader than the right claimed should 
have been no bar to a finding that EU law had been engaged. Assistance 
encompasses information, and a right to impart and receive that information having 
been claimed, this went to the heart of the validity of the injunction with respect to 
EU law. The question then arises of the extent to which fear of the possible 
consequences of engagement with EU law on a sensitive issue played a part in the 
Court’s reasoning. 
Dissatisfied with their defeat, the defendants applied to the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg. That Court’s judgment, in Open Door and Dublin Well 
Woman v Ireland,44 will be discussed at Section 3.1.2 below. 
	  
1.2 SPUC v Grogan 
In Chapter 2, the decision in Grogan was discussed as part of a preliminary analysis 
of the relationship between Irish and EU law and the ‘torpedo’ or ‘ripple’ effect of 
what is now Article 29.4.6°, and the Supreme Court’s application of the principle of 
conditional recognition. These features will be elaborated upon in this section. 
	  
1.2.1 Engagement begins: the High Court judgment 
As will be recalled, the facts were quite similar to Open Door, but whereas in that 
case SPUC had sought an injunction preventing assistance in procuring an abortion 
abroad by means of one-to-one counselling, the defendants in Grogan were the 
officers of various students’ unions who had published the contact information of 
licensed English abortion clinics in their annual students’ welfare guides. The 
defendants relied on this difference to distinguish their case from Open Door, and 
claimed a right to distribute the impugned information under EU law, the right to 
receive information in relation to services provided in another Member State giving 
rise to a corresponding right to impart such information. Carroll J, for the High 
Court, agreed with this distinction between these two cases, and exercised her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland (1992) 15 EHRR 244, hereinafter Open Door 
(ECHR). 
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discretion under then-Article 177 EEC to refer questions on the issue to the ECJ. 
Having done this, and considering that an answer from the ECJ was required in order 
for her to dispose of the case, she made no formal order in relation to the 
interlocutory injunction that had been sought by SPUC.45 
As with the High and Supreme Court decisions in Open Door, this judgment is 
an ordinary instance of national constitutionalism, but in a different way. A national 
judge was faced with a case that she felt required an authoritative interpretation of 
EU law and duly referred the question to Luxembourg, as she was entitled to do 
under the national constitution and under the Treaty. We cannot make any distinction 
here between EU-constitutionalism and national-constitutionalism—at least in this 
case and at this stage—as the two amount to the same thing, particularly in light of 
the constitutional status afford to EU law by the Irish Constitution. Kumm’s terms, 
European Constitutional Supremacy and National Constitutional Supremacy,46 are 
inapplicable here, the case not (yet) being one of conflict between legal orders, and 
the question of supremacy therefore not yet being called into question. The principle 
of avoidance, employed in different ways by the High and Supreme Courts in Open 
Door in an attempt to avoid precipitating a conflict between the Irish and EU orders, 
played no part in the High Court judgment in Grogan. The decision exhibit none of 
the wariness of engaging EU law that permeates the judgments in Open Door; in 
fact, Síofra O’Leary suggests that ‘the national judge was eager to introduce the case 
to the European forum given the continuous flow of litigation at national level.’47 
	  
1.2.2  Solange in Ireland: the Supreme Court judgment 
On appeal by SPUC to the Supreme Court, the interlocutory injunction it had 
sought—and on which the High Court had made no formal decision—was granted. 
The Supreme Court was unanimous that regardless of the form of her order, Carroll J 
had effectively made two decisions: first, to refer questions to the ECJ, and, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Grogan (n 20) at 758–759. 
46 M Kumm ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe 
Before and After the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal 262 at 266. 
47 S O’Leary ‘Freedom of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services: The Court of Justice as a 
Reluctant Constitutional Adjudicator: An Examination of the Abortion Information Case’ (1992) 17 
European Law Review 138 at 143. 
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secondly, not to grant the injunction sought.48 The Supreme Court did not question or 
seek to review the propriety of Carroll J’s having sought a reference under then-
Article 177 EEC (an option unavailable to the Supreme Court by its own 
jurisprudence49), but noted that it was entirely open to her to have made this 
reference while still granting the interlocutory injunction, which is the course that 
should have been followed.50  
 As noted in Chapter 2, the justices of the Supreme Court were critical of Carroll 
J’s distinction between the facts of Open Door and the present case, Finlay CJ 
rejecting the distinction as unsound, and noting that: 
It is clearly the fact that such information is conveyed to pregnant women, 
and not the method of communication which creates the unconstitutional 
illegality, and the judgment of this Court in [Open Door] is not open to any 
other interpretation.51 
This seems difficult to reconcile with the importance that the Supreme Court had 
attached in Open Door to the distinction between the provision of information and 
the provision of assistance, and I suggest that this difficulty arises from the Supreme 
Court’s losing sight of another important distinction: between legality (under Irish 
law) and the necessity of a reference. With respect to the former, both information 
and assistance in the circumstances were illegal under Irish law, and the Supreme 
Court was perfectly correct that this was clear from Open Door. Accordingly, Carroll 
J should indeed have granted the injunction pending the return of the answers from 
Luxembourg—no real distinction could be made between the two cases as regards 
legality. However, a close reading of the judgment in Open Door shows that the 
information/assistance distinction in that case related only to the question of whether 
an issue of EU law arose—and thus the necessity of a reference to the ECJ—and not 
to the substantive question of whether the impugned action was illegal. Thus the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Grogan (n 20) at 762 per Finlay CJ. 
49 Campus Oil v Minister for Industry [1983] IR 82 at 86 per Walsh J: ‘A request by a national judge 
to [the ECJ] for an interpretation of articles of the Treaty is not, in any sense, an appeal to a higher 
court. It is an exercise of a right … to request an interpretation of the Treaty from the Court of Justice 
which itself is the only one having jurisdiction to give such binding interpretations. … The power is 
conferred upon [the national judge] by the Treaty without any qualification, express or implied, to the 
effect that it is capable of being overruled by any other national court. … The national judge has an 
untrammelled discretion as to whether he will or will not refer questions for a preliminary ruling 
under article 177. In doing so, he is not in any way subject to the parties or to any other judicial 
authority.’ 
50 Grogan (n 20) at 762 per Finlay CJ. 
51 Ibid at 764, emphasis added. 
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Supreme Court confused the issue by seeming to regard the two cases as entirely 
indistinguishable: they were not, at least as regards the necessity of a reference. 
The remainder of the judgments in the Grogan case concern the interpretation to 
be given to the constitutional ‘exclusion clause’ in relation to EU law, the paramount 
duty of the national judge to vindicate constitutional rights, and, as we saw in 
Chapter 2, an application of the principle of conditional recognition in the Solange-
style warning that the Supreme Court’s obedience to the ECJ could not be 
guaranteed in the event of that Court deciding that EU law was in conflict with the 
Supreme Court’s Article 40.3.3° jurisprudence. However, there is one further 
important aspect of the judgment, linked to the Supreme Court’s warning, which was 
not discussed in Chapter 2. Let us bear in mind that this case, and its counterpart in 
the ECJ’s jurisprudence which will be discussed at Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 below, 
were procedurally unusual: a case was brought before the High Court and a reference 
made to the ECJ, but the Supreme Court heard the plaintiff’s appeal prior to the ECJ 
having answered the questions asked. This was not, however, an attempt by the 
Supreme Court to pre-empt the decision of the ECJ—the appeal related only to the 
question of the interlocutory injunction, and not the substance of the issues. We have 
already seen the Supreme Court’s warning that:  
If and when a decision of the [ECJ] rules that some aspect of European 
Community law affects the activities of the defendants impugned in this 
case, the consequence of that decision on these constitutionally guaranteed 
rights and their protection by the courts will then fall to be considered by 
these courts.52 
Crucially, however, Finlay CJ also expressly granted both parties liberty to apply to 
the High Court to have the injunction varied in light of the ECJ’s judgment once it 
was handed down.53 This essential fact had two effects, one legal and one theoretical. 
Legally, it was instrumental in the ECJ’s determination that the questions referred to 
it were not moot, and that it could therefore accept jurisdiction in the case.54 
Theoretically, it lends weight to the argument made initially in Chapter 2 that the 
Supreme Court’s judgment in Grogan is an example of the metaconstitutional 
principle of conditional recognition in action: having made its point regarding the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Ibid at 765 per Finlay CJ, emphasis added. 
53 Ibid at 766. 
54 Case C–159/90 SPUC (Ireland) v Grogan [1991] ECR I–4685 at paras 11–13. 
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particular importance attached in Ireland to the right to life of the unborn and how 
obedience to an adverse judgment from the ECJ could not be guaranteed, the 
Supreme Court did not go so far as to preclude either the ECJ from delivering its 
judgment or that judgment from being given legal effect by the High Court. Seen in 
this light, what the Supreme Court ‘took away’ with one hand (automatic and 
unquestioning obedience to Luxembourg) it ‘gave’ with the other (the very real 
possibility of the loyal application of the Luxembourg judgment). 
We can therefore see reflected in the Supreme Court’s decision the first of 
Kumm’s metaconstitutional interface norms, the formal principle of legality.55 For 
Kumm, ‘legality’ means that ‘national courts should start with a strong presumption 
that they are required to enforce EU law, national constitutional provisions 
notwithstanding.’56 That this is the starting position of the Supreme Court in Grogan 
is evident from both its language in the case and its general praxis of loyal 
application of EU law. But Kumm’s countervailing principles of subsidiarity, 
democracy as well as the protection of basic rights would all seem to weigh strongly 
in the present case against the automatic enforcement of that presumption: 
subsidiarity because abortion is not something regulated at the EU level; democracy 
(which I categorised in Chapter 2 as a means of defending national specificity) 
because the right recognised by Article 40.3.3° (whether rightly or wrongly) was a 
democratically-endorsed, specific expression of the values of a self-determining 
political community; and the protection of rights because that is what the entire 
controversy boils down to, with the right to life—and its particular formulation in 
Ireland—being considered decisive, at least from the domestic perspective. However, 
the fact that Kumm’s interface norms mesh well with the decision in Grogan does 
not lend too much weight to the claim as to their universality, bearing in mind that 
they were formulated with precisely such a situation in mind. As we shall see below 
in Section 4, their applicability to the decision in Grogan is the exception, and not 
the rule. 
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56 Ibid. 
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2 POLYARCHIC DELIBERATION 
The national decisions in Open Door and in Grogan triggered a series of responses at 
each point in the triangular constitution, which can be grouped thematically into 
three areas: the right to receive and impart information; the right to travel; and the 
right to private and family life. The first of these, the right to receive and impart 
information, will be further divided into two subsections, reflecting the different 
natures of the two European orders: the right as a corollary to the EU freedom to 
provide services, and the right as an inherent part of the right to freedom of 
expression under Article 10 ECHR. 
 
2.1 The right to receive and impart information 
2.1.1 The right as a corollary to the freedom to provide services 
The ECJ’s response57 to the reference requested by the High Court in Grogan was 
the first opportunity for a European court to rule on the compatibility of Irish 
abortion law with a European legal order. Before dealing with the questions raised in 
the reference, the Court summarised the law in Ireland as it arose from Open Door: 
According to the Irish Courts … , to assist pregnant women in Ireland to 
travel abroad to obtain abortions, inter alia by informing them of the 
identity and location of a specific clinic or clinics where abortions are 
performed and how to contact such clinics, is prohibited under Article 
40.3.3° of the Irish Constitution.58 
We can see straightaway that the distinction between providing information and 
providing assistance, which had been decisive in the Supreme Court’s refusal to 
make an Article 177 reference in Open Door, and which had been the cause of 
confusion between the High and Supreme Courts in Grogan, did not appear to be 
important to the ECJ. Instead, the two were elided; the act of providing information 
subsumed under the rubric of giving assistance generally, the former being an 
obviously essential part of the latter. This is an altogether more logical approach, 
lacking the casuistry of attempting to make a nice distinction between the two. 
The questions submitted by the High Court to the ECJ were as follows: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Case C–159/90 SPUC (Ireland) v Grogan [1991] ECR I–4685, hereinafter Grogan (ECJ). 
58 Ibid at para 5. 
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Does the organized activity or process of carrying out an abortion or the 
medical termination of pregnancy come within the definition of ‘services’ 
provided for in Article 60 [EEC]? 
In the absence of any measures providing for the approximation of the laws 
of Member States concerning the organized activity or process of carrying 
out an abortion or the medical termination of pregnancy, can a Member 
State prohibit the distribution of specific information about the identity, 
location and means of communication with a specified clinic or clinics in 
another Member State where abortions are performed? 
Is there a right at Community law in a person in Member State A to 
distribute specific information about the identity, location and means of 
communication with a specified clinic or clinics in Member State B where 
abortions are performed, where the provision of abortion is prohibited under 
both the Constitution and the criminal law of Member State A but is lawful 
under certain conditions in Member State B?59 
SPUC objected to the ECJ accepting jurisdiction in the case on the grounds, first, that 
the distribution of information in question was not done in the context of any 
economic activity and, secondly, that the distribution of information had taken place 
entirely within Ireland, with no cross-border element. However, the Court held that 
while these objections may be relevant to the substantive answers to be provided, 
they were no bar to the Court accepting jurisdiction in the matter.60 By this logic, it 
must also then be accepted that Hamilton P’s decision that no issue of EU law had 
arisen in the High Court in Open Door due to the lack of a cross-border element was 
incorrect, as was demonstrated above in Section 2.1.1. 
The Court’s answer to the first question was both brief and affirmative. The plain 
text of then-Article 60 EEC provides that a ‘service’ within the meaning of the 
Treaty is any service ‘normally provided for remuneration, in so far as [it is] not 
governed by the provisions relating to freedom of movement for goods, capital and 
persons.’61 Then as now, Article 60 went on to include, at indent (d), activities of the 
professions. Because abortion is a medical activity which is lawfully practiced and 
provided for remuneration in several Member States, it must be regarded as a service 
within the meaning of the Treaties, especially in light of the finding in Luisi and 
Carbone62 that medical activities fall within the scope of then-Articles 59 and 60 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Ibid at para 9. 
60 Ibid at paras 14–15, citing Case 180/83 Moser v Land Baden-Württemberg [1984] ECR 2539. 
61 Article 60 EEC, now Article 57 TFEU. 
62 Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro [1984] ECR 377, at para 
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EEC.63 As against this, SPUC alleged that abortion could not be regarded as a service 
due to its gross immorality and because it involves the destruction of the life of an 
unborn child, which, on SPUC’s analysis, and by Irish constitutional law, is a human 
being.64 The ECJ’s response to this objection was as follows: 
Whatever the merits of those arguments on the moral plane, they cannot 
influence the answer to the national court’s first question. It is not for the 
Court to substitute its assessment for that of the legislature in those Member 
States where the activities in question are practiced legally.65 
The converse of this statement must also be true, that it is not for the Court to 
substitute its assessment for that of the legislature (still less that of the people) in 
those Member States where abortion is not legal. But of course, we must bear in 
mind that the ECJ was emphatically not called upon to rule substantively whether 
EU law required abortion to be legal. 
The second and third questions were similarly easily disposed of on the facts of 
the case as the ECJ found them. For the Court: 
[T]he link between the activity of the [defendants] and medical termination 
of pregnancies carried out in clinics in another Member State is too tenuous 
for the prohibition on the distribution of information to be capable of being 
regarded as a restriction within the meaning of Article 59 [EEC].66 
Accordingly, the defendants’ allegation that the restriction on the distribution of 
information fell foul of the ‘no-backsliding’ provision of then-Article 62 EEC67 did 
not need to be considered by the Court: Article 62 was complementary to Article 59, 
and the Court having already decided that the ‘restriction’ at issue was not a 
‘restriction’ within the meaning of Article 59, no further legal issues arose. 
Taken together, all of this meant that the second and third questions had to be 
answered negatively; it was:  
[N]ot contrary to Community law for a Member State in which medical 
termination of pregnancy is forbidden to prohibit students’ associations from 
distributing information about the identity and location of clinics in another 
Member State where voluntary termination of pregnancy is lawfully carried 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Grogan (ECJ) (n 57) at para 17–18. 
64 Ibid at para 19. 
65 Ibid at para 20. 
66 Ibid at para 24, Case C–362/88 GB-INNO-BM v Confédération du Commerce Luxembourgeois 
[1990] ECR I–667 distinguished, emphasis added. 
67 Which has since been repealed, and read: ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, Member 
States shall not introduce any new restrictions on the freedom to provide services which have in fact 
been attained at the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.’ 
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out and the means of communicating with those clinics, where the clinics in 
question have no involvement in the distribution of the said information.68 
Before discussing the interface norms at work in the judgment, it is worthwhile to 
note the Opinion of the Advocate General on the case, which differed substantially 
from the Court’s judgment. Though the AG’s Opinion is not law, it provides a useful 
foil for the discussion to follow. 
	  
2.1.1.1  A less reticent approach 
For AG van Gerven, the tenuous link between the defendants and the English clinics 
was no barrier to a finding that there had been a restriction within the meaning of 
Article 59. He had little difficulty in deriving from Luisi and Carbone69 and Cowan70 
the existence of a right to go to another Member State to receive a service provided 
there. This is the same logic that was later adopted by the Court itself. However, the 
Opinion differs in its answer to the next question: whether this gives rise to an 
ancillary right ‘to receive, unimpeded, information in one’s own Member State about 
providers of services in the other Member State and about how to communicate with 
them.’71 This the Advocate General answered in the affirmative. He noted the 
importance that the Court attached to consumer information with respect to goods in 
GB-INNO-BM,72 argued that this logic applied with no less force to trade in services, 
and then stated that the right to receive information:  
[A]lso holds good where the information comes from a person who is not 
himself the provider of the services and does not act on his behalf. … As a 
fundamental principle of the Treaty, the freedom to supply services must 
… be respected by all, just as it may be promoted by all, inter alia by means 
of the provision of information, whether or not for consideration, concerning 
services which the provider of information supplies himself or which are 
supplied by another person.73 
As we have seen, this analysis was not taken up by the Court, without much in the 
way of explanation as to why not. The Court distinguished GB-INNO-BM on the 
ground that that case concerned restrictions on advertising by the foreign economic 
operators themselves, but this does not go to the substance of the portion of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Grogan (ECJ) (n 57)at para 32. 
69 Luisi and Carbone (n 62) at para 10 
70 Case 186/87 Cowan v Trésor Publique [1989] ECR 195 at para 15. 
71 Grogan (ECJ) (n 57) Opinion at para 18. 
72 GB-INNO-IM (n 66) at para 8. 
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Opinion emphasised above, that a fundamental principle of the Treaty must be 
respected by all and may be promoted by all, regardless of whether they have a 
personal economic stake in its promotion.74 However, even if the Court had applied 
AG van Gerven’s recommendations in full, this still would have been of little avail to 
the defendants. The Advocate General went on to confirm that the objective behind 
the restriction of information in question—the protection of the unborn enshrined in 
the Irish Constitution—was an imperative requirement of public interest within the 
meaning of Community law,75 and that the restriction itself was not 
disproportionate.76 What is notable, however, is the erga omnes nature of the 
Advocate General’s reasoning: the expansive—indeed, theoretically horizontal in its 
application—interpretation he gave to the freedom to provide services is 
quintessentially constitutionalist reasoning, but its breadth is tempered by the 
recognition of the legitimacy of the imperative requirement of public interest 
pursued. In this sense, the Opinion in Grogan (ECJ) is a precursor to the later 
decision in Omega,77 which similarly sought to reconcile the requirements of free 
movement law with national specificities, and contrasts with the much more limited 
reasoning of the ECJ in its judgment in Grogan (ECJ), which, by its focus on the 
individual economic links between actors, is more contractual in its nature, casting 
EU law in this instance as a sort of quasi-private law. Such an approach is in marked 
contrast to the ECJ’s well-known constitutionalising tendencies in other cases, and 
shows the extent of the Court’s wariness of triggering constitutional conflict. 
 
2.1.2 The right as part of freedom of expression 
The ECJ did not confine itself in Grogan (ECJ) to viewing the case from the 
perspective of the freedom to provide services. Because of the ‘tenuous’ link 
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between the defendants and the English clinics, the Court regarded the contested 
restrictions on information as:  
[C]onstitut[ing] a manifestation of freedom of expression and of the freedom 
to impart and receive information which is independent of the economic 
activity carried on by clinics established in another Member State.78 
However, this too did not avail the defendants, who had claimed that the restriction 
was a breach of fundamental rights, and in particular of Article 10 ECHR.79 The 
Court noted that its jurisdiction as regards determining the compatibility of national 
legislation with fundamental rights is limited to cases where that national legislation 
falls within the scope of Community law.80 Though the Court repeated its (by 1991) 
familiar dictum that fundamental rights, as laid down in particular in the ECHR, set 
standards the observance of which the Court must ensure, it made no mention of the 
‘inspiration; guidelines; special significance’ formula discussed in Chapter 3. In 
parallel with the argument based on free movement, the lack of an economic link—
meaning that no ‘restriction’ arose under Article 59—was fatal to the fundamental 
rights argument too,81 and the finding that Ireland’s actions were therefore outwith 
the scope of Community law foreclosed any further analysis of the issue. 
Again, the Opinion of AG van Gerven went further than the Court’s judgment. 
As we saw in Section 3.1.1, he suggested that there had been a restriction within the 
meaning of Article 59, though this restriction was motivated by an imperative 
requirement of public interest and was therefore justified. However, this brings the 
Member State’s actions within the scope of Union law, and thus subjects them to 
review for conformance with fundamental rights as general principles of Union 
law.82 The Advocate General discussed the restriction in light of the Community’s 
obligation to uphold fundamental rights and freedoms, and, as was the case with the 
right to impart and receive information as a corollary of the freedom to provide 
services, found that the aim behind the restriction was legitimate and the restriction 
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79 Ibid at para 30. 
80 Grogan (ECJ) (n 57) at paras 28–32, citing Case C–260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I–2925, at para 42. 
81 Grogan (ECJ) (n 57) at paras 28–32. 
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itself was not disproportionate.83 His analysis on this issue was extensive, and 
included detailed consideration of the case law of the ECmHR and the ECtHR that 
existed at that time.84  
However, the ECtHR itself would soon take a different view. In Open Door and 
Dublin Well Woman v Ireland,85 as well as the two counselling organisations against 
which the original injunctions had been issued in Open Door, there were four other 
applicants: two women who had worked as trained counsellors for Well Woman, and 
two women—Mrs X and Ms Geraghty—who joined in Well Woman’s application 
‘as women of child-bearing age.’86 Despite the Irish Government’s objections, these 
four women were accorded ‘victim’ status within the meaning of the Convention by 
the Court by a 15:8 split, the same 15:8 split which went on to uphold the applicants’ 
complaint that there had been a violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
The complaint under Article 10 was that the Supreme Court injunction 
restraining the applicants from assisting pregnant women to travel abroad to obtain 
abortions infringed the rights of Open Door and Well Woman and the two 
counsellors to impart information, as well as the rights of Mrs X and Ms Geraghty to 
receive information. The complaint was confined to that part of the injunction 
restraining the provision of information to pregnant women, and not the part 
restraining the making of travel arrangements or referral to clinics.87 The 
Government contested these claims, and argued that Article 10 should be interpreted 
in the light of Article 2’s protection of the right to life, Article 17’s prohibition on the 
Convention being interpreted so as to permit the destruction or limitation of the 
rights it guarantees, and Article 60’s ‘floor’ provision, that the Convention shall not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Grogan (ECJ) (n 57) Opinion at paras 30–38. 
84 Ibid, citing the ECmHR decisions in X v UK (1980) 19 Decisions and Reports 244 and Brüggemann 
and Scheuten v Germany (1981) 3 EHRR 244; and the ECtHR cases of Sunday Times v UK (1979–
1980) 2 EHRR 245; Markt Intern and Beerman v Germany (1990) 12 EHRR 161; and Silver and 
Others v UK (1983) 5 EHRR 347. Recall Sionaidh Douglas-Scott’s observation, quoted in Chapter 3, 
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do so in its judgments: S Douglas-Scott ‘A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the 
Growing European Human Rights Acquis’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 629 at 645. 
85 Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland (1992) 15 EHRR 244, hereinafter Open Door 
(ECHR). 
86 Ibid at para 9. 
87 Ibid at para 53. 
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be construed so as to limit or derogate from any rights or freedoms additionally 
ensured by the Contracting States or by other agreements to which they are party.88 
The Government did not contest that the injunction constituted an interference 
with the counselling services’ freedom to impart information, and the Court noted 
that given the plain terms of the injunction, which restrained the ‘servants and 
agents’ of the counselling services from assisting ‘pregnant women’, there must also 
have been an interference with the rights of the individual counsellors to impart 
information, and with the rights of Mrs X and Ms Geraghty to receive information 
should they become pregnant.89 
As to whether the interference had been ‘prescribed by law’ within the meaning 
of Article 10(2) ECHR, the Court noted the broad powers of the Irish judiciary to 
vindicate constitutional rights; the horizontal effect given to the Irish Constitution in 
certain circumstances whereby the infringement of a constitutional right by an 
individual may be actionable as a constitutional tort; and the interpretation given by 
the Irish judiciary to the word ‘laws’ in Article 40.3 of the Constitution90 so as to 
include judge-made law.91 These factors, coupled with the fact that ‘the possibility 
that action might be taken against the corporate applicants must have been, with 
appropriate legal advice, reasonably foreseeable’,92 led the Court to conclude that the 
interference had been prescribed by law, a decision reinforced by the fact that Well 
Woman had actually received legal advice as to its vulnerability to legal action 
following the coming into force of Article 40.3.3° of the Constitution.93 
The Court went on to hold that the restriction had aims that were legitimate under 
Article 10(2) ECHR, and did so in terms very similar to AG van Gerven’s Opinion in 
Grogan (ECJ):94 
[I]t is evident that the protection afforded under Irish law to the right to life 
of the unborn is based on profound moral values concerning the nature of 
life which were reflected in the stance of the majority of the Irish people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Ibid at para 54. 
89 Ibid at para 55. 
90 Which reads, at Article 40.3.1, ‘The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as 
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.’ 
91 Open Door (ECHR) (n 85) at paras 59 and 35, citing State (Quinn) v Ryan [1965] IR 70; Meskell v 
CIÉ [1973] IR 121; and The People v Shaw [1982] IR 1. 
92 Open Door (ECHR) (n 85) at para 60, citing Sunday Times v UK (1979–80) 2 EHRR 245. 
93 Open Door (ECHR) (n 85) at para 60. 
94 Grogan (ECJ) (n 57) Opinion at para 26. 
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against abortion as expressed in the 1983 referendum. The restriction thus 
pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of morals of which the 
protection in Ireland of the right to life of the unborn is one aspect.95 
However, the Government’s contention that the relevant provisions of Irish law were 
intended for the prevention of crime was rejected, seeing as neither the provision of 
the information in question nor the procurement of an abortion abroad were criminal 
offences.96 In light of the finding that the aim of the protection of morals was 
legitimate, the Court held that it was unnecessary to examine the Government’s 
further contention that the contested Irish law was intended for the protection of the 
rights of others, which the Government had argued included the unborn. Thus the 
Court avoided expressing a view as to whether the use of the term ‘others’ in Article 
10(2) ECHR extends to the unborn.97 
The final question to be decided in relation to the Article 10 complaint was 
whether the interference was ‘necessary in a democratic society’ as required by 
Article 10(2). The Government contended that the Court’s approach to this question 
should be guided by the combined effects of Articles 2, 17 and 60 ECHR, as outlined 
above, and added that a test of proportionality must be inadequate in a case where the 
rights of the unborn were in issue.98 According to the Government, ‘[t]he right to life 
could not, like other rights, be measured according to a graduated scale. It was either 
respected or it was not.’99 The Government also argued that in granting the 
injunction, the Supreme Court ‘was merely sustaining the logic of Article 40.3.3° of 
the Constitution. The determination by the Irish courts that the provision of 
information … assisted in the destruction of unborn life was not open to review by 
the Convention institutions.’100 
The Court dismissed the argument with respect to Article 2, because no question 
arose in the case as to whether the foetus is encompassed by that provision’s 
guarantee of a right to life, and the Court had not been asked to determine whether a 
right to abortion is guaranteed under the Convention.101 The Government’s argument 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Open Door (ECHR) (n 85) at para 63. 
96 Ibid at para 61. 
97 Ibid at para 63. 
98 Ibid at para 64. 
99 Ibid at para 67. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid at para 66. 
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against the use of a proportionality test with respect to the right to life was also 
dismissed, the Court rightly disagreeing that ‘the State’s discretion in the field of the 
protection of morals is unfettered and unreviewable’.102 While ‘national authorities 
enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in matters of morals, particularly in an area such 
as the present which touches on matters of belief concerning the nature of human 
life’,103 this margin is not unlimited and is still subject to supervision by the Court. 
For the Court to accept the Government’s argument as to the inappropriateness of a 
proportionality test ‘would amount to an abdication of the Court’s responsibility 
under [Article 19 ECHR] “to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken 
by the High Contracting Parties …”.’104 
Before moving on to the Court’s application of the proportionality test, 
something must be said about its verdict as regards the injunction’s ‘legitimate aim’ 
and about the application of the margin of appreciation in the case. I suggest that the 
(preliminary) deference shown to a democratically-expressed moral choice on the 
part of a (theoretically) sovereign people—similar in form to the previous statements 
of a national judge105 and a member of the ECJ—is emblematic of both what Krisch 
meant when he described the margin of appreciation as a ‘central political tool in a 
pluralist order’,106 and also of the conception of ‘overlapping consensus’ employed 
by Sabel and Gerstenberg, whereby ‘the parties to an overlapping consensus know 
that they have reached agreement on essentials … through differing, only partially 
concordant interpretations of … comprehensive ideas.’107 The right to life is 
protected under both the Irish Constitution and the ECHR, and is a right of basic and 
foundational importance in the legal orders of both. But the interpretation given to it 
by each order is ‘differing, [and] only partially concordant’. In Ireland, the right 
extends to the unborn (though the precise meaning of this would not be defined until 
2013) and is, after X, almost absolute. The ECtHR, being a court with supervisory 
jurisdiction over a diverse array of ‘differing, only partially concordant’ 
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105 See the judgment of Costello J in AG v X (n 1) at 15, discussed below at Section 3.2. 
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constitutional orders, was never going to come down on one side of the argument or 
the other, and had not been asked to do so. But, contra Krisch, the fact that the 
ECtHR’s jurisdiction and jurisprudence in this sense is pluralist does not make it 
non-constitutional, particularly in light of its strong statement, above, that a State’s 
discretion in the field of morals cannot be unfettered or unreviewable—that state 
power and discretion must be fettered and reviewable is, rather, a fundamental aspect 
and hallmark of constitutionalism. For the Court to have given Ireland, or any other 
State, free reign in the way the Government argued for would have been neither 
constitutionalist nor pluralist but unconstitutional—an (illegal) dereliction of the 
Court’s (legal) duty. 
In applying the proportionality test, the Court recalled its longstanding 
Handyside108 doctrine that freedom of expression extends to information or ideas 
which may offend, shock or disturb; noted that it was not a criminal offence in 
Ireland to travel abroad for an abortion; and noted further that the information 
restricted in the case concerned activities which were lawful in other Convention 
countries.109 In this regard, the absolute nature of the injunction was striking, in that 
it was perpetual and took no account of a woman’s age, state of health, or reasons for 
seeking counselling about abortion. This was even more striking in light of the 
subsequent decision in AG v X110 (to be discussed in the next Section) and, at the oral 
hearing in Open Door (ECHR), the Government conceded that the injunction could 
no longer apply to the limited class of women who could in theory receive an 
abortion within Ireland under the X criteria.111 These reasons alone were sufficient 
for the ECtHR to find the injunction overbroad and disproportionate,112 a finding 
compounded by the facts that the link between the provision of information and the 
actual procurement of an abortion was not definite;113 similar information was 
available in British magazines and phonebooks freely circulating in Ireland;114 the 
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112 Ibid at para 74. In light of the finding of a violation under Article 10, the Court held that it did not 
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injunction was ineffective in that it did not prevent large numbers of women from 
obtaining abortions abroad;115 it created a risk to the health of women who, because 
of a lack of information were seeking abortions later in their pregnancies and were 
not availing themselves of proper aftercare;116 and these effects would be worse in 
the case of poorer and less well-educated women.117 The Government’s arguments 
regarding Articles 17 and 60 ECHR were of no use in light of the injunction’s 
ineffectiveness in preventing abortion and the availability of information by means 
other than counselling.118 
The restriction of information about abortion services available abroad having 
being found—at least in this case—in violation of the Convention, it was clear that 
Irish law on the matter was in need of revision or the two legal orders would remain 
in a state of conflict. However, judgment in Open Door v Ireland was handed down 
on 29 October 1992, and the process of bringing Irish constitutional law into line 
with Convention norms was in motion even before it was certain that the two were in 
conflict, as we shall now see. 
	  
2.1.3 Political resolution: the Fourteenth Amendment 
Less than a month119 after the verdict in Open Door v Ireland, three referendums 
were held, on the Twelfth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution. The Twelfth and Thirteenth Amendments will be discussed below at 
Sections 3.2.3 and 3.3. With respect to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Irish 
electorate was asked whether it agreed with the following text being inserted as a 
proviso to Article 40.3.3°: 
This subsection shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in this 
State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, information 
relating to services lawfully available in another state. 
The Amendment was endorsed by a margin of 59.9% to 40.1%, on a turnout of 
65.2%,120 and the conflict between the Irish and ECHR legal orders was therefore 
resolved by the adaptation of the Irish order. Though the genesis of the Amendment 
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predated the ECtHR’s judgment in Open Door (ECHR), that judgment and 
subsequent public comment thereon cannot have harmed the Amendment’s chances 
of finding public acceptance. The existence of complementary, sometimes competing 
and conflicting, legal orders, and the way in which they interacted in the resolution 
(or otherwise) of constitutional conflict demonstrates the dialogic and polyarchic 
nature of the relationships between the orders. 
 
2.2 The right to travel 
In the course of his Opinion in Grogan (ECJ), AG van Gerven noted that ‘Ireland 
does not prohibit or seek to prevent a pregnant woman from exercising her right to 
travel and receive services of termination of pregnancy abroad.’121 However, this is 
precisely what Ireland sought to do in the later case of Attorney General v X.122 The 
discussion of this case here needs to be explained, in that it was not part of any 
formal ‘interaction’ or ‘dialogue’ between Ireland and the EU. However, the verdict 
in the case had important repercussions as regards EU law, which, as we shall see, 
ended up being resolved politically rather than legally (or, better, politically and 
legally, rather than judicially), in the same manner as the conflict between the Irish 
and ECHR orders with respect to the availability of information. Moreover, the X 
case is the proximate cause of the subsequent ECtHR judgment regarding the right to 
a private and family life under Article 8 ECHR, to be discussed below at Section 3.3. 
Even now, 21 years later, the X case arouses controversy in Ireland, both because of 
the way in which the case came before the courts in the first place, and because of 
the way in which it was ultimately resolved. Notwithstanding two political attempts 
to have its meaning restricted, on which more below, the Supreme Court verdict in 
the case still reflects the law in Ireland. 
X was a 14 year old girl, pregnant as a result of having being raped by her 
schoolfriend’s father in December 1991. When her parents learned of this in late 
January 1992, they and their daughter decided to go to England for an abortion. The 
parents told the Gardaí (the Irish police) of this decision and asked if it would be 
possible to have tests performed on the foetus in order to prove the rapist’s paternity, 
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and therefore his guilt, the victim being a minor. An officer explained that such 
evidence may not be admissible in Ireland, but said that he would make enquiries. 
Legal advice was sought from the Director of Public Prosecutions, who advised that 
the evidence would not be admissible, and who then informed the Attorney General 
of the intentions of the girl and her parents. On the morning of 6 February, the 
Attorney General applied ex parte to the High Court for an interim injunction 
restraining X and her parents from interfering with the right to life of the unborn; 
restraining X from leaving Ireland for nine months and restraining her parents from 
assisting her to leave; and restraining X from procuring or arranging an abortion, 
whether within or outwith the jurisdiction. The injunctions were granted. That same 
day, the family had travelled to London for the procedure, but when they learned of 
the orders of the High Court, they cancelled the procedure and returned to Ireland to 
challenge the orders, which the Attorney General sought to make permanent. 
Crucial to the final outcome of the case was the oral and documentary evidence 
of the parents, Gardaí and a clinical psychologist regarding X’s mental and 
emotional state. X had ‘coldly expressed a desire to solve matters by ending her 
life’,123 which in the psychologist’s opinion ‘she was capable [of doing], not so much 
because she is depressed but because she could calculatingly reach the conclusion 
that death is the best solution.’124 The psychologist testified that continuing with the 
pregnancy would be devastating to X’s mental health.125 
	  
2.2.1 ‘A spurious and divisive uniformity’? The High Court judgment 
In the High Court, the defence objected to the grant of the orders on four grounds. 
First was a jurisdictional issue, that because there had been no legislation regulating 
the manner in which the equal rights to life of the unborn and pregnant women under 
Article 40.3.3° should be reconciled, the Court could make no order in a case such as 
this where such a reconciliation was necessary.126 The second objection related to the 
substance of X’s guaranteed right to life: for the Court to make the order sought 
would be to prejudice X’s right to life because of the very real danger that she would 
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commit suicide if she was unable to procure an abortion.127 Third was an argument 
based on Article 40.4 of the Constitution, and the guarantee contained therein that 
‘no citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty save in accordance with law’.128 
The final objection was based on EU law, that the plain text of then-Articles 59 and 
60 EEC, coupled with the ECJ’s interpretation of these provisions in Luisi and 
Carbone and Grogan (ECJ)—which had been handed down just months earlier—
guaranteed a right to travel to another Member State to avail of services (now 
definitely including abortion) legally available there. In view of the urgency of the 
case, the defence did not request an Article 177 EEC reference.129 
The first objection quickly fell, Costello J invoking the clear ruling in Open Door 
that Article 40.3.3° was self-executing, and required no enabling or explanatory 
legislation: ‘[c]omplicated and difficult issues of fact may, of course, arise in 
individual cases but that does not inhibit the court from applying the clear rule of law 
laid down in [Article 40.3.3°].’130  
As regards the second objection, Costello J distinguished the present case from 
those that arise in the ordinary practice of medicine: 
In which surgical intervention, necessary to save the life of the unborn, may 
involve risk to the mother’s life, or in which the surgical invention necessary 
to save the life of a mother may involve risk to the life of the unborn.131 
In this case, in which the threat to the life of the pregnant woman arose from the state 
of mind of the woman herself, Costello J held that he was: 
[Q]uite satisfied that there is a real and imminent danger to the life of the 
unborn and that if the court does not step in to protect it by means of the 
injunction sought its life will be terminated. … [T]he risk that the defendant 
may take her own life if an order is made is much less and is of a different 
order of magnitude than the certainty that the life of the unborn will be 
terminated if the order is not made.132 
This distinction between risk on one hand and certainty on the other was sufficient 
for Costello J to regard it as his constitutional duty to protect the life of the unborn, 
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while still claiming to have had ‘due regard for the equal right to life of the mother’ 
as required by Article 40.3.3°.133 
Costello J rejected the third objection as being based on a misunderstanding. The 
defence had based their argument on cases decided under Article 40.4, where the 
Supreme Court had held unlawful the refusal of bail in criminal cases on the mere 
suspicion that the accused would commit further crimes if left at liberty.134 Costello J 
distinguished these cases in that ‘[t]hey did not decide that the court cannot order a 
defendant to refrain from doing an unlawful act, if necessary by restraining his or her 
constitutional right to liberty.’135 
The fourth objection, the argument based on EU law, also failed. Costello J noted 
that he was required to determine the issue of EU law raised, and that no request for 
a preliminary reference had been made, before stating (without reference to ECJ or 
Irish jurisprudence on the point) that ‘[o]ur courts must enforce Community law; and 
if that law conflicts with Irish law, including Irish constitutional law, then 
Community law will prevail.’136 There was no mention of the rather more ambiguous 
statements of the Supreme Court in Grogan. The Attorney General argued, without 
disputing the general principles of Community law on which X relied, that Article 
40.3.3° of the Constitution and its legal consequences—including the jurisdiction of 
the Court to prohibit travel abroad to procure an abortion—constituted a derogation 
from Directive 73/148/EEC on grounds of public policy within the meaning of 
Article 8 of that Directive.137 Costello J quoted at length from Bouchereau,138 where 
the ECJ had expounded on the meaning of a ‘public policy’ derogation in the context 
of Article 48 EEC’s provisions on the free movement of workers; he accepted as 
valid the Attorney General’s argument that the reasoning in that case could be 
legitimately transplanted to the context of the Article 59 EEC freedom to provide and 
receive services; and he held accordingly that: 
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I can find no provision or principle of Community law which would prohibit 
the exercise of the discretionary power to derogate in the manner contained 
in the Eighth Amendment. On the contrary, Community law already 
recognises that within the Community wide cultural differences exist and 
has permitted derogations which flow from such differences. I can see no 
reason why it should refuse to do so when the derogation by a Member State 
arises because of deeply held convictions on moral issues. Indeed, I think the 
attainment of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty is enhanced by laws 
which assist in the development of a Community in which legitimate 
differences on moral issues are recognised and which does not seek to 
impose a spurious and divisive uniformity on its members on such issues.139 
Finally, Costello J noted that ‘[i]n considering certain issues of public policy in 
Community law it may be relevant to consider the jurisprudence of the [ECtHR].’140 
This is perhaps surprising, given the historically rather sceptical attitude of the Irish 
judiciary to the Convention and its lack of incorporation into Irish law at the time 
(outlined in Chapter 2); the fact that the ECJ itself had yet to refer to the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR at this point (outlined in Chapter 3); and the fact that no 
Convention argument had been raised by the defence. However, Costello J’s analysis 
on the point was terse and made no reference to any specific case decided by the 
ECtHR. Instead, he merely noted that ‘the case law of that court has allowed … 
national authorities a margin of appreciation in relation to laws dealing with moral 
issues’,141 and stated (but did not expand on this) that he did not think that the power 
to stop a woman going abroad for an abortion was disproportionate to the aim of 
Article 40.3.3°. On the contrary, without such a power, the right to life afforded to 
the unborn ‘would in many cases be worthless.’142 
Having ruled against all of the defendants’ objections, Costello J held in favour 
of the Attorney General and made permanent the interim injunction. 
As was suggested in Chapter 2, Costello J’s point about the objectives of the 
Treaty being endangered by the imposition of a ‘spurious and divisive uniformity’ 
was well made, particularly in the subsequent light of the ECJ’s decision in Omega. 
We can also discern within it something of Maduro’s requirements of vertical and 
horizontal coherence. Though it is essentially an argument from national specificity 
(and therefore potentially appealing ‘horizontally’ to the courts of other Member 
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States, for better or for worse), it is also vertically coherent, couched as it is in the 
ECJ’s own language of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty, and thus of the 
integrity and efficacy of EU law. However, the decision also contains a very strong 
and unqualified statement of the primacy of EU law, and this without reference to 
authority. The nature of this statement fits well with the Luxembourg understanding 
of that principle, but it is odd with regard to the Supreme Court’s more qualified, 
unanimous, and at the time very recent, pronouncements in Grogan. The High Court 
judgment in X therefore demonstrates a certain inconsistency in terms of interface 
norms. The effect of the judgment was to limit an individual’s freedom to travel to 
another Member State to avail of a service, something which AG van Gerven had 
indirectly warned against in his Opinion in Grogan (ECJ),143 and yet the High Court 
made no attempt to shield its decision from the rigours of EU law by invoking the 
Supreme Court’s application of the principle of conditional recognition in Grogan. In 
this instance, at least, it would seem that quite aside from not being universal across 
the Union, the interface norms at work were not even universal within the domestic 
jurisdiction. 
	  
2.2.2  Conflict avoided, for now: the Supreme Court judgment 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the judgment of the High Court was reversed by a 
4:1 split decision. The Court was unanimous on three points: that the Attorney 
General had acted properly in bringing the matter before the Courts;144 that the 
provisions of Article 40.3.3° were self-executing and required no enabling 
legislation;145 and that the Constitution must be interpreted harmoniously, involving 
a changing hierarchy of rights in a case of conflict between them, generally headed 
by the right to life, the destruction of which is irreversible.146 The most important 
aspect of the Supreme Court judgments is the interpretation given to Article 40.3.3°, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Grogan (ECJ) (n 57) Opinion at para 13. 
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O’Flaherty J, upholding the finding of Costello J at 9. This was almost certainly done in view of the 
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and specifically its statement that the State’s guarantee to respect, defend and 
vindicate the life of the unborn extended only ‘as far as practicable’ and must be 
‘with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother’. For the majority of the 
Court (Finlay CJ, McCarthy, O’Flaherty and Egan JJ; Hederman J dissenting), these 
two aspects of Article 40.3.3° meant that, in the words of Finlay CJ: 
[T]he proper test to be applied is that if it is established as a matter of 
probability that there is a real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct from 
the health, of the mother, which can only be avoided by the termination of 
her pregnancy, such termination is permissible, having regard to the true 
interpretation of [Article 40.3.3°].147 
Because the thrust of the judgments was such as to authorise a lawful abortion even 
within the jurisdiction—the risk to X’s life flowing from her suicidal state—it 
therefore followed that no order could be sustained which purported in any way to 
prohibit or inhibit X from obtaining an abortion, whether at home or abroad. As a 
result, the previously central question of the right to travel, whether under the 
Constitution or the Treaty, was no longer relevant. X and her parents now being free 
to deal with her situation as they saw fit, their arguments based on Community law, 
which had been offered in the alternative to their Constitutional arguments, did not 
need to be considered. 
While the Supreme Court in X did clarify the meaning of Article 40.3.3°, in 
particular that it permitted abortion in Ireland under very narrowly-drawn 
circumstances, it left the law in relation to the freedom to travel abroad to procure an 
abortion (or services more generally) less clear than it had found it. For Finlay CJ 
and Hederman and Egan JJ, the right to travel could never trump the right to life of 
the unborn if the two rights were in conflict.148 This was not the case for O’Flaherty 
J, who held that an injunction restraining travel from the jurisdiction interfered to an 
‘extraordinary degree with the individual’s freedom of movement’, and also 
constituted—in the present case—an unwarranted interference with the authority of 
the family.149 McCarthy J went even further, holding that the right to travel could 
never be curtailed because of a particular intent, going so far as to state that ‘if I 
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proclaim my intent to explode a bomb or shoot an individual in another country, I 
cannot lawfully be prevented from leaving my own country for that purpose.’150 
Although—or perhaps because of the fact that—all of these conflicting statements 
were obiter dicta,151 their combined effect was to leave Irish law on the freedom to 
travel, both under the Constitution and with respect to EU law, in a very confused 
state indeed. 
Taking these statements together, and although no aspect of EU law was 
discussed in any detail, the fact remains that a majority of the Court was of the 
opinion that the right to travel (logically under both Irish law as an aspect of the 
liberty of the individual and under EU law as a right ancillary to the freedom to 
provide services) must always be subordinated to the Irish constitutional conception 
of the right to life. The fact that these comments were obiter was scant comfort, in 
that they set up the distinct possibility that in a future case, where the life of the 
pregnant woman seeking an abortion abroad was held not to be in danger (or that the 
risk to her life was not ‘probable’ or ‘substantial’ enough, under the test enunciated 
by the Court), then her right to travel could be curtailed in order to prevent the 
abortion taking place. Of course, in such a case, it is unlikely that the woman’s 
reason for travelling would ever become known to any organ of the State, 
particularly considering that, in light of the State’s actions in X, pregnant women 
travelling abroad would not be inclined to let their intentions become known. The 
unlikeliness of the situation arising does not, however, lessen the potential 
incompatibility between the laws of Ireland and of the EU. In this sense, this aspect 
of the judgments in X owes rather more to Kumm’s national constitutional 
supremacy or democratic statism than to any other conception of European 
constitutionalism, and bears little resemblance to the ostensibly communautaire—but 
still, I argue, pluralist in the sense of being vertically and horizontally coherent—
reasoning of the High Court. Moreover, it makes only partial use of the principle of 
avoidance. While the resolution of the case on grounds of national law meant that the 
arguments based on EU law did not have to be considered—and thus conflict in this 
specific instance was avoided—the general tenor of the majority’s opinions 
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regarding the subordination of the right to travel to the right to life of the unborn left 
the door open for conflict in a future case. 
	  
2.2.3 Potential conflict resolved politically: the Thirteenth Amendment 
The uncertainty surrounding a woman’s right to leave the jurisdiction—and Ireland’s 
conformance to EU law with respect to services—did not last long. As noted above 
in Section 3.1.2.1, three referendums were held on 25 November 1992. The 
Thirteenth Amendment proposed to insert the following text as a proviso to Article 
40.3.3°: 
This subsection shall not limit freedom to travel between the State and 
another state. 
The electorate accepted this proposal, by a margin of 62.4% to 37.6%, on a turnout 
of 65.3%,152 and thus the uncertainty caused by the X case, and Ireland’s potential 
breach of EU law, was ended. As was the case with the right to receive and impart 
information, the potential for conflict between legal orders was resolved by political 
means. It would be a stretch, however, to imagine that removal of the potential 
incompatibility between Irish and EU law was the sole reason for the Amendment’s 
endorsement by the electorate. Public concern with the treatment of the victim in X—
including those opposed to abortion as a general, abstract matter—and with the idea 
of pregnant women being effectively detained within the jurisdiction were more 
likely explanations.  
 
2.3 The right to private and family life 
Along with the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Twelfth Amendment 
proposed to insert the following additional text as a proviso to Article 40.3.3°: 
It shall be unlawful to terminate the life of an unborn unless such 
termination is necessary to save the life, as distinct from the health, of the 
mother where there is an illness or disorder of the mother giving rise to a 
real and substantial risk to her life, not being a risk of self-destruction.153 
As is clear, the aim of this amendment was to keep the essence of the Supreme 
Court’s judgment in X—that abortion was permissible in Ireland in order to save the 
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life (but not the health) of the pregnant woman—but to restrict it by removing the 
risk of suicide as a ground justifying such a procedure. On a turnout of 64.9%, the 
amendment was rejected by a margin of 65.4% to 34.6%.154 Accordingly, the rule in 
X would remain the law. A further attempt was made similarly to restrict the 
circumstances under which abortion is legal in Ireland on 6 March 2002, which also 
failed, but by the much narrower margin of 50.4% to 49.6%, on a turnout of 
42.7%.155 
Despite the failure of these two attempts to reverse the decision in X at least 
insofar as the threat of suicide is concerned, no related legislation was enacted. It is 
this failure to legislate which lead to the ECtHR case of A, B & C v Ireland.156 The 
case differs substantially from those discussed above in that the applicants were not 
claiming that state action had breached their rights under the Convention, but rather 
state omission. Moreover, the case did not arise from any domestic legal proceedings 
but was instead entirely freestanding. As was the case with X, it is therefore not part 
of any formal (judicial) dialogue. However, the judgments of the majority and a 
partly dissenting majority of the Grand Chamber in the case reveal an interesting 
disconnect between the institutional self-images of the two sets of judges which is of 
particular relevance to the present discussion, because it may lead us to prefer the 
more nuanced (and, in this sense, heterarchical) approach of the majority over the 
more constitutionally (and, in this sense, hierarchically) ambitious approach of the 
dissent. 
All of the applicants had travelled from Ireland to England in order to procure 
abortions, A for what the ECtHR termed reasons of health and well-being (in view of 
her history of alcohol addiction, post-natal depression, and difficult family and 
financial circumstances); B for reasons of well-being (she did not feel ready to have 
a child); and C because she feared that her pregnancy put her life at risk, having 
previously undergone three years of chemotherapy for a rare form of cancer.157 
A and B complained that the prohibition of abortion on health and well-being 
grounds in Ireland was a violation of their rights not to be subject to inhuman and 
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degrading treatment under Article 3 ECHR; to private and family life under Article 
8; to an effective remedy under Article 13; and not to be discriminated against under 
Article 14. C’s complaint was that the failure to implement legislation under Article 
40.3.3° of the Constitution following the X case—and the failure of the referendums 
to narrow its implications—meant that she had no appropriate means of establishing 
her right to a lawful abortion in Ireland on the grounds of a risk to her life, and thus 
she alleged violation of the same rights as A and B, along with a further violation of 
her right to life under Article 2. 
It was mentioned above that the case was freestanding, and did not arise from 
any domestic legal proceedings. The Irish Government therefore objected to the 
ECtHR hearing the case on the ground that the applicants had not exhausted their 
domestic remedies as required by Article 35 ECHR. As regards A and B, the Court 
rejected this argument, it being abundantly clear from the judgment in X, and the lack 
of a change in the law since then, that any domestic constitutional challenge to the 
unavailability in Ireland of abortion for reasons of health or well-being had no 
chance of success.158 Furthermore, the Court noted the residual, subsidiary and sub-
constitutional nature of the incorporation of the Convention into Irish law under the 
ECHR Act 2003, which, as shown in Chapter 2, places no legal obligation on the 
State to amend domestic law in the event of a declaration of incompatibility being 
granted. This being the case, a request for such a declaration would not constitute an 
effective remedy.159 As regards C, the Court joined the objection to the merits of her 
complaint.160 
C’s Article 2 complaint was held to be manifestly ill-founded for lack of 
evidence, and her associated complaint under Article 13 fell with it.161 All three 
applicants’ Article 3 complaints were also held to be manifestly ill-founded on 
account of the treatment complained of not reaching the minimum level of severity 
required by the Court’s case law, and again the linked Article 13 complaints also 
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fell.162 The case was therefore decided on the basis of the Article 8 complaints. 
Because of the differing reasons of A and B, on the one hand, and C on the other for 
having had their abortions (and thus for their complaints under the Convention), the 
Court addressed the two situations separately. 
With respect to A and B, it was found that there had been an interference with 
their rights under Article 8’s private life component, but that this was ‘in accordance 
with law’ under Article 8(2).163 Furthermore, the interference was held to have been 
in pursuit of a legitimate aim, the Court confirming its earlier finding on the same 
point in Open Door v Ireland, and reiterating its subsequent statement in Vo v 
France164 that it was not just undesirable but also impossible to answer the question 
of whether the unborn was a person within the meaning of Article 2.165 The 
applicants’ argument—based on opinion polls they had submitted in evidence—that 
the views of the Irish people had significantly changed since the passage of Article 
40.3.3° in its original form in 1983 was held not to be sufficient to rebut this 
finding.166  
In the final leg of the analysis—the proportionality test of whether the 
interference was ‘necessary in a democratic society’—the majority held that owing 
to the ‘acute sensitivity’167 of the moral and ethical issues at stake, a broad margin of 
appreciation should, in principle, be accorded to the Irish State. However, the Court 
went on to note that the question of whether there was consensus as to how rights 
should be reconciled in a particular area was essential to determining the breadth of 
the margin of appreciation in such matters, and that the question of a developing 
consensus had long played a role in the development and evolution of the 
Convention’s protections, and its interpretation as a ‘living instrument’,168 which 
Krisch has described as another of the ‘central political tools in a pluralist order’.169 
The Court then held that there is a consensus amongst a substantial number of the 
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States of the Council of Europe towards allowing abortion on grounds wider than 
those in Irish law—indeed, only three of the 47 Contracting States have more 
restrictive abortion laws than Ireland.170 However, the consensus in this case did not 
decisively narrow the margin of appreciation to be afforded to Ireland: 
Since the rights claimed on behalf of the foetus and those of the mother are 
inextricably interconnected …, the margin of appreciation accorded to a 
State’s protection of the unborn necessarily translates into a margin of 
appreciation for that State as to how it balances the conflicting rights of the 
mother. It follows that, even if it appears … that most Contracting Parties 
may in their legislation have resolved those conflicting rights and interests 
in favour of greater legal access to abortion, this consensus cannot be a 
decisive factor in the Court’s examination of whether the impugned 
prohibition … struck a fair balance between the conflicting rights and 
interests, notwithstanding an evolutive interpretation of the convention.171 
It therefore followed that, in light of the right to travel for an abortion and the 
availability of travel and suitable medical care in Ireland, the interference was not 
disproportionate, and A and B’s Article 8 rights were held not to have been violated. 
The very different reasoning of a minority of the Grand Chamber on this issue will 
be discussed below. 
 
2.3.1 (Temporary?) reverse conditional recognition: the judgment of the 
majority 
With respect to C, matters were different. Because her argument was that her rights 
had been violated by the State’s failure to legislate with respect to the Supreme 
Court’s judgment in X, her complaint fell to be examined under the State’s positive 
obligations under Article 8.172 Reiterating that there was a broad margin of 
appreciation for States to decide the circumstances under which abortion should be 
permissible, the Court stated that: 
[O]nce that decision is taken the legal framework devised for this purpose 
should be ‘shaped in a coherent manner which allows the different 
legitimate interests involved to be taken into account adequately and in 
accordance with the obligations deriving from the Convention.’173 
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However, despite the decision having been taken as long ago as 1992, no legal 
framework had been devised at all, ‘shaped in a coherent manner’ or otherwise. 
Returning to her alleged non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Government 
claimed that C could have sought mandatory orders in the High Court requiring 
doctors to terminate her pregnancy.174 The ECtHR did not consider this an effective 
remedy, quoting a judgment of McCarthy J in another abortion case (not directly 
relevant to questions of pluralism) that it would be wrong to turn the High Court into 
a ‘licensing authority’ for abortions.175 Accordingly, the uncertainty caused by the 
lack of legislation following X, and especially the lack of effective and accessible 
procedures to establish the right to an abortion, led the Court to conclude that the 
State had failed in its positive obligations to C, and found a violation of Article 8.176 
The Court held fast to its Open Door (ECHR) finding of a legitimate aim (the 
protection of morals as decided domestically) and the relevance of a broad margin of 
appreciation, and this even in the face of a finding of a broad European consensus on 
the issue of abortion with which Ireland is at odds. This, I suggest, can be taken as a 
warning. European and Irish developments in the time between Open Door (ECHR) 
and A, B & C were not, in this case, sufficient to dislodge the legitimacy finding in 
Open Door (ECHR), but it would be going too far to suggest that this is going to be 
the case for all time coming. As a court of subsidiary and supervisory jurisdiction, 
the ECtHR (or rather, a majority of the Grand Chamber) was unprepared to pre-empt 
the future domestic development of the law, but was perfectly prepared to put 
domestic actors on notice, even if not literally and specifically. Further evidence of 
this is the way in which the Court repeated a finding of McCarthy J in X: 
In the context of the eight years that have passed since [Article 40.3.3°] was 
adopted and the two years since [Grogan] the failure by the legislature to 
enact the appropriate legislation is no longer just unfortunate; it is 
inexcusable. 
If a failure to legislate with respect to Article 40.3.3°, adopted in 1983, was 
‘inexcusable’ in 1992, what word could adequately describe such persistent inertia in 
2010? Perhaps wisely, the Grand Chamber did not offer one, but the specific 
invocation by an international court of a domestic Supreme Court judge’s damning 
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indictment of State failure to act furthers the argument that A, B & C constitutes a 
dialogic, pluralistic warning to the State, articulating the ECtHR’s own position 
while still leaving room for the (‘voluntary’?) adjustment of domestic preferences. 
The Court was not (yet) prepared to find the lack of provision for abortion on health 
and well-being grounds in breach of the Convention, but was perfectly prepared to 
find the lack of implementation of a right pronounced by the State’s own highest 
judicial actors, eighteen years previously, to be so. Maduro’s principle of vertical 
coherence is relevant here: what could be more vertically coherent than pointing out 
that the ‘inexcusable’ nature of a State’s failure to act was initially pronounced by a 
domestic actor? 
Of course, dialogue requires two voices, so it is important to note the results of 
the ECtHR’s prompting of the Irish legislature with respect to C, and the effective 
operationalisation of the very limited right to an abortion outlined in X. Both parties 
in the current Irish coalition Government committed in their manifestos for the 2011 
election to act on the ruling, and the new Government announced the formation of an 
expert group to examine how to proceed in June 2011.177 The group reported on 27 
November 2011.178 Any discussion of abortion in Ireland will generate controversy, 
but events conspired to push the issue to the very top of the agenda. One month 
previously, a pregnant woman had died of septicaemia while miscarrying in hospital 
in Galway, having requested, and been denied, an abortion.179 The final result was 
the enactment of the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act in July 2013, which 
establishes specific, highly restrictive means by which a woman may procure an 
abortion within the State in accordance with the X criteria, that is, in case of risk to 
her life, including from the threat of suicide, but not of risk to her health.180 Though 
the relevant sections of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, outlined above in 
Section 1.2, were repealed,181 the 2013 Act went on to create a new offence, that of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 ‘Expert group on abortion to be set up by November’ Irish Times (Dublin, 17 June 2011). 
178 Report of the Expert Group on the Judgment in A, B and C v Ireland (Department of Health, 
Dublin, available at <http://www.dohc.ie/publications/pdf/Judgment_ABC.pdf>) 
179 Full details are to be found in the Health Service Executive investigation into the incident, 
available at <cdn.thejournal.ie/media/2013/06/savita-halappanavar-hse-report.pdf>, and the 
subsequent Health Information and Quality Authority investigation, available at 
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180 Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013, Ss 7–9. 
181 Ibid, S 5. 
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intentional destruction of unborn life,182 punishable by a fine, up to 14 years 
imprisonment, or both.183 Though the Act does at least attempt to make effective the 
previously entirely theoretical right to an abortion in X case circumstances, whether 
it will pass muster at Strasbourg (or even in the Irish courts) remains to be seen.  
	  
2.3.2  Unconvincing constitutionalism: the dissent regarding A & B 
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR was unanimous in finding a violation of Article 8 
with respect to C, but a significant minority of eight judges dissented with respect to 
A and B, holding that there had in fact been a violation of Article 8 in their case. The 
dissent’s argument centred on the relationship between European consensus and the 
margin of appreciation, the minority disagreeing with the majority’s assessment of 
the issue, and I argue that their reasons for doing so lean very heavily—indeed, 
openly so—towards the constitutional end of the spectrum, aligning well in the 
process with Mac Amhlaigh’s conception of the ECHR legal order as being 
distinctively constitutionally pluralist by reason of the overarching 
metaconstitutional frame of the Convention.184 
The dissent repeated the majority’s finding that there was a broad consensus 
amongst a substantial majority of Contracting States that abortion should be legal in 
circumstances much wider than in Ireland, and stated that: 
According to the Convention case-law, in situations where the Court finds 
that a consensus exists among European States on a matter touching upon a 
human right, it usually concludes that the consensus decisively narrows the 
margin of appreciation which might otherwise exist if no such consensus 
were demonstrated. This approach is commensurate with the ‘harmonising’ 
role of the Convention’s case-law: indeed, one of the paramount functions of 
the case-law is to gradually create a harmonious application of human rights 
protection, cutting across the national boundaries of the Contracting States 
and allowing the individuals within their jurisdiction to enjoy, without 
discrimination, equal protection regardless of their place of residence.185 
As should immediately be obvious, this is quintessentially constitutionalist 
reasoning, with its focus on the universality and integrity of the Convention system 
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within the territories of the Contracting States. The minority went on to note that this 
harmonising role is not unlimited, and that one limit upon it is in cases where there 
is, first, no clear European consensus on how (or whether) to protect a particular 
human right from State violation and, second, the alleged Convention violation 
concerns a relative right which can be balanced against ‘other rights or interests also 
worthy of protection in a democratic society’.186 In such cases, the Court allows a 
(limited) margin of appreciation to the States to make this balance for themselves, 
‘preferring not to become the first European body to “legislate” on a matter still 
undecided at European level.’187 The broad European consensus in favour of less 
restrictive abortion laws was therefore sufficient for the minority to find Ireland’s 
restrictions beyond the limits of its margin of appreciation. In so finding, the 
minority was critical of the majority’s rather more complex analysis regarding the 
issue of consensus, calling it ‘the first time that the Court has disregarded the 
existence of a European consensus on the basis of “profound moral views”.’188  
There are three serious flaws with the analysis of the minority, which may lead 
us to prefer the more nuanced (and less rigidly ‘constitutionalist’) approach of the 
majority. First, the dissenters were of the opinion that: 
[The question of when life begins] was not the issue before the Court, and 
undoubtedly the Court is not equipped to deal effectively with it. The issue 
before the Court was whether, regardless of when life begins—before birth 
or not—the right to life of the foetus can be balanced against the right to life 
of the mother, or her right to personal autonomy and development, and 
possibly found to weigh less than the latter rights or interests.189 
This is emphatically not the issue that was before the Court. What is more, the 
question as formulated here makes little sense. The rights to life of the foetus and of 
the woman cannot be weighed and balanced against each other ‘regardless of when 
life begins—before birth or not’, because the answer to the balancing question will 
differ greatly depending on the answer to the question of when life begins. The 
question of whether the rights of the foetus can possibly be found to weigh less than 
the competing rights of the pregnant woman leads us inexorably to a particular 
answer: yes, they can, as the laws of a number of Contracting States make clear. 
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However, for this possibility to be sufficient to narrow the margin of appreciation in 
the case ignores the reasons behind the differing abortion laws of the States forming 
part of the consensus, and thus whether the consensus is relevant.190  
The analysis of the European consensus in both the majority and minority 
judgments was restricted to the laws currently in force, with no evidence before the 
Court regarding their relevant context: do they recognise, even in a contingent or 
limited way, a right to life vested in the foetus? Are they the result of some balancing 
exercise under national law, by which the relative strength of the rights of the foetus 
(if any) and of the pregnant woman can be determined? Do they flow from some 
specific and fundamental moral choice on the part of the citizenry or their 
representatives, or do they flow instead or in addition from ordinary politics, or 
medical and scientific opinion, or some particular aspect of the State’s political 
history, or from a multitude of sources and factors? The answers given to these 
questions will differ in each national context, considerably lessening the strength of 
the dissent’s assertion that the existence of a general consensus regarding the 
circumstances under which abortion should be permissible necessarily narrows the 
particular margin of appreciation to be afforded to Ireland in the case. Accordingly, a 
more nuanced, contingent approach, such as that of the majority, is preferable, and 
this leads directly to the question of the universality of interface norms. Just as the 
way in abortion is regulated across Europe is jurisdictionally-specific, so too must be 
the norms applied in regulating the interactions between legal orders on the issue. 
Secondly, and related to the foregoing, is the fact that the dissenting judgment 
does not attempt seriously to engage with the majority’s reasoning as to why the 
consensus identified should not narrow Ireland’s margin of appreciation. This 
reasoning is worth recalling: 
Since the rights claimed on behalf of the foetus and those of the mother are 
inextricably interconnected …, the margin of appreciation accorded to a 
State’s protection of the unborn necessarily translates into a margin of 
appreciation for that State as to how it balances the conflicting rights of the 
mother.191 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 This idea of a relevant consensus is the essential thrust of Judge Finlay Geoghegan’s brief 
concurring opinion in the case. 
191 A, B & C v Ireland (n 156) at para 237. 
Chapter 4: The Triangular Frame 
 200 
This is an altogether more justifiable view. The whole Court was in agreement that 
the question of when life begins was not in issue. In any event, the Convention 
neither requires nor prohibits that the State should afford a right to life to the foetus. 
It therefore follows, particularly in light of the moral element of the argument, that a 
wide margin of appreciation should be afforded to how the State resolves the 
question. If this is the case, by what logic may we then move the goalposts by 
narrowing the margin of appreciation, not at the level of principle itself (the right to 
life of the foetus), but at the level of the application of that principle (how this 
balances with the rights of the pregnant woman)? Contrary to the dissenting 
argument, the mere fact that the current law in most Contracting States with respect 
to abortion is wider than in Ireland—and regardless of the prior question of whether 
this consensus is a relevant consensus—does not change the essential fact that if a 
State is to be afforded a wide margin of appreciation in determining the extent to 
which the life of the foetus ought to be protected, then it must logically also be 
afforded a similarly wide margin in any subsequent balancing or reconciliation 
exercise, the rights of the two entities at issue (both human persons within the logic 
of Irish law, and this without offence to the Convention) being as interconnected as 
their biology. Again, the specificity of the law and practice at issue leads us away 
from a universal conception of interface norms. 
While the first and second objections to the majority’s reasoning relate to their 
conception of European consensus and its effect on the margin of appreciation (and 
are thus procedural or metaconstitutional), the third relates more to the substantive 
question of the rights and wrongs of abortion. That is not the concern of this chapter; 
but this third difficulty must be discussed in the present context because of the way 
in which it relates to the institutional self-image of the dissenting minority. The 
minority did not confine itself to noting the European consensus with respect to 
abortion, but went on to justify it, holding that:  
This seems to us a reasonable stance for European legislation and practice to 
take, given that the values protected—the rights of the foetus and the rights 
of a living person—are, by their nature, unequal: on the one hand there are 
the rights of a person already participating, in an active manner, in social 
interaction, and on the other hand there are the rights of a foetus within the 
mother’s body, whose life has not been definitively determined as long as 
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the process leading to the birth is not yet complete, and whose participation 
in social interaction has not even started.192  
This sentence contains a point which is entirely valid, even if we allow for the fact 
that the minority’s use of language in the juxtaposition of the rights of the ‘foetus’ 
and the rights of a ‘living person’ is question-begging (and telling) in light of the 
specific earlier finding that the case was not about when ‘life’ begins.193 What is 
much more difficult to understand is the sentence which immediately follows: 
In Convention terms, it can also be argued that the rights enshrined in that 
text are mainly designed to protect individuals against State acts or 
omissions while the former participate actively in the normal everyday life 
of a democratic society.194 
This is a bizarre statement. Quite aside from being entirely unprecedented (the prefix 
‘[i]n Convention terms’ thereby being rendered meaningless), it is about as far from 
being vertically coherent as one could imagine. Taken to its conclusion, it seems to 
imply that the sick, the disabled, the shy, the lonely, the depressed, the agoraphobic 
and the misanthropic are somehow deserving of less protection under the Convention 
against state acts or omissions because they may not ‘participate actively in the 
normal everyday life of a democratic society’, which itself is left undefined. Even if 
not taken to the extreme of being applied to these categories of adults, and only used 
as a justification for weighing the foetus’s right to life less heavily than the pregnant 
woman’s competing rights, it is not an argument that makes any sense from within 
the internal perspective of Irish constitutional law, or from the perspective of a 
Convention which is agnostic as to the right to life of the foetus. As was clear to the 
Court from the voluminous evidence before it regarding restrictions on abortion in 
Ireland, a fundamental part of the justification for the judicial vindication of the right 
to life of the unborn is the fact that the foetus is not in a position to vindicate those 
rights for him or herself. Put simply, the above quoted passages went too far: rather 
than confining themselves to pointing out that the life of a foetus is necessarily 
contingent and the life of a woman is a life in being, and drawing conclusions from 
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this, the minority went on to make a bold yet highly suspect statement as to the 
purpose of the Convention and the characteristics of those it protects. 
The reason this is important for the present analysis is because of the resultant 
gap between the dissent’s constitutional ambitions and the quality of its 
constitutional reasoning. The major issue of the case was formulated by the dissent 
in a way that permits of only one answer: there was no investigation as to whether 
the European consensus was a relevant consensus; there was no attempt to engage 
with the majority’s reasoning on the margin of appreciation; and the dissent 
contained exactly the sort of unthinking generalisation that apex courts ought to 
avoid because of the potential to create problems in cases beyond the present. And 
yet despite all this, the judgment was couched in the language of constitutionalism, 
of ‘gradually creat[ing] a harmonious application of human rights protection’195 
across Europe. But with a view gradually to creating this harmonious application of 
human rights protection, which decision as regards A and B is preferable? I suggest 
that the decision of the majority, which I have categorised above as being dialogic 
and pluralist, is superior. By its application of the margin of appreciation doctrine—
what Sabel and Gerstenberg have called reverse conditional recognition196—it seeks 
to engage, rather than impose, and prefers to postpone conflict in the hope that it can 
be properly avoided by other means (particularly by politics), rather than ensuring 
conflict—both constitutional and political—by means of reasoning which is of 
doubtful rigour, of doubtful justifiability to the national legal order, and of doubtful 
coherence with respect to the Convention itself. 
	  
3 THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIPS AND THE  
UNIVERSALITY OF INTERFACE NORMS 
The foregoing has described in detail the means by which an issue of human rights 
under national constitutional law entered the European legal discourse; the responses 
and reactions of the different sites of constitutional authority within the deliberative 
polyarchy of the triangular constitution; and the means by which conflict, when it 
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arose, was resolved. In this regard, let us consider the whole of Article 40.3.3° as it 
now appears in the Irish Constitution, post-amendment: 
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard 
to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect and, 
as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right 
This subsection shall not limit freedom to travel between the State and 
another state. 
This subsection shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, within 
the State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, 
information relating to services lawfully available in another state. 
As constitutional provisions go, this one is messy. Despite this, and regardless of 
whether one imagines the underlying philosophy of the Article to be right or wrong, 
there is an obvious normative value inherent in a legal and constitutional system 
which does not regard itself as the be-all and end-all of the articulation and 
vindication of rights, justice and the common good, but is instead structurally open to 
adjustment and reinterpretation in light of the claims of other legal actors and 
individuals, whether these be expressed in an internal or external forum. The concept 
of deliberative polyarchy describes precisely such a constitutional configuration, 
lending weight to the normative claim of constitutional pluralism. But what does the 
foregoing reveal with respect to the metaconstitutional interface norms regulating the 
relationships between legal orders?  
I suggest that the universality of these norms—a claim made openly by Kumm 
and inherent in the work of Maduro—is seriously called into question by the 
evidence presented. As was noted in Section 2.2.2, Kumm’s interface norms of 
legality, subsidiarity, democracy and the protection of rights fit well with the Irish 
Supreme Court’s decision in Grogan. However, as was also noted above, this is 
hardly surprising given that they were formulated with specific reference to the 
relationship between the EU and its Member States, citing in particular the Irish 
Constitution’s provisions on abortion.197 
With respect to the right to receive and impart information, the Irish courts 
repeatedly subordinated this right—whether under the national constitution or under 
European law of either species—to the Constitution’s particular formulation of the 
right to life. Whether or not one agrees with the right’s particular application to the 
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unborn, this subordination is justifiable on its own terms because of the unqualified 
and foundational nature of the right to life, both under the Constitution and the 
Convention. But in metaconstitutional terms, what is notable is the role played by 
what I have termed the principle of avoidance. While reticence to involve the EU 
legal order is clear from both the High and Supreme Court judgments in Open Door, 
we can also see the principle at work in Grogan (ECJ). Whereas AG van Gerven had 
been willing to deal with the substance of the issue—and this in a way which would 
still have accommodated national concerns—the ECJ adopted a less ambitious 
approach in its finding that the economic link between the Irish counselling services 
and the English providers of abortion services was ‘too tenuous’. Restrictions on free 
movement go to the very core of the EU’s constitutional order, as expounded and 
defended by the ECJ. In a contemporaneous assessment of the judgment, O’Leary 
wrote that:  
Beyond the recognition of abortion as a service, the progressive approach 
forged by the Court in the area of services was forgotten. Furthermore, 
recent developments expanding the power of the Court in its assessment of 
national legislation in the light of the Community’s fundamental rights 
principles sit uneasily with the refusal to engage in any such analysis in 
Grogan … Taken unawares by the nature and the subject matter of the 
preliminary ruling requested, the Court was unwilling to act as arbiter in 
such an unfriendly arena. No doubt it was aware of the Irish Supreme 
Court’s barely restrained protest in Grogan. Content to assert a role for 
Community law, it left the resolution of the case to national law. This 
judicial restraint is legally and logically acceptable, particularly given the 
delicate and controversial nature of the issue. What is not acceptable is the 
legal method employed by the Court and its failure substantively to dispose 
of the case … on the grounds of Community law at its disposal.198 
There is the obvious difficulty that we cannot know what the Court’s judgment might 
have been if the Supreme Court had adopted a less assertive stance in Grogan, but 
nonetheless, by far the most important factor for the ECJ was the first question 
referred, whether abortion constitutes a service within the meaning of the Treaty. As 
is plain from the judgment, and from the Court’s previous decisions, the ruling that it 
does could never have been otherwise without undermining the integrity of the 
Court’s jurisprudence. Moreover, the Court’s refusal to take into account SPUC’s 
moral objection to classifying abortion as a service demonstrates an awareness of its 
own institutional limitations as regards the many Member States where abortion is 
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regulated more liberally than in Ireland. But the ECJ, in attempting to recognise the 
limits of its own authority, ability, and legitimacy, undermined its own jurisprudence 
on free movement. It is true that the importance to the ECJ—and to the Union and its 
law more generally—of the second and third questions referred was of a much lesser 
degree. The questions were narrowly phrased, focusing specifically on the question 
of abortion—and not services generally—and the attempt to frame the third question 
in the abstract, with talk of Member State A and Member State B, surely fooled no-
one. It was specifically noted in the Advocate General’s Opinion that Ireland was not 
(yet, as it turned out) seeking to prevent pregnant women from travelling to avail of 
services lawfully available abroad199—something which would rightly have 
exercised the Court—and neither were criminal sanctions threatened. Accordingly, it 
is no great leap of the imagination to see the restriction at the heart of the case—on 
the provision of information regarding the location and contact details of foreign 
abortion clinics in a jurisdiction where abortion is illegal—as a local matter of minor 
importance, at least from the perspective of the freedom to provide and receive 
services.  
However, this does not justify the ECJ’s ‘ducking’200 of the issue. The approach 
of AG van Gerven, which I characterised above in Section 2.1.1.1 as a precursor to 
the later judgment in Omega—itself a modified application of the principle of 
conditional recognition—would have allowed the Court to have regard to its own 
limited competence and jurisdiction while still safeguarding the core of its 
jurisprudence. Let us bear in mind that the restriction of information in Grogan was 
already subject to challenge in Strasbourg (a fact of which the ECJ would have been 
aware), and the ECtHR had yet to rule on the issue. Given the dark tone of what 
Ireland’s Supreme Court had to say about the potential for conflict with EU law; 
given the very limited impact of the restriction on the provision of services 
throughout the Union; and given the ECJ’s (at least then) limited experience and 
expertise as regards non-economic fundamental rights, the approach of AG van 
Gerven would still have safeguarded the ‘uniformity and efficacy’201 of EU law, as 
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the ECJ requires itself and others to do, without precipitating inter-order conflict and 
without undermining the jurisprudence on free movement with the finding that a ‘too 
tenuous’ economic link was fatal to the engagement of EU law. 
This point can be extended to the right to receive and impart information as 
protected by Article 10 ECHR. Though the ECJ did not enter into any discussion of 
the issue, AG van Gerven had found that the fundamental right to freedom of 
expression had been breached, but that this breach was necessary and proportionate. 
Problematically, this is not the decision arrived at by the ECtHR a short time later in 
Open Door (ECHR), where that Court found the restriction overbroad and 
disproportionate on several grounds. But this potential disconnect between the two 
Courts could easily have been remedied—as conflicts between Luxembourg and 
Strasbourg go, the constitutional difficulties it would have raised would have been 
more similar to the cases following Hoechst202 and Orkem203 than to the much more 
serious disconnect following Demir and Baykara204 and Enerji Yapı-Yol Sen,205 
discussed in Chapter 3. The ECJ’s application of a principle of avoidance in Grogan 
(ECJ), therefore, may have had the effect of staving off constitutional conflict both 
with a Member State and with the ECtHR, but it did so at the expense of the integrity 
of the ECJ’s own jurisprudence.  
 In rejecting the Government’s claim in Open Door (ECHR) that the State’s 
discretion in moral matters was unfettered and unreviewable, the ECtHR’s decision 
was quintessentially constitutionalist and demonstrates that Court’s institutional self-
image as the guardian of the Convention. However, this was tempered by the 
ECtHR’s emphasis that Ireland’s (broad) margin of appreciation in the area was 
restricted by the breadth, permanence, practical ineffectiveness and socially unequal 
effects of the restriction on information about abortions available abroad—concerns 
which were as vertically coherent as they were coherent within the Convention legal 
order itself. A similar approach was employed nearly 20 years later in A, B & C, with 
the Court being unwilling to go so far as to find Ireland’s (lack of) abortion laws in 
breach of the Convention with respect to A and B. However, with respect to C, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst v Commission [1989] ECR 2859. 
203 Case 374/87 Orkem v Commission [1989] ECR 3283. 
204 Demir and Baykara v Turkey (2009) 48 EHRR 54. 
205 Enerji Yapı-Yol Sen v Turkey (2009) ECHR 2251. 
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Court effectively put Ireland on notice that this sensitivity to national specificity is 
neither definitive nor permanent. This approach, applying the margin of appreciation 
doctrine as a principle of reverse conditional recognition, is in sharp contrast to the 
approach of the minority dissent in the case, which relied on questionable 
assumptions about the nature of European consensus and a questionable 
interpretation of the purpose of the Convention to reach an altogether more rigid 
conclusion than that of the majority. Indeed, the minority dissent casts the ECtHR as 
exactly the kind of European Supreme Court which it would be under a hierarchical 
construction of the Convention legal order, not as a court of subsidiary and 
supervisory jurisdiction, playing its part in polyarchic deliberation, which is what 
emerges from the majority judgment.  
What emerges from the decisions taken together is a distinctively 
constitutional—yet emphatically pluralist—legal universe, well captured by the 
notion of overlapping consensus. With respect to the different fundamental rights in 
question—information, travel and private and family life—we have seen that conflict 
between the legal orders, both actual and potential, was ultimately resolved by 
Ireland modifying its Constitution or its laws. However, this emphatically does not 
cast Ireland as being in any way subordinate to the two European legal orders. 
Rather, the citizens (in the case of constitutional amendment) and the legislature (in 
the case of law reform) were modifying domestic arrangements in light of (but not at 
the behest of) the positions of legal orders beyond the domestic. 
Like the Irish Constitution’s protection of the right to life of the unborn, much of 
this is nationally specific and historically contingent. The Constitution’s 
amendability only by referendum is unusual in Europe, and the way in which the 
Irish courts, the ECJ and the ECtHR interacted in their decisions is predicated not 
just on the legal relationships that these institutions share (which can be generalised 
across the Union), but also on the specific ways in which the cases came before the 
courts, the specific ways in which the courts dealt with the issues at hand, and the 
general historic praxis of interaction and cooperation between the courts. It was 
noted in Chapter 2 that there are probably at least as many instances of specific 
national constitutional provisions—jealously guarded by national courts—as there 
are Member States of the Union. The above has demonstrated that with respect to 
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one of these—abortion in Ireland—the norms employed by courts at each site in the 
European polyarchy were contingent and specific to the case at hand. Certainly, 
some major threads can be drawn out—the principle of avoidance for one. But 
though this is a principle that courts can employ in seeking to avoid conflict in 
balancing the claims of overlapping legal orders, it is altogether looser and more 
general than the tightly-formulated interface norms proposed by Krisch. Avoidance 
and (reverse) conditional recognition are exactly the sort of tools that can be 
employed within a deliberative polyarchy to constitutionalise an overlapping 
consensus, but they are not a ready-made, step-by-step, a priori guide for the 
resolution of constitutional conflict. 
 
4 CONCLUSION 
Having looked at the ‘vertical’ relationships between Ireland and both European 
legal orders in Chapter 2, and at the ‘horizontal’ (but frequently in practice 
‘triangular’) relationship between the EU and the ECHR in Chapter 3, this Chapter 
sought to examine the way in which all three legal orders have interacted with 
respect to one specific national constitutional provision. The way that this interaction 
played out—encompassing the right to receive and impart information both under the 
Treaties and under the Convention, the right to travel, and the right to a private and 
family life—demonstrates the contingent nature of such interaction, which, in 
another case, in another country, may well have involved different rights or gone a 
different way. Though (very) general metaconstitutional principles can be drawn out 
from the various judgments, we cannot derive hard and fast, universally applicable 
norms from them. 
However, the main series of cases under discussion above occurred 20 years ago 
and the ECJ’s case law as regards fundamental rights has developed significantly 
since then, Kadi206 being a recent and seminal example. Recall that Sabel and 
Gerstenberg have noted that this extension of the ECJ’s jurisdiction may ‘overlap 
and potentially compete with that of Member States in matters of visceral 
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concern’.207 We can easily add to this that it may overlap and potentially compete 
with that of the ECtHR, as we saw with respect to labour rights in Chapter 3. If the 
1986–1992 dialogue—from Open Door to the amendment of Article 40.3.3° of the 
Constitution with respect to the rights to travel and to information—had in fact not 
occurred until, say, 2006–2012, the outcome of the cases may have been very 
different indeed, especially in light of the more specifically political, rather than 
solely economic, basis of the Union as opposed to the Community; the growth of the 
ECJ’s fundamental rights jurisprudence; and the rather more rigidly constitutionalist 
dissent in A, B & C.  
The purpose of the next Chapter is, therefore, to take what we have learned from 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4, and analyse it holistically, with respect to the three legal orders 
as they relate and interact today.
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CHAPTER 5:  
INTERFACE NORMS WITHIN THE TRIANGULAR CONSTITUTION:  
UNIVERSAL CATEGORIES, PARTICULAR NORMS 
 INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis, I have posited the relationship between the modern European state 
(represented by Ireland), the EU and the ECHR—the triangular constitution—as an 
instance of overlapping consensus in a deliberative polyarchy in the sense described 
by Sabel and Gerstenberg. In each of the previous three chapters, I have suggested 
that the specific interface norms employed by the judicial actors at each site in the 
polyarchy in regulating the relationships between the different systems vary in their 
nature, from the legislative, through to the constitutional, to the metaconstitutional. 
While we might well expect sub-constitutional and constitutional interface norms—
being creatures of their own legal systems—to lean away from the universal, and 
towards the historically contingent and jurisdictionally specific, this tendency has 
also been evident with respect to the metaconstitutional interface norms employed. 
Chapters 2 and 3 focused on the three ‘sides’ of the triangular constitution in 
turn, and illustrated the nature of the relevant relationships and the interface norms 
thereunder with reference to a broad range of cases over a long period of time. 
Chapter 4 broadened the focus jurisdictionally, dealing simultaneously with all three 
sides of the triangle; and narrowed the focus jurisprudentially, dealing with the 
specific issue of the regulation of abortion and its various manifestations across 
different sites in the polyarchy.  
The purpose of this Chapter is, first, to tie these threads together by to engaging 
with the tripartite deliberative polyarchy as it currently stands, and, secondly, to 
demonstrate the hypothesis of the non-universality of metaconstitutional interface 
norms. Section 2 will briefly restate the structure of the polyarchy in order to ground 
the discussion, in Section 3, of the particular interface norms at work. The Chapter 
will then conclude that the specific norms at work in regulating the relationships 
between legal orders are necessarily contingent, and that the attempt to universalise 
them results not in specific, universally applicable norms, but merely in broad 
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categories that must be concretised in given cases and circumstances to offer any 
guidance. 
 
1 THE EVOLVING STRUCTURE OF THE POLYARCHY 
It was noted in Chapter 1 that the idea that constitutionalism and pluralism are 
irreconcilable is perfectly true if we take the classical, documentary constitutionalism 
of the state as our sole point of reference for what counts as constitutionality. As an 
organisation of (still) sovereign states based on (reversibly) conferred powers, the 
EU could never claim to be constitutional in this sense; and as an international 
treaty—even one overseen and interpreted by an autonomous international court—
the ECHR’s claim to constitutionality would be even weaker. However, when we 
broaden our concept of constitutionalism to include the evolutionary, as I have 
argued we must, the claims to the constitutional nature of their respective 
jurisdictions and their respective legal orders made by the ECJ1 and the ECtHR2 are 
perfectly plausible. These orders are not constitutional in exactly the same way in 
which the legal orders of Ireland and other European states are, but this is precisely 
because the two European orders are not states. The evolutionary nature of these 
non-state constitutional orders is further reflected in the evolutionary nature of the 
tripartite deliberative polyarchy of which they form two parts. The relationships 
between Ireland, the EU and the ECHR have changed over time, due to Treaty and 
constitutional amendment, judicial (re)interpretation of the constitution(s), and 
legislative changes. This section will briefly recapitulate the structure of this 
triangular constitution as it currently stands in order to frame the discussion on 
interface norms that then follows. 
Ireland is a Member State of the EU, and this membership is specifically 
authorised by a provision of the Irish Constitution, inserted and repeatedly updated 
by referendum.3 From within the internal perspective of Irish law, norms of EU law 
derive their legal force from an Act of the Oireachtas,4 and these norms are 
ostensibly immunised from challenge on national constitutional grounds by a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339 at para 23. 
2 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland [2005] ECHR 440 at para 156. 
3 See, now, Arts 29.4.3°–5°.  
4 European Communities Act 1972, as amended. 
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constitutional exclusion clause’5 The widespread orthodoxy is that this exclusion 
clause has a ‘torpedo’ effect on the rest of the Constitution, ‘whereby [it] destroy[s] 
the effect of every other provision’.6 However, it was suggested in Chapter 2 that this 
interpretation is unprincipled; is at odds with a unanimous decision of the Supreme 
Court, which has never been reversed;7 and therefore does not reflect what has 
actually happened in constitutional practice. It is more principled, more justifiable, 
and more accurate to regard the exclusion clause as having a ‘ripple effect’, 
‘whereby [it] temporarily displace[s], without destroying the effect, of the other 
provisions.’8  
Ireland is also a signatory to the ECHR. Not only is the Convention binding on 
Ireland as a matter of international law, but, since 2003, Convention rights are 
themselves also enforceable (sub-constitutional) norms of domestic law,9 and Irish 
courts are obliged to take ‘due account of the principles laid down’ in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR.10 
The Irish constitutional order is not, therefore, self-contained, but rather 
intricately linked with the European orders. A vast swathe of what we can properly 
call Irish law (that is, law having effect within Ireland) has its origin outwith the 
domestic legal order. Moreover, though the Irish High and Supreme Courts retain 
their interpretive authority over the Irish Constitution, interpretive authority over the 
other two sources of what we can properly call Irish constitutional law rests with the 
ECJ and the ECtHR. In short, the Irish legal system does not operate, and cannot be 
analysed, in isolation. 
Similarly, the legal order of the EU cannot be looked at in isolation from its 
Member States. Regardless of whether we regard EU law as being autochthonous or 
dependant on national law for its legitimacy, it is on the authorities and institutions—
including the courts—of the Member States that the ECJ depends for the actual 
enforcement of its jurisprudence. This division of labour between the ECJ and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Art 29.4.6°. 
6 M Cahill ‘Constitutional Exclusion Clauses, Article 29.4.6°, and the Constitutional Reception of 
European Law’ (2011) 18(2) Dublin University Law Journal 74 at 90. 
7 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children v Grogan [1989] IR 753. 
8 Cahill (n 6) at 90. 
9 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. 
10 Ibid, S 4. 
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national judiciaries occupies a central role in the constitutional development of the 
Union, as the ECJ has attempted to reconcile its own autonomy and prerogatives 
with those of the national judiciaries with which it is in a dialogic and symbiotic 
relationship. 
Moreover, the ECHR is a part of the law of the EU (whether imported through 
the medium of the general principles of Union law11 or the Charter12); the EU will 
shortly accede to the ECHR; and, even before this accession, the ECJ’s level of 
protection of fundamental rights may not fall below that of the ECtHR.13 
Accordingly, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is of greater normative force within the 
EU under the Charter than it is within Ireland under the ECHR Act 2003. 
Finally, the ECtHR has subsidiary and supervisory jurisdiction over all 28 EU 
Member States, 19 other members of the Council of Europe, and, soon, the EU itself. 
As the court with supreme interpretive authority over the Convention—which is 
itself enforceable within Ireland and the EU—the ECtHR’s judgments form an 
integral part of the constitutional make-up of both. 
Such is the deliberative polyarchy of the triangular constitution. But a 
fundamental and distinctive feature of this polyarchy is its asymmetry. First, each of 
the three constitutional sites in the polyarchy partially differs from the others and 
also partially overlaps: in their nature, structure, origins, functions, and purpose. 
Secondly, and as a result of this, each order within the polyarchy relates to the others 
in different ways. The metaconstitutional interface norms posited by Kumm and 
Maduro are ostensibly universal criteria that can be employed in regulating these 
relationships. The two sets of interface norms differ amongst themselves (with 
Kumm’s, for example, being a prescriptive set of substantive criteria, and Maduro’s 
being rather looser sets of epistemic requirements). However, the preceding chapters 
have seriously called into question their ostensible universality, and it is to this 
question that we now turn. 
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2 INTERFACE NORMS IN THE TRIANGULAR CONSTITUTION 
It was noted in Chapter 1 that Kumm’s ‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’ serves a 
dual purpose. It provides a set of ostensibly universal metaconstitutional principles 
that allow us to determine, first, when heterarchy is preferable to hierarchy in the 
relations between legal orders, and, secondly, how that heterarchy should be 
structured in those cases where heterarchy is, in fact, preferable.14 Accordingly, the 
first—and keystone—of Kumm’s metaconstitutional interface norms is the principle 
of legality, whereby ‘national courts should start with a strong presumption that they 
are required to enforce EU law, national constitutional provisions notwithstanding.’15 
This presumption is then rebuttable through the application of three further interface 
norms: the principles of subsidiarity, democracy, and the protection of basic rights. 
Of these three, the principle of subsidiarity is the most tightly embedded in—and 
therefore most difficult to extricate from—the Member State-EU relationship with 
reference to which it was developed by Kumm. Moreover, it played no part in any of 
the instances of interaction and (potential) conflict discussed in this thesis, and will 
therefore form no part of the discussion to follow. In Chapter 2, I characterised the 
principle of democracy (or democratic legitimacy) as a means of protecting national 
specificity, and this is the title under which it will be analysed here. Similarly, in 
Chapter 1, I noted that the principle of the protection of basic rights is essentially a 
recitation of the Solange principle of conditional recognition. Again, this is the 
nomenclature that will be used below. 
 
2.1 The principle of legality 
Though phrased with specific reference to EU law, it is not difficult to generalise the 
principle of legality to take into account the relationship between the EU and the 
ECHR. Kumm himself adopts such a generalised version of the principle in his 
account of Kadi,16 where he sees the principle of legality considered, and departed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 M Kumm ‘Rethinking Constitutional Authority: On the Structure and Limits of Constitutional 
Pluralism’ in M Avbelj and J Komárek (eds) Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and 
Beyond (Oxford: Hart, 2012) at 65. 
15 M Kumm ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe 
Before and After the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal 262 at 299. 
16 Joined Cases C–402/05 P and C–415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission [2008] 
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from, in the ECJ’s review of the UN’s lack of judicial protection for those subject to 
sanctions regimes mandated by the Security Council.17 The evidence adduced in the 
preceding chapters allows us to draw two major conclusions regarding the principle 
of legality as an ostensibly universal metaconstitutional interface norm. First, it is, in 
fact, capable of universal application. But, secondly, this is only because at the level 
of application, it is not, in fact, metaconstitutional at all. These seemingly—but not—
contradictory conclusions must be explained in greater detail. 
None of the cases of actual and potential conflict considered in this thesis were 
instances of open rebellion on the part of the Irish or EU courts with respect to the 
law of the Union or the Convention, along the lines of the Czech Constitutional 
Court’s recent Slovak Pensions case.18 Quite the contrary: in each case, the courts 
were careful to stress the weight that must be attached to the norms of the more 
encompassing system, whether these norms were followed, departed from, or such a 
departure was threatened. But importantly, when we find the principle of legality 
being applied by the Irish courts with respect to the EU or the ECHR, this is only 
because it is a norm specifically commanded by the Irish legal system. In the case of 
the Irish-EU relationship, the principle of legality finds legislative expression in 
Section 2 of the ECA 1972: 
From the 1st day of January, 1973, the treaties governing the European 
Communities and the existing and future acts adopted by the institutions of 
those Communities shall be binding on the State and shall be part of the 
domestic law thereof under the conditions laid down in those treaties. 
Sections 2 and 3 of the ECHR Act 2003 perform a similar function in the Irish-
ECHR relationship, requiring courts to interpret the law in accordance with the 
Convention ‘in so far as possible’, and requiring organs of the state to perform their 
functions in a Convention-compatible manner. With respect to the EU and the 
ECHR, the Convention is nowadays part and parcel of EU law at a constitutional 
level, whether through Article 6(3) TEU or Article 52(3) of the Charter,  
The principle of legality, therefore, rather than being an external, freestanding 
constitutional-norm-about-constitutional-norms, is better regarded as being merely 
the generalised and delocalised expression of the particular legislative or 
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constitutional mandate by which the norms of a more encompassing legal order 
become applicable within a less encompassing order. The precise nature and 
normative strength of this applicability will necessarily vary from order to order, 
particularly given the asymmetry of the polyarchy adverted to above in Section 2. 
This then poses a further difficulty for the principle’s ostensible universality—the 
principle of legality is a rebuttable presumption and, for Kumm, the criteria 
justifying its rebuttal are ‘countervailing concerns of sufficient weight that suggest 
[that the more encompassing norm should not be applied].’19 But whether the 
‘countervailing concerns’ are of ‘sufficient weight’ or not will again differ according 
to jurisdictional circumstance. In the case of EU law in Ireland, the interpretation one 
gives to Article 29.4.6°—‘torpedo’ or ‘ripple’—will be determinative. If the 
‘exclusion clause’ really does have a ‘torpedo’ effect on the rest of the Constitution, 
then the principle of legality expressed in the ECA 1972 is not, in fact, rebuttable, 
but definitive. As we have seen, in Grogan—the sole decided case where the matter 
came to a head—the Irish Supreme Court opted for a ‘ripple’ interpretation, 
signalling its (potential) refusal to subordinate the Constitution’s protection of the 
right to life of the unborn to the ‘exclusion clause’, and, through the ‘exclusion 
clause’, to the requirements of EU free movement law.  
The Irish courts have never refused to follow the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
since the coming into force of the ECHR Act 2003, but that Act’s incorporation of 
the Convention ‘subject to the Constitution’, its requirement for the courts merely to 
take ‘due account’ of Strasbourg jurisprudence, and its requirement that the law be 
interpreted in accordance with the Convention only ‘in so far as possible’ leave open 
the possibility of disagreement, and thus the rebuttal of the principle of legality. But 
as with EU law in Grogan, in such a case, the criteria establishing what constitutes a 
‘countervailing concern’ of ‘sufficient weight’ will be criteria internal to Irish 
constitutional law, and not the freestanding exceptions—democratic legitimacy, 
fundamental rights—posited by Kumm. 
There is one area where the application of the principle of legality in a properly 
metaconstitutional sense is evident: the ECJ’s case law with respect to the 
Convention. However, this only holds true prior to the elevation of the Charter to the 
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status of primary EU law. The presumption that ECtHR jurisprudence should be 
followed—evident in the ECJ’s reversal of its Hoechst20 and Orkem21 jurisprudence 
in the light of subsequent developments at Strasbourg22—did not, at this stage in the 
development of the EU-ECHR relationship, arise from primary EU law, but rather 
from the ECJ’s own metaconstitutional jurisprudence on the relations between the 
orders, specifically the ‘inspiration; guidelines; special significance’ formula. 
Despite the cogency of de Witte’s argument that Article 6(3) TEU specifically 
imports the norms of the Convention as general principles of EU law,23 this 
interpretation has only recently— and partially—made its way into the ECJ’s 
judgments. The closest that the ECJ has come to disagreement with the ECtHR as to 
the requirements of the Convention is with respect to the compatibility of its 
procedures and the role of the Advocates General with Article 6 ECHR, an issue 
which was again resolved prior to the elevation of the Charter to Treaty status. In 
Kaba II,24 though AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer’s Opinion had expressed serious 
concerns regarding the cogency of the relevant ECtHR case law in a manner redolent 
of Kumm’s criteria justifying rebuttal of the presumption of legality,25 the ECJ did 
not engage with this reasoning, and instead avoided outright conflict (but maintained 
its possibility) by deciding the case on different grounds. The ECtHR subsequently 
defused the potential conflict between the orders through the application of the 
Bosphorus26 presumption of equivalent protection in Kokkelvisserij.27 
Following the elevation of the Charter to Treaty status, the principle of legality 
with respect to the relationship between EU and ECHR law is no longer 
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2219. 
25 Ibid (Opinion) at para 105. 
26 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland [2005] ECHR 440 
27 Cooperatieve Producentenorganisatie van de Nederlandse Kokkelvisserij UA v the Netherlands 
App No 13645/05 (decision, ECtHR, 20 Jan 2009). 
Chapter 5: Interface Norms within the Triangular Constitution 
 218 
metaconstitutional in nature, but is rather the logical result of the Charter’s own 
provisions regarding the status of the Convention and Strasbourg jurisprudence in 
EU law. This alteration to the terms of engagement between the two European orders 
may yet have important repercussions for the manner in which the current disconnect 
between the jurisprudence of the ECJ and the ECtHR—on labour rights—is resolved. 
However, as was made clear in Chapter 3, the resolution of this conflict could take a 
number of forms, and may be further influenced by the EU’s accession to the ECHR. 
What is clear, however, is that whether rebutted or not, the principle that the ECJ 
should apply the law of the Convention and the jurisprudence of the ECHR—
notwithstanding its own prior, conflicting articulation of the requirements of the 
Convention and of EU law—will derive from the primary law of the EU, and not 
from a freestanding metaconstitutional principle. 
Taken together, all of this implies that Kumm’s metaconstitutional principle of 
legality is in fact capable of universal application, but only because it is a 
generalised statement of what is already the law. This universal applicability is 
therefore at the expense of what makes the principle metaconstitutional. The ECJ’s 
obligation to provide a standard of protection of Convention rights at least equivalent 
to that of the ECtHR is an obligation imposed by the terms of primary EU law itself. 
Similarly, each Member State of the EU has its own jurisdictionally specific means 
by which norms of EU law and the Convention become effective within the legal 
order. In the particular case of Ireland, this is achieved by legislation, strengthened in 
the case of EU law by a constitutional ‘exclusion clause’. As a result, neither the 
substantive presumption of legality, nor the (possible, differing) means by which that 
presumption might be rebutted, is external or freestanding in nature. Rather, they are 
historically contingent and intimately connected with jurisdictional circumstance. 
Kumm’s principle of legality is therefore caught in a trap: when viewed as 
universally applicable, it is not in fact metaconstitutional. When viewed as 
metaconstitutional, it is too general and abstract in its statement and requirements to 
be universally applicable. This problem with the first and keystone of Kumm’s 
interface norms then filters down through the others, as we shall now see. 
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2.2 The protection of national specificity 
In elaborating what he describes as the principle of democracy or democratic 
legitimacy, Kumm states that: 
Given the persistence of the democratic deficit on the European level … 
national courts continue to have good reasons to set aside EU Law when it 
violates clear and specific constitutional norms that reflect essential 
commitments of the national community.28 
The attempt to generalise this interface norm so that it might be applied also to the 
relationship between the EU and the ECHR is rather more difficult than was the case 
with the principle of legality, but it is not impossible. As was suggested in Chapter 3, 
concern for national specificity in the Member State-EU relationship has parallels on 
the EU-ECHR side of the triangle with concern for the autonomy, uniformity, and 
specificity of Union law as a specifically non-state legal system. Though this concern 
may be justified on many grounds, democracy is almost certainly not one of them, 
for precisely the reasons of democratic deficit identified by Kumm. However, this is 
not necessarily fatal for the potential universal applicability of the principle, provided 
that we recast it in these specific circumstances as a method of protecting specifically 
‘post-national specificity’. 
In this regard, the ECJ’s filtering of the Convention through its 
(metaconstitutional) ‘inspiration; guidelines; special significance’ formula allowed 
room for manoeuvre in a potential case where a provision of the Convention or its 
interpretation by the ECtHR might strike at the heart of the EU legal order. However, 
concern for the specificity of the EU finds its strongest expression not in the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ, but rather in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in the pre-
accession era; and in the specific terms of the Draft Accession Agreement29 in the 
post-accession era to come. The Bosphorus presumption of equivalent protection 
(itself an application of the principle of conditional recognition, to be discussed 
below in Section 3.3) is the means by which the ECtHR operationalises this concern 
for EU specificity prior to EU accession. The sheer strength of this presumption is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Kumm (n 15) at 300, footnote omitted, emphasis in original. 
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demonstrated by the highly deferential approach of the ECtHR to matters of EU law 
in applying the presumption in Kokkelvisserij. While this presumption of equivalence 
will be lifted upon EU accession to the Convention, the autonomy and specificity of 
EU law will instead be accommodated—though arguably to a lesser extent—by the 
terms of the Accession Agreement. The co-respondent mechanism will absolve the 
ECtHR of the need to apportion responsibility for breaches of the Convention 
between the Member States and the EU—and thus effectively decide questions of 
substantive EU law—leaving this instead to be worked out within the Union. The 
‘prior involvement’ mechanism will ensure that the ECJ will first have the 
opportunity to remedy breaches of the Convention, or to (re)interpret EU law in 
accordance with the Convention. Therefore, while it is not theoretically impossible to 
generalise the principle of the protection of ‘post-national specificity’ so that it can 
encompass the relationship between the EU and the ECHR, the evidence suggests 
that it is unnecessary to do so: the ECtHR’s application of the (metaconstitutional) 
principle of conditional recognition already provides for such protection, and this 
protection will shift from the metaconstitutional and jurisprudential to the 
constitutional and institutional following ratification of the Accession Agreement. 
Generalising the principle to the relationship between Ireland and the ECHR is 
less difficult, but as was the case with the principle of legality, Kumm’s principle of 
democracy attempts to serve a purpose that is in fact already served by domestic law 
and practice. The sub-constitutional status of the Convention in Irish law not only 
permits but also obliges the domestic judiciary to prefer constitutional norms to those 
of the Convention in cases of conflict. As the case of Foy (No 2)30 demonstrates, 
where developments in ECtHR jurisprudence render Irish law or practice 
incompatible with the Convention’s requirements, the domestic law or practice can 
be—and will be—remedied judicially, provided that this is possible within the terms 
of the Constitution. Where such judicial remedy is impermissible, three possibilities 
arise. First, the legislature can amend the law, as happened following the adverse 
judgment with respect to C in A, B & C v Ireland.31 Second, the Constitution can be 
amended by referendum, as happened with the adoption of the Fourteenth 
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31 A, B & C v Ireland (2010) 53 EHRR 13. 
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Amendment following the adverse judgment in Open Door v Ireland.32 Third, the 
incompatibility between Irish law and the ECHR might simply continue unresolved, 
leaving Ireland in breach of its international obligations and subject to the Council of 
Europe’s diplomatic enforcement (or, better, ‘monitoring’) mechanisms. This would 
have been the case had the Fourteenth Amendment been rejected by the electorate, 
and would almost certainly have been the case if the dissenting minority of the Grand 
Chamber with respect to A and B in A, B & C had, in fact, been in the majority. But 
in each of these three cases, the domestic judiciary has no need of a 
metaconstitutional principle justifying the rebuttal of the (legislative) presumption of 
legality—its own domestic terms of reference not only permit but oblige such a 
rebuttal where conflict between the orders cannot be resolved judicially, whether this 
is on grounds of democratic legitimacy, national specificity, both, or neither. 
With respect to the Irish-EU relationship, matters are more complex, but no more 
promising for the ostensible universality of the interface norm. First, by focusing his 
interface norm of democratic legitimacy on issues of national specificity, Kumm 
elides two separate—though related—issues into one. In imposing the requirement, 
in Crotty,33 that any Treaty amendment which would alter the ‘scope and 
objectives’34 of the Union be put to a further referendum, the Supreme Court was 
clearly concerned with democratic legitimacy, but not with national specificity. 
Though the Irish constitutional provisions regarding the locus of constituent power 
and the means by which the Constitution may be amended are specific to that State, 
there is nothing nationally specific about the idea of popular sovereignty. 
Secondly, even on the abortion issue—where democratic legitimacy and national 
specificity do overlap—the way in which the issue came to a head and the way in 
which the Supreme Court phrased and structured its decision in Grogan bear little 
resemblance to the interface norm as Kumm presents it, despite the fact that the Irish 
constitutional provision on the right to life of the unborn specifically informed 
Kumm’s development of the principle, and despite the further fact that this 
development post-dated the decision in Grogan. The orthodox, ‘torpedo’ 
interpretation of Article 29.4.6 would have rendered the presumption of legality 
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33 Crotty v An Taoiseach [1987] IR 713. 
34 Ibid at 767 per Finlay CJ. 
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absolute, and no interface norm would justify its rebuttal. But by holding fast to its 
obligation to uphold and vindicate constitutional rights, even in the face of a 
conflicting constitutional norm which seemed to exempt EU law from the 
requirement of compatibility with these rights, the Supreme Court in Grogan was not 
disapplying EU law, but rather indicating the possibility—but no more than this—
that it might do so. Though the particular constitutional norm that the Supreme Court 
sought to insulate from the potential rigours of EU free movement law—Article 
40.3.3°’s protection of the right to life of the unborn—is an example of national 
specificity, it is the fundamentality of the right, rather than the specificity of its 
formulation, which motivated the Court—if the constitutional norm at issue had been 
nationally specific but had also been capable of being limited in certain 
circumstances, the Supreme Court’s approach may well had been less assertive. 
Being a constitutionally guaranteed absolute right, it ‘must be fully and effectively 
protected by the courts’.35 Moreover: 
[I]t cannot be one of the objectives of the European Communities that a 
member state should be obliged to permit activities which are clearly 
designed to set at nought the constitutional guarantees for the protection 
within the State of a fundamental human right.36 
Seen in the light of Crotty and Grogan, Kumm’s interface norm of democracy, rather 
than being a universally applicable, a priori metaconstitutional principle, is instead 
cast as a somewhat inaccurate ex post rationalisation of difficult circumstance, which 
not only confuses two separate issues—democratic legitimacy and national 
specificity—but also cannot account for historical constitutional practice. 
As was the case with the ECtHR’s Bosphorus presumption with respect to EU 
law, it is also the case that the ECJ’s jurisprudence is in fact capable of taking 
national specificity into account and reconciling its exigencies with those of Union 
law. The divergence between the judgment of the ECJ and the Opinion of the 
Advocate General in Grogan (ECJ) predated Omega,37 and illustrates the advantages 
for both legal orders of the Omega approach. AG van Gerven had considered that the 
restriction of information at issue fell within the scope of Community law; but that 
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36 Ibid at 769. 
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the restriction was justified because its objective qualified as an imperative 
requirement of public interest within the meaning of Community law.38 However, the 
ECJ went on to avoid the issue altogether by holding that the ‘tenuous’ link between 
the Irish students’ unions and the British abortion providers took matters outside the 
scope of Community law. While clearly motivated by a desire to avoid precipitating 
constitutional conflict, this decision rode roughshod over the Court’s previous 
jurisprudence on potential restrictions on freedom of movement, a consequence that 
could have been avoided by the adoption of the Advocate General’s rather more 
nuanced approach. The ECJ subsequently developed precisely such an approach in 
some cases—though the effective and uniform application of EU law is of 
foundational importance to the ECJ’s jurisprudence, it is going to far too argue that it 
is the most important constitutional norm in Europe. AG van Gerven’s Opinion in 
Grogan (ECJ) and the subsequent judgment in Omega illustrate the ECJ’s 
recognition of this fact. Certainly, in attempting to reconcile national specificity with 
the requirements of the Treaties, the ECJ will not always get it ‘right’ from a national 
perspective—as the reaction to Viking39 and Laval40 demonstrates—but the point is 
that rather than being the sole responsibility of national courts, reconciling national 
specificity with EU law is rather, like so much else in EU law, a shared, dialogic, 
deliberative enterprise between the national and Union judiciaries. Such a vision of 
relations between legal orders leaves little room for the universal applicability of 
Kumm’s principle of democracy. 
 
2.3 The principle of conditional recognition 
The last of Kumm’s metaconstitutional interface norms is the protection of 
fundamental rights, by which he means that the principle of legality can be rebutted 
if the enforcement of a norm of EU law would violate a basic right guaranteed by a 
Member State constitution.41 However, if ‘the guarantees afforded by the EU amount 
to structurally equivalent protections, then there is no more space for national courts 
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40 Case C–341/05 Laval un Partneri v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] ECR I–11845. 
41 Kumm (n 15) at 294. 
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to substitute the EU’s judgment on the rights issue with their own.’42 The principle is 
therefore essentially a recitation of the Solange principle of conditional recognition. 
Whereas Kumm posits the principle as a substantive interface norm that can be 
applied in order to protect fundamental rights, Sabel and Gerstenberg’s conception is 
less prescriptive and somewhat more subtle. Though their ‘coordinate 
constitutionalism’ is a species of metaconstitutional pluralism, Sabel and 
Gerstenberg expressly discount the possibility of substantive interface norms being 
posited in the abstract.43 Rather than being a substantive norm, the principle of 
conditional recognition on this account is a jurisgenerative mechanism, allowing for 
the dialogic articulation, re-articulation and adjustment of requirements and 
perspectives in a deliberative polyarchy. In light of the evidence adduced in this 
thesis, Sabel and Gerstenberg’s conception of the principle is to be preferred. 
The major problem with conceiving of the principle of conditional recognition as 
a freestanding metaconstitutional interface norm capable of universal application is 
that it begs the most important question: conditional on what? The answer 
‘conditional on the protection of fundamental rights’ only begs the question further, 
because, given the asymmetries of the triangular constitution and the only partially 
overlapping nature of their conceptions and articulations of fundamental rights, what 
one order regards as sufficiently fundamental to justify the withholding of legal 
recognition may not arouse similar concerns in an another order, even one situated 
similarly in the polyarchy.  
 Though the principle is capable of being phrased or posited in the abstract, it is 
devoid of meaningful content at this stage and offers us no guidance in the resolution 
of conflict. It is only when the principle is concretised in a particular case that it 
becomes capable of fulfilling the role of an interface norm, but—as was the case 
with the principle of legality—this can only come at the expense of the principle’s 
metaconstitutionality. The problem is therefore one of epistemology: it is only from 
an epistemic vantage point situated within a constitutional order, looking out, that the 
principle becomes meaningful. Kumm partially recognises this problem in his 
admission that the weakness of the claim to universality ‘lies in the fact that it does 
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Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order’ (2010) 16 European Law Journal 511 at 550. 
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not guarantee that the results [the application of an interface norm] leads to will be 
the same in every legal order’.44 However, this is much more than a weakness of the 
claim. Rather, it is fatal to it. Consider the application of the principle of conditional 
recognition by the Irish Supreme Court in Crotty. The ‘scope and objectives’ test is 
one that is particularly within the interpretive domain of the Irish courts, and any 
Treaty amendment which broadened the ‘scope and objectives’ of the Union would 
require popular authorisation by referendum. But this is only because of the specific 
nature and provisions of the Irish constitution—in another jurisdiction, other 
methods of Treaty ratification—usually parliamentary—might suffice. Similarly, in 
Grogan, the effect of the judgment was to hold open the possibility of the loyal 
application of Luxembourg jurisprudence so long as that jurisprudence does not ‘set 
at nought the constitutional guarantees for the protection within the State of a 
fundamental human right’.45 A statement such as this is only metaconstitutional in 
the very thin sense that it concerns the relationships between legal orders. It is 
substantively situated within the constitutional order and, accordingly, its frame of 
reference is limited to that order. 
The same problem presents itself in the ‘horizontal’ frame: the ECtHR’s 
Bosphorus presumption, though an application of an ostensibly universal principle, is 
necessarily specific to the particular—unique—relationship it has to the ECJ. It is the 
means by which the ECtHR reconciles the triply conflicting requirements of 
maintaining its own interpretive authority over the Convention, respecting the 
autonomy of EU law, and still ensuring that the Convention rights continue to be 
guaranteed in the face of EU action. The doctrine of the margin of appreciation, as 
applied by the majority judgment in A, B & C, sees the principle applied in reverse, 
the ECtHR reconciling state autonomy with the requirements of the Convention by 
means of a conditional, supervised, temporally contingent leeway. In both cases, the 
substantive principles being applied—the presumption of equivalence or the margin 
of appreciation—are much more than the mere application of a universal 
metaconstitutional interface norm. Instead, they are substantive doctrines in their 
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own right, with their own specific case law, based within the epistemic confines of 
the Convention. 
Accordingly, we can well regard the principle of conditional recognition as a 
jurisgenerative mechanism in Sabel and Gerstenberg’s sense, a framework the 
particular application of which will differ depending on jurisdiction, subject matter, 
and much else. What we cannot do is posit it in the abstract, as a universally 
applicable norm-about-constitutional-norms, because when stated so generally, the 




The research question that this thesis sought to answer is as follows: Are the 
interface norms between legal orders the same regardless of the relationship 
between the orders themselves and between the institutional actors involved? 
In light of the evidence presented, I submit that they are not. It is perfectly 
permissible and possible to posit broad, freestanding categories into which the 
various norms applied in regulating the relationships between legal orders in a 
polyarchy may fall. Such taxonomies are important and useful in helping us to 
analyse these inter-order relationships. However, the fundamental problem is that 
these categories are just that—categories, rather than substantive action-guiding rules 
or principles. For the actual rules or principles that regulate the relationships between 
legal orders—the substantive interface norms at work—we must assume a viewpoint 
internal to the legal system in question, and take into account its own constitutional 
text and its own particular telos. But when we do this, the norms cease to be 
metaconstitutional, and are so far evolved from their abstract description that they 
are incapable of universal application. When we then zoom back out of a particular 
legal order, and attempt to metaconstitutionalise the particular constitutional 
interface norms at work, we lose precisely what it was that made those norms useful 




This aim of this thesis has been to test the assumption that the metaconstitutional 
interface norms regulating the relationships between legal orders under certain 
conceptions of constitutional pluralism are universally applicable in nature. The 
jurisdictional setting for the analysis was the ‘triangular constitution’ of Ireland, the 
EU, and the ECHR, which I have characterised as being an instance of coordinate 
constitutionalism in a deliberative polyarchy. While the individual orders in the 
polyarchy cannot be analysed or understood properly in isolation, this does not 
amount to the polyarchy being a single, unified legal order.  
Chapter 1 began by tracing the origins of the theory of constitutional pluralism in 
the work of Neil MacCormick, who sought to reconcile the competing sovereignty-
claims of the EU and its Member States, and continued to outline Neil Walker’s 
development of the theory. At its simplest, the theory holds that different, interacting 
legal orders, state and non-state, do not necessarily need to be arranged 
hierarchically, as traditional constitutional theories demand. Rather, the relations 
between legal orders can be considered heterarchically, whereby the acquiescence of 
one order to the norms of another in one instance need not have the effect of 
rendering the entirety of that first order subordinate to the second. 
The initial—and potentially fatal—criticism that ‘constitutional pluralism’ is a 
contradiction in terms, constitutionalism and pluralism being irreconcilable 
opposites, was then addressed, and it was suggested that rather than being 
irreconcilable, the two notions are in fact end points on a spectrum: constitutionalism 
can be pluralised, and pluralism can be constitutionalised. Attention then turned to 
one of the normatively thickest ways in which such a reconciliation is attempted: the 
theories of metaconstitutional pluralism, which seek to posit or identify certain 
freestanding, overarching norms-about-constitutional-norms—metaconstitutional 
interface norms—by which the relations between pluralistically-situated legal orders 
can be constitutionalised. 
Charles Sabel and Oliver Gerstenberg’s characterisation of the European legal 
universe as being an instance of coordinate constitutionalism in a deliberative 
polyarchy founded on an overlapping consensus was adopted as the model for the 
analysis of the thesis. The advantages of the model are that, first, it leaves open the 
Conclusion 
 228 
possibility of either hierarchy or heterarchy manifesting themselves in the relations 
between legal orders in given cases, without demanding either in every circumstance, 
and, secondly, it is broad enough to encompass not just the relations between the EU 
and its Member States, but also between these legal orders and the ECHR. But 
though their theory is metaconstitutional in nature, Sabel and Gerstenberg 
specifically do not seek to posit individual metaconstitutional interface norms 
regulating the relations within the polyarchy. Rather, their focus is temporal: the 
principle of conditional recognition, in its various jurisdictionally-specific 
manifestations, is the jurisgenerative mechanism by which such norms are worked 
out over time, rather than having been posited in advance. The theory is therefore 
rather more descriptive than prescriptive, but, crucially, is still theoretically 
compatible with some of the more prescriptive accounts of interface norms in the 
literature: we can accept the description of the European legal sphere as being a 
deliberative polyarchy without necessarily accepting Sabel and Gerstenberg’s 
account of how different sites in the polyarchy relate to each other, and instead 
import differing accounts of interface norms in order to test their applicability. 
The next conception of metaconstitutional pluralism considered was the 
‘contrapunctual law’ of Miguel Poiares Maduro. Under this conception of the theory, 
analogous to the musical notion of counterpoint, certain ‘contrapunctual’ principles 
are to be found in European judicial practice, whereby different, seemingly 
conflicting voices can in fact result in harmony, rather than cacophony. As an 
account of ‘best practice’ in the mutual working-out of the requirements of EU law, 
Maduro’s theory is both descriptive and prescriptive: the contrapunctual principles 
can in fact be identified in historical practice, and ought to be put into effect in future 
cases. The underlying claim, therefore, is that these principles are universally 
applicable. However, the principles are so broadly phrased that though they may well 
be universally applicable, they do not offer much in the way of guidance as to how 
conflict should actually be managed. The contrapunctual principles—the interface 
norms of contrapunctual law—did not therefore form a key part of the analysis of the 
thesis. 
The ‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’ of Mattias Kumm, however, makes rather 
stronger claims, justifying its being placed at the centre of the analysis. For Kumm, 
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four freestanding, external, metaconstitutional interface norms can be, and ought to 
be, applied in regulating the relationships between legal orders. First is the principle 
of legality, which establishes a rebuttable presumption that the norms of the more 
encompassing legal order should be applied, notwithstanding the conflicting 
demands of the less encompassing order. The principles justifying the rebuttal of the 
presumption are then threefold: the principles of subsidiarity; democratic legitimacy 
(which in actual effect amounts to the protection of national specificity); and the 
protection of fundamental rights (which similarly amounts to a recitation of the 
Solange principle of conditional recognition). 
Chapter 1 then concluded by considering two problems of these 
metaconstitutional pluralisms. First was the accusation that any kind of constitutional 
pluralism, metaconstitutional or otherwise, is necessarily destructive to the rule of 
law. Put most forcefully by Julio Baquero Cruz, this criticism, if true, would be fatal. 
However, I suggested that the objection is overstated, and that while it may serve us 
well as a warning not to become too attached to the notion of constitutional 
heterarchy, it is not a trump, forcing us always to retreat into hierarchy. 
The second problem formed the research question of the thesis: the assumption in 
the literature that metaconstitutional interface norms are universally applicable by 
nature, and are the same regardless of the orders in question or the subject matter. 
This claim is explicit in Kumm’s work, and implicit in that of Maduro. However, 
these theories were developed with reference to a quite limited range of European—
and particularly German—jurisprudence, and it appeared at least arguable that when 
broadened to take into account the relations between the EU and other Member 
States, and the relationship between the EU and the ECHR, the principles may not in 
fact be fit for the purpose of regulating inter-order relationships, at least not without 
considerable modification to take into account jurisdictional circumstance, taking 
them far beyond their freestanding origins. 
Accordingly, the thesis then proceeded to analyse these interface norms—and 
particularly Kumm’s principles of cosmopolitan constitutionalism—in light of the 
triangular constitutional relationship between Ireland, the EU, and the ECHR. 
Chapter 2 parsed this relationship in the ‘vertical’ frame, outlining the particular 
way in which the Irish legal order relates to those of the EU and the ECHR; the 
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means by which the norms of these European orders become effective within Ireland; 
and the actual historical experience of conflict between them. In the case of the EU, 
it was argued that the orthodox account of Irish constitutional law being subordinated 
to that of the EU by means of the constitutional ‘exclusion clause’ is both 
unprincipled on its own terms and contradicted by actual practice. Accordingly, we 
need not view the relationship as being hierarchical, and the possibility of the two 
orders being polyarchic in nature is preserved. In the regulation of this polyarchy, we 
find principles being applied that do bear a certain basic, low-level resemblance to 
those posited by Kumm. However, these principles—conditional recognition, 
democratic legitimacy—in their actual application are highly jurisdictionally 
specific, and, what is more, they are expressly constitutional rather than 
metaconstitutional in nature. They could not therefore be applied universally without 
stripping them of the specific normative content by which they performed the task of 
regulating the relationships between legal orders. 
The relationship between Ireland and the ECHR is different, as one might expect 
given the differing natures and purposes of the two European legal orders. Having 
been incorporated at the sub-constitutional level, the interface norms regulating the 
relationship are neither constitutional nor metaconstitutional, but in fact legislative. 
Being products of the national political system, they therefore could not be universal 
in application, and bear little resemblance to Kumm’s principles of cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism. 
Chapter 3 considered matters in the ‘horizontal’ frame, dealing with the 
relationship between the EU and the ECHR. This is a dynamic relationship, which 
has changed over time and will continue to do so, at least until the EU completes its 
accession to the ECHR. Initially an instance of mere comity between non-state 
courts, the relationship has been progressively formalised and institutionalised. 
While the specific interface norms regulating the relationship—particularly the 
principle of legality on the part of the ECJ and that of conditional recognition on the 
part of the ECtHR—are directly comparable to those posited by Kumm, their actual 
operation in the non-state sphere is much more than the simple transposition of 
norms developed with reference to the EU-Member State relationship. Given the 
differences in the field of application, the formulation of the interface norms at work 
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must be modified accordingly. We therefore found the principles of legality and 
condition recognition being employed in the dialogic reconciliation of two 
conflicting aims: the preservation of each order’s autonomy and prerogatives; while 
still respecting those of the counterpart non-state order. However, this 
(metaconstitutional) reconciliation is currently challenged by the disconnect between 
the two European orders’ approaches to labour rights—a disconnect that may remain 
unresolved until the EU’s accession to the Convention is complete, when the terms 
of engagement between the orders will shift from the metaconstitutional to the 
constitutional, as set out in the Treaties, the Charter, and the Accession Agreement. 
Chapter 4 then broadened the focus jurisdictionally and narrowed the focus 
jurisprudentially, taking as its case study the various instances of polyarchic 
deliberation on the question of the legal status of abortion in Ireland. In this 
‘triangular’ frame, we ran up against the limits of metaconstitutional methods of 
conflict management in two cases, where conflict between the state and non-state 
legal orders could only be resolved by the amendment of the national Constitution. 
That the various rights at issue, particularly that of freedom of expression, came into 
play as differing requirements of the EU legal order and that of the Convention 
demonstrate what Sabel and Gerstenberg meant by overlapping consensus, where the 
same fundamental notion receives similar, but only partially concordant, protection 
in different legal orders, and the gaps between these conceptions must be bridged. 
Though the means employed to bridge these gaps—judicial (re)interpretation, 
legislation, constitutional amendment—can be placed in broad metaconstitutional 
categories, their particular manifestations in actual practice were historically 
contingent and jurisdictionally specific. 
Accordingly, it was submitted in Chapter 5 that close study of the triangular 
constitution of Ireland, the EU and the ECHR seriously calls into question the 
universality of metaconstitutional interface norms. It is perfectly possible to place the 
various means—metaconstitutional, constitutional, and legislative—by which 
polyarchically-arranged legal orders manages their interrelations in broad categories, 
but these categories are then so loose and general in their formulation that they 
cannot serve as action-guiding rules and principles. When concretised in actual 
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cases, these interface norms then become too jurisdictionally specific to re-generalise 
across the European legal sphere. 
Therefore, while it is indeed possible to constitutionalise the plural or to pluralise 
the constitutional; under such a reconciled, polyarchic legal regime, the universal and 
the particular seem to remain stubbornly separate. This finding highlights the 
importance of continued, close, careful analysis of the intricacies of the individual 
cases that make up the jurisprudence of the European polyarchy, and the intricacies 
of the individual jurisdictions from which they arise. The polyarchy is not an 
indivisible whole, and cannot be analysed as one. Rather, to the extent that the 
universal exists, it must be shaped by reference to the particular.
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